Dr Sophie Gibb, BA, MA, PhD
Sophie Gibb is Reader in the Department of Philosophy, University of Durham. Her research interests lie within contemporary metaphysics (in particular, ontology) and the philosophy of mind (in particular, the mental causation debate). Her current central research topics are concerned with the ontology of the mental causation debate, dualist accounts of psychophysical causation, the powers theory of causation and the trope/ universal debate.
Research Grants and Awards
- Principal investigator in an AHRC-funded two-year project (£165,000) on 'The New Ontology of the Mental Causation Debate' (co-investigator Professor E. J. Lowe, Durham University), 2008-10.
- Investigator (and leader of the philosophy of mind work group) in a John Templeton Foundation funded three-year project (£1.6 million approx.) on emergence (project leader Professor Robin Hendry, Durham University), 2013-present.
- Principal Investigator for an AHRC Network Grant, 'Emergence: Where is the Evidence?' (co-investigator Professor Robin Hendry, Durham University), Dec. 2014-present.
Sophie Gibb's research is primarily concerned with the following areas of contemporary metaphysics and the philosophy of mind and she would welcome enquiries from students wishing to pursue PhDs in any of them:
- The categories of being, in particular, the nature of properties
- Causation, laws and powers
- The mental causation debate, in particular, the ontology of the mental causation debate.
- Chair of the Board of Examiners
- Director of the Mind, Language and Metaphysics Research Group
- Mind, Language and Metaphysics
- Gibb, S. C., Lowe, E. J. & Ingthorsson, R. D. (2013). Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gibb, S. C. (2012). 'Tropes: Objects, Properties and Mental Causation' by D. Ehring. Analysis 72(4): 850-851.
- Gibb, S.C. (2009). 'Physical Realization' by Sydney Shoemaker. Mind 118(469): 207-211.
- Gibb, S. C. (2009). 'The Mind in Nature' by C. B. Martin. Analysis 69(2): 386-388.
- Gibb, S. C. (2005). 'Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again' by M. Rowlands. Philosophical Books 46(3): 282-284.
Essays in edited volumes
- Gibb, S.C. (Forthcoming). Trope Simplicity. In Substance: New Essays. Garcia, R. Philosophia Verlag.
- Gibb, S.C. (Forthcoming). Tropes and the Generality of Laws. In The Problem of Universals in Contemporary Philosophy. Galluzzo, G. & Loux, M. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gibb, S. C. (2013). Introduction. In Mental Causation and Ontology. Gibb, S. C., Lowe, E. J. & Ingthorsson, R. D. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1-17.
- Gibb, S.C. (2013). Mental Causation and Double Prevention. In Mental Causation and Ontology. Gibb, S.C., Lowe, E.J. & Ingthorsson, R.D. Oxford Oxford University Press. 193-214.
Journal papers: academic
- Gibb, S. C. (Forthcoming). Defending Dualism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
- Gibb, S. C. (Forthcoming). The Causal Closure Principle. The Philosophical Quarterly
- Gibb, S. C. (2015). Physical Determinability. Humana Mente (Special edition on Causation and Mental Causation)
- Gibb, S. C. (2014). Mental Causation. Analysis 74(2): 327-338.
- Gibb, S. C. (2014). The Entailment Problem and the Subset Account of Property Realization. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92(3): 551-566.
- Gibb, S. C. (2013). The Causal Criterion of Property Identity and the Substraction of Powers. Erkenntnis 79(1): 127-146.
- Gibb, S. C. (2012). Non-reductive physicalism and the problem of strong closure. American Philosophical Quarterly 49(1): 29-42.
- Gibb, S.C. (2010). Causal Closure Principles and the Laws of Conservation of Energy and Momentum. Dialectica 64(3): 363-384.
- Gibb, S.C. (2009). Explanatory Exclusion and Causal Exclusion. Erkenntnis 71(2): 205-221.
- Gibb, S.C. (2007). Is the Partial Identity Account of Property Resemblance Logically Incoherent? Dialectica 61(4): 539-558 (Awarded the Dialectica Annual Essay Prize).
- Gibb, S.C. (2006). Space, Supervenience and Entailment. Philosophical Papers 35(2): 173-186.
- Gibb, S.C. (2006). Why Davidson is not a Property Epiphenomenalist. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14(3): 407-422.
- Gibb, S.C. (2004). The Problem of Mental Causation and the Nature of Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82(3): 464-476.