Staff profile

Administrative Roles

Deputy Director of Philosophy MA

Director of Philosophy Graduate Diploma

I was born in Kirkby-in-Ashfield, Nottinghamshire, where I attended Ashfield School and Sixth Form. After being inspired by Descartes, I studied Philosophy at the University of York, where I graduated with first class BA honours. I stayed on for the MA in Philosophy at York, before receiving a PhD scholarship at the University of Nottingham as part of the AHRC Metaphysics of Science Project, led by Helen Beebee, Alexander Bird, and Stephen Mumford. I wrote a doctoral thesis about the metaphysics of dispositions, supervised by Stephen Mumford and D. M. Armstrong. After passing the PhD, I worked for three years as Teaching Fellow at the University of Birmingham. I then moved to Durham University in 2013, to take up the post of Lecturer in Philosophy. I have been at Durham ever since and became Professor of Philosophy in 2022. 

Office Hours

Thursdays (term-time only), 11.00-14.00 in room 206, 51 Old Elvet (or online on request)

Research Interests

My core philosophical interests lie in the metaphysics of science and I publish mainly on the topics of properties, dispositions, laws, causation and teleology. I argue that properties are metaphysically fundamental and can help to explain many other metaphysical phenomena such as causation, dispositions, laws, modality, and teleology. I am a Platonic realist about properties and my recent work focuses on how to motivate a Platonic metaphysics by reflecting on science and modality. This work is published in my 2022 monograph Putting Properties First: A Platonic Metaphysics for Natural Modality (Oxford: Oxford University Press). This research was supported by a Mind Association Research Fellowship. More recently, I have written a short book called Teleology for the Cambridge Elements series (to be published in 2024). 

I enjoy supervising research students and I have supervised 10 PhD projects to completion, on topics including identity, laws, mental causation, monism, powers, properties, reduction in economics, structural realism, teleology, and time.

• Metaphysics (especially the topics of essence, identity and individuation, modality, ontological dependence, properties and substance)
• Metaphysics of Science (especially the topics of causation, chance, dispositions, laws and natural kinds)

Authored book

• Tugby, M. (2022). Putting Properties First: A Platonic Metaphysics for Natural Modality. Oxford University Press

Chapter in book

• Guo, X., & Tugby, M. (2023). Collective Powers. In C. J. Austin, A. Marmodoro, & A. Roselli (Eds.), Powers, Parts and Wholes: Essays on the Mereology of Powers (142-166). New York and Abingdon: Oxon: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003298830-11
• Alvarado, J. T., & Tugby, M. (2021). A Problem for Natural-Kind Essentialism and Formal Causes. In L. Jansen, & P. Sandstad (Eds.), Neo-Aristotelian perspectives on formal causation (201-221). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429329821
• Tugby, M. (2020). Atoms as Universals. In U. Zilioli (Ed.), Atomism in philosophy: A history from antiquity to the present (387-399). Bloomsbury Academic
• Tugby, M. (2020). Organic Powers. In A. S. Meincke (Ed.), Dispositionalism : perspectives from metaphysics and the philosophy of science (213-238). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28722-1_13
• Hamilton, A., Macarthur, D., Squires, R., Tugby, M., & Wiseman, R. (2019). Dialogue on Rhythm: Entrainment and the Dynamic Thesis. In P. Cheyne, A. Hamilton, & M. Paddison (Eds.), The philosophy of rhythm : aesthetics, music, poetics (15-42). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199347773.003.0002
• Tugby, M. (2016). What Are Dispositional Properties?. In M. Jago (Ed.), Reality making (75-98). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780198755722.003.0005
• Tugby, M. (2016). Mirage Realism Revisited. In F. F. Calemi (Ed.), Metaphysics and scientific realism : essays in honour of David Malet Armstrong (13-30). De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110455915-002
• Mumford, S., & Tugby, M. (2013). What Is the Metaphysics of Science?. In S. Mumford, & M. Tugby (Eds.), Metaphysics and science (3-28). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780199674527.003.0001
• Tugby, M. (2012). The Metaphysics of Pan-dispositionalism. In A. Bird, B. Ellis, & H. Sankey (Eds.), Properties, powers, and structures : issues in the metaphysics of realism (165-179). Routledge

Edited book

• Mumford, S., & Tugby, M. (Eds.). (2013). Metaphysics and Science. Oxford University Press

Journal Article

• Tugby, M. (2022). The Laws of Modality. Philosophical Studies, 179(8), 2597-2618. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-022-01789-3
• Tugby, M. (2022). Dispositional realism without dispositional essences. Synthese, 200(3), Article 222. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03554-9
• Tugby, M. (2021). Grounding theories of powers. Synthese, 198(12), 11187-11216. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02781-2
• Tugby, M. (2021). Abduction and the Scientific Realist Case for Properties. Grazer philosophische Studien, 98(1), 123-145. https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000112
• Giannini, G., & Tugby, M. (2020). Potentiality: actualism minus naturalism equals platonism. Philosophical inquiries, 8(1), 117-140. https://doi.org/10.4454/philinq.v8i1.278
• Tugby, M. (2018). Modal Platonism and the Problem of Negativity. Erkenntnis, 83(3), 465-476. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9898-y
• Tugby, M. (2017). Power Worlds and the Problem of Individuation. American Philosophical Quarterly, 54(3), 269-281
• Tugby, M. (2016). On the Reality of Intrinsically Finkable Dispositions. Philosophia, 44(2), 623-631. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9713-z
• Tugby, M. (2016). The Problem of Retention. Synthese, 194(6), 2053-2075. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1036-x
• Tugby, M. (2015). Universals, Laws, and Governance. Philosophical Studies, 173(5), 1147-1163. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0521-2
• Tugby, M. (2015). The Alien Paradox. Analysis, 75(1), 28-37. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anu113
• Tugby, M. (2014). Categoricalism, Dispositionalism, and the Epistemology of Properties. Synthese, 191(6), 1147-1162. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0316-y
• Tugby, M. (2013). Nomic Necessity for Platonists. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2(4), 324-331. https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.99
• Tugby, M. (2013). Graph-theoretic Models of Dispositional Structures. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 27(1), 23-39. https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2013.783979
• Tugby, M. (2013). Causal Nominalism and the One Over Many Problem. Analysis, 73(3), 455-462. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ant038
• Tugby, M. (2013). Platonic Dispositionalism. Mind, 122(486), 451-480. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzt071
• Tugby, M. (2012). Rescuing Dispositionalism from the Ultimate Problem: Reply to Barker and Smart. Analysis, 72(4), 723-731. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ans112
• Tugby, M. (2010). Simultaneity in Dispositional Interaction?. Ratio: An international journal of analytic philosophy, 23(3), 322-338. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2010.00470.x