Publication details for Dr Benedict SmithSmith, Benedict (2019). Hume on Belief and Vindicatory Explanations. Philosophy 94(2): 313-337.
- Publication type: Journal Article
- ISSN/ISBN: 0031-8191, 1469-817X
- DOI: 10.1017/S0031819119000111
- Further publication details on publisher web site
- Durham Research Online (DRO) - may include full text
Author(s) from Durham
Hume's account of belief is understood to be inspired by allegedly incompatible motivations, one descriptive and expressing Hume's naturalism, the other normative and expressing Hume's epistemological aims. This understanding assumes a particular way in which these elements are distinct: an assumption that I dispute. I suggest that the explanatory-naturalistic aspects of Hume's account of belief are not incompatible with the normative-epistemological aspects. Rather, at least for some central cases of belief formation that Hume discusses at length, S's coming to believe that p can be explained in a way that vindicates S's belief that p.