Publication details for Dr David FaraciFaraci, David (2019). Moral Perception and the Reliability Challenge. Journal of Moral Philosophy 16(1): 63-73.
- Publication type: Journal Article
- ISSN/ISBN: 1740-4681 (print), 1745-5243 (electronic)
- DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20170002
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Author(s) from Durham
Given a traditional intuitionist moral epistemology, it is notoriously difficult for moral realists to explain the reliability of our moral beliefs. This has led some to go looking for an alternative to intuitionism. Perception is an obvious contender. I previously argued that this is a dead end, that all moral perception is dependent on a priori moral knowledge. This suggests that perceptualism merely moves the bump in the rug where the reliability challenge is concerned. Preston Werner responds that my account rests on an overly intellectualized model of perception. In this paper, I argue that though Werner may well be correct, my arguments, properly extended, still suggest that perceptualism leaves realists in no better position than intuitionism when it comes to the reliability challenge.