Publication details for Dr Matthew TugbyTugby, Matthew (2013). Platonic Dispositionalism. Mind 122(486): 451-480.
- Publication type: Journal Article
- ISSN/ISBN: 0026-4423 (print), 1460-2113 (electronic)
- DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzt071
- Further publication details on publisher web site
- Durham Research Online (DRO) - may include full text
Author(s) from Durham
In this paper I argue that if one subscribes to dispositionalism — the view that natural properties are irreducibly dispositional in character — then one ought to favour a Platonic view of properties. That is, dispositionalists ought to view properties as transcendent universals. I argue for this on the grounds that only with transcendent universals in play can two central dispositionalist platitudes be accounted for in a satisfactory way. Given that dispositionalism is becoming an increasingly influential view in the metaphysics of science, my argument, if successful, suggests that Platonism will see something of a revival in contemporary metaphysics. This new kind of Platonism is shown to have some striking metaphysical and epistemological consequences.