Dr Christopher Cowie
(email at firstname.lastname@example.org)
I work in Moral and Political Philosophy, and Epistemology. I am especially interested in the Moral Error Theory and the study of Axiology, Population and Welfare.
I have two new books: one on the moral error theory - Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The Argument From Analogy - published by Oxford University Press, and another on population axiology - The Repugnant Conclusion: A Philosophical Inquiry - published by Routledge. A recent collection edited by myself and Richard Rowland, Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics was published earlier this year.
My current projects are on the nature of significance, the metaethical importance of axiological impossibilty theorems, and the extinction of the human race. I am also trying to run a Philosophy Department football team. I will be on research leave at Stanford this Ephiphany Term.
Prior to coming to Durham, I was a Research Fellow at the University of Cambridge and a post-doc for Sir Prof Partha Dasgupta. I took my PhD at Cambridge under the supervision of Professor Hallvard Lillehammer, graduating in 2014, including a visiting scholarship at Princeton. My cv is available here.
I will be giving talks at Frankfurt, Nottingham and Oxford this term.
- Moral Philosophy
- Political Philosophy
- Ethics (MA)
- Moral Theory
- Political Philosophy
- (2019). Moral and Epistemic Judgment: The Argument from Analogy. Oxford University Press.
- (2019). The Repugnant Conclusion: A Philosophical Inquiry. Routledge.
Chapter in book
- Cowie, Christopher & Rowland, Richard (Published). Introduction. In Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Routledge.
- Cowie, Christopher (Published). The Similarity Hypothesis in Metaethics. In Methodology and Moral Philosophy. Suikkanen, Jussi & Kauppinen, Antti Routledge. 127-147.
- Cowie, Christopher. (2019). Contemporary Work on Debunking Arguments in Ethics and Mathematics. In Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Routledge.
- Cowie, Christopher & Greenberg, Alexander (2018). Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity. In Metaepistemology: Realism and Anti-Realism. Kyriacou, Christos & McKenna, Robin Palgrave Macmillan. 173-196.
- Christopher Cowie & Richard Rowland (2019). Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Routledge.
- Cowie, Christopher (2019). Do Constitutive Norms on Belief Explain Moore's Paradox?. Philosophical Studies
- Cowie, Christopher (2018). Companions in Guilt Arguments. Philosophy Compass 13(11): e12528.
- Schleicher, Judith, Schaafsma, Marije, Burgess, Neil D., Sandbrook, Chris, Danks, Fiona, Cowie, Chris & Vira, Bhaskar (2018). Poorer without It? The Neglected Role of the Natural Environment in Poverty and Wellbeing. Sustainable Development 26(1): 83-98.
- Cowie, Christopher (2017). Does the repugnant conclusion have any probative force?. Philosophical Studies 174(12): 3021-3039.
- Cowie, Christopher (2016). Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94(1): 115-130.
- Greenberg, Alexander & Cowie, Christopher (2016). Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
- Cowie, Christopher (2016). Revisionist Responses to the Amoralism Objection: A Reply to Julia Markovits. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19(3): 711.
- Cowie, Christopher (2015). Conservatism in Metaethics: A Case Study. Metaphilosophy 46(4-5): 605-619.
- Cowie, Christopher (2014). A New Explanatory Challenge for Nonnaturalists. Res Philosophica 91(4): 661-679.
- Cowie, Christopher (2014). Epistemic Disagreement and Practical Disagreement. Erkenntnis 79(1): 191-209.
- Cowie, Christopher (2014). In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity. Synthese 191(16): 4003-4017.
- Cowie, C. (2014). Why Companions in Guilt Arguments Won't Work. The Philosophical Quarterly 64(256): 407-422.