Dr Christopher Cowie
(email at firstname.lastname@example.org)
I work in Moral and Political Philosophy, and Epistemology. I am especially interested in the Moral Error Theory and the study of Axiology, Population and Welfare.
I have two new books: one on the moral error theory - Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The Argument From Analogy - published by Oxford University Press, and another on population axiology - The Repugnant Conclusion: A Philosophical Inquiry - published by Routledge. A recent collection edited by myself and Richard Rowland, Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics was published earlier this year.
Prior to coming to Durham, I was a Research Fellow at the University of Cambridge and a post-doc for Sir Prof Partha Dasgupta. I took my PhD at Cambridge under the supervision of Professor Hallvard Lillehammer, graduating in 2014, including a visiting scholarship at Princeton.
For details of my research and teaching see my personal website.
I will be giving talks at Frankfurt, Nottingham and Oxford this term.
- Moral Philosophy
- Political Philosophy
- Ethics (MA)
- Moral Theory
- Political Philosophy
- Cowie, Christopher (2019). Morality and Epistemic Judgement: The Argument from Analogy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cowie, Christopher (2019). The Repugnant Conclusion: A Philosophical Inquiry. Routledge.
Chapter in book
- Cowie, Christopher (Published). The Similarity Hypothesis in Metaethics. In Methodology and Moral Philosophy. Suikkanen, Jussi & Kauppinen, Antti Routledge. 127-147.
- Cowie, Christopher & Rowland, Richard (2020). Introduction. In Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. London: Routledge. 1-16.
- Cowie, Christopher. (2019). Contemporary Work on Debunking Arguments in Ethics and Mathematics. In Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Routledge.
- Cowie, Christopher & Greenberg, Alexander (2018). Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity. In Metaepistemology: Realism and Anti-Realism. Kyriacou, Christos & McKenna, Robin Palgrave Macmillan. 173-196.
- Christopher Cowie & Richard Rowland (2019). Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Routledge.
- Cowie, Christopher (2020). Do Constitutive Norms on Belief Explain Moore's Paradox?. Philosophical Studies 177(6): 1685-1702.
- Cowie, Christopher (2018). Companions in Guilt Arguments. Philosophy Compass 13(11): e12528.
- Schleicher, Judith, Schaafsma, Marije, Burgess, Neil D., Sandbrook, Chris, Danks, Fiona, Cowie, Chris & Vira, Bhaskar (2018). Poorer without It? The Neglected Role of the Natural Environment in Poverty and Wellbeing. Sustainable Development 26(1): 83-98.
- Cowie, Christopher (2017). Does the repugnant conclusion have any probative force?. Philosophical Studies 174(12): 3021-3039.
- Cowie, Christopher (2016). Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94(1): 115-130.
- Greenberg, Alexander & Cowie, Christopher (2016). Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
- Cowie, Christopher (2016). Revisionist Responses to the Amoralism Objection: A Reply to Julia Markovits. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19(3): 711.
- Cowie, Christopher (2015). Conservatism in Metaethics: A Case Study. Metaphilosophy 46(4-5): 605-619.
- Cowie, Christopher (2014). A New Explanatory Challenge for Nonnaturalists. Res Philosophica 91(4): 661-679.
- Cowie, Christopher (2014). Epistemic Disagreement and Practical Disagreement. Erkenntnis 79(1): 191-209.
- Cowie, Christopher (2014). In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity. Synthese 191(16): 4003-4017.
- Cowie, C. (2014). Why Companions in Guilt Arguments Won't Work. The Philosophical Quarterly 64(256): 407-422.