Dr Christopher Cowie
(email at email@example.com)
- Admissions Tutor (UG)
- Co-Director of Ethics Research Cluster
In term time, Tuesdays 2-5pm, or by appointment. Rm 004 Old Elvet 50-51.
I work in moral philosophy. I am interested in the nature of moral norms and standards. Why we should care about them? How, if at all, can we think systematically about them?
I have just finished a manuscript on the relationship between morality and epistemology: Moral Judgment and Epistemic Judgment: The Argument from Analogy, now under contract with OUP. If you would like to read it, please email me. I'm happy to send a draft. Many of the issues are discussed in prior pieces in Philosophical Quarterly, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Synthese and in collections (see below).
I am also currently co-editing a collection on a similar theme – Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics – with Richard Rowland. This will be forthcoming shortly. For a summary of the kinds of issues discussed in that collection see my Philosophy Compass piece (below).
I also work on more traditional issues in Moral Philosophy. I have published on measures of welfare – in Sustainable Development - and on axiology – in Philosophical Studies. I will be focusing on this side of things a bit more over the next few years: I am currently writing a book on The Repugnant Conclusion for Routledge’s Focus on Philosophy series. I am especially interested in how traditional questions in population and axiology interact with questions about the quality of human life: Are our lives, on balance good for us or bad for us? How would you tell? Do these questions even make sense?
Prior to coming to Durham, I was a Research Fellow at Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge. I took my PhD at Cambridge under the supervision of Professor Hallvard Lillehammer, graduating in 2014.
Upcoming Talks (2018/19)
- Morality, Epistemic Judgmentand Kinds of Probability. Invited Seminar. University of Cyprus. September 2018.
- Moral Theory and Population Axiology. Santa Fe Institute Workshop on Demography and Applied Population Ethics. October 2018.
- Title TBC. Pre-Read Seminar. University of Edinburgh. November 2018.
- Title TBC. Departmental Seminar. University of Sheffield. March 2019.
- Moral Philosophy
- Political Philosophy
- Ethics (MA)
- Moral Theory
- Political Philosophy
- (Forthcoming). Moral and Epistemic Judgment: The Argument from Analogy. (Under Contract with Oxford University Press).
- (Forthcoming). The Repugnant Conclusion (Under contract with Routledge).
Chapter in book
- Jussi Suikkanen (Forthcoming). Metanormativity as a Method. In Methodology and Moral Philosophy. Routledge.
- Cowie, Christopher & Greenberg, Alexander (2018). Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity. In Epistemic Realism and Antirealism: Approaches to Metaepistemology. McKenna, Robin & Kyriacou, Christos Palgrave Macmillan.
- Christopher Cowie & Richard Rowland (Forthcoming). Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics (Under contract with Routledge).
- Cowie, Christopher (2018). Companions in Guilt Arguments. Philosophy Compass 13(11): e12528.
- Schleicher, Judith, Schaafsma, Marije, Burgess, Neil D., Sandbrook, Chris, Danks, Fiona, Cowie, Chris & Vira, Bhaskar (2018). Poorer without It? The Neglected Role of the Natural Environment in Poverty and Wellbeing. Sustainable Development 26(1): 83-98.
- Cowie, Christopher (2017). Does the repugnant conclusion have any probative force?. Philosophical Studies 174(12): 3021-3039.
- Cowie, Christopher (2016). Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94(1): 115-130.
- Greenberg, Alexander & Cowie, Christopher (2016). Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
- Cowie, Christopher (2016). Revisionist Responses to the Amoralism Objection: A Reply to Julia Markovits. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19(3): 711.
- Cowie, Christopher (2015). Conservatism in Metaethics: A Case Study. Metaphilosophy 46(4-5): 605-619.
- Cowie, Christopher (2014). A New Explanatory Challenge for Nonnaturalists. Res Philosophica 91(4): 661-679.
- Cowie, Christopher (2014). Epistemic Disagreement and Practical Disagreement. Erkenntnis 79(1): 191-209.
- Cowie, Christopher (2014). In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity. Synthese 191(16): 4003-4017.
- Cowie, C. (2014). Why Companions in Guilt Arguments Won't Work. The Philosophical Quarterly 64(256): 407-422.