Dr Christopher Cowie
In term time, Tuesdays 2-5pm, or by appointment. Rm 004 Old Elvet 50-51.
I work in moral philosophy. I am interested in the nature of moral norms and standards. Why we should care about them? How, if at all, can we think systematically about them?
I have just finished a manuscript on the relationship between morality and epistemology: ‘Moral Judgment and Epistemic Judgment: The Argument from Analogy’. If you would like to read it, please email me. Many of the issues are discussed in prior pieces in Philosophical Quarterly, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Synthese and in collections (see below). I am also currently co-editing a collection on a similar theme – Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics – with Richard Rowland. This will be forthcoming shortly. For a summary of the kinds of issues discussed in that collection see my Philosophy Compass piece (below).
I also work on more traditional issues in Moral Philosophy. I have published on measures of welfare – in Sustainable Development - and on axiology – in Philosophical Studies. I will be focusing on this side of things a bit more over the next few years: I am currently writing a book on The Repugnant Conclusion for Routledge’s Focus on Philosophy series. I am especially interested in how traditional questions in population and axiology interact with questions about the quality of human life: Are our lives, on balance good for us or bad for us? How would you tell? Do these questions even make sense?
Prior to coming to Durham, I was a Research Fellow at Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge. I took my PhD at Cambridge under the supervision of Professor Hallvard Lillehammer, graduating in 2014.
- Moral Philosophy
- Political Philosophy
- Moral Theory
- Political Philosophy
- (Planned). Moral and Epistemic Judgment: The Argument from Analogy.
- (Forthcoming). The Repugnant Conclusion (Under contract with Routledge).
Chapter in book
- Cowie, Christopher & Greenberg, Alexander (Forthcoming). Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity. In Epistemic Realism and Antirealism: Approaches to Metaepistemology. McKenna, Robin & Kyriacou, Christos Palgrave Macmillan.
- Jussi Suikkanen (Forthcoming). Metanormativity as a Method. In Methodology and Moral Philosophy. Routledge.
- Christopher Cowie & Richard Rowland (Forthcoming). Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics (Under contract with Routledge).
- Cowie, Christopher (2018). Companions in Guilt Arguments. Philosophy Compass e12528.
- Schleicher, Judith, Schaafsma, Marije, Burgess, Neil D., Sandbrook, Chris, Danks, Fiona, Cowie, Chris & Vira, Bhaskar (2018). Poorer without It? The Neglected Role of the Natural Environment in Poverty and Wellbeing. Sustainable Development 26(1): 83-98.
- Cowie, Christopher (2017). Does the repugnant conclusion have any probative force?. Philosophical Studies 174(12): 3021-3039.
- Cowie, Christopher (2016). Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94(1): 115-130.
- Greenberg, Alexander & Cowie, Christopher (2016). Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
- Cowie, Christopher (2016). Revisionist Responses to the Amoralism Objection: A Reply to Julia Markovits. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19(3): 711.
- Cowie, Christopher (2015). Conservatism in Metaethics: A Case Study. Metaphilosophy 46(4-5): 605-619.
- Cowie, Christopher (2014). A New Explanatory Challenge for Nonnaturalists. Res Philosophica 91(4): 661-679.
- Cowie, Christopher (2014). Epistemic Disagreement and Practical Disagreement. Erkenntnis 79(1): 191-209.
- Cowie, Christopher (2014). In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity. Synthese 191(16): 4003-4017.
- Cowie, C. (2014). Why Companions in Guilt Arguments Won't Work. The Philosophical Quarterly 64(256): 407-422.