Dr Christopher Cowie
(email at firstname.lastname@example.org)
I work in Moral Philosophy, understood in the broadest sense. I am interested in whether we can think systematically about value, obligation and reason. For a full list of my publications see my cv.
I have spent much of the last few years working on a manuscript about the moral error theory: the view that all moral judgments are mistaken. It is entitled Moral Judgment and Epistemic Judgment: The Argument from Analogy. It will be published by Oxford University Press. You can read the introduction here. Contact me if you would like to read a full draft.
I also work in population axiology. I am currently finishing up a manuscript entitled The Repugnant Conclusion: A Philosophical Inquiry, due to be be published by Routledge. It is about how we should evaluate outcomes in which both the distributon of welfare and the number of people are varied. A summary is available here. I have also just finished co-editing a collection on methodology in metaethics (with Richard Rowland), Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics, to be published by Routledge.
Over the next few years I would like to think about: whether our extinction will be a bad thing, how, if at all, we should think about 'absolute' quality of life, and 'first order' arguments for the moral error theory. I would also like to organise a Philosophy Department football team. I probably can't manage all of these, but I've got research leave next year so I'll do my best.
Prior to coming to Durham, I was a Research Fellow at Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge. I took my PhD at Cambridge under the supervision of Professor Hallvard Lillehammer, graduating in 2014, including a visiting scholarship at Princeton. Whilst at Cambridge I was also, briefly, a post-doc for Sir Prof Partha Dasgupta.
- Morality and Epistemic Judgment. Colloqium Talk. University of Zurich. April 2019.
- The Repugnant Conclusion and Quality of Life. British Society for Ethical Theory. Univeristy of Glasgow. July 2019.
- Title TBC. Department Seminar. University of Nottingham. 2019/20.
- Moral Philosophy
- Political Philosophy
- Ethics (MA)
- Moral Theory
- Political Philosophy
- (Forthcoming). Moral and Epistemic Judgment: The Argument from Analogy. (Under Contract with Oxford University Press).
- (Forthcoming). The Repugnant Conclusion (Under contract with Routledge).
Chapter in book
- Cowie, Christopher (Published). The Similarity Hypothesis in Metaethics. In Methodology and Moral Philosophy. Suikkanen, Jussi & Kauppinen, Antti Routledge. 127-147.
- Cowie, Christopher & Greenberg, Alexander (2018). Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity. In Metaepistemology: Realism and Anti-Realism. Kyriacou, Christos & McKenna, Robin Palgrave Macmillan. 173-196.
- Christopher Cowie & Richard Rowland (Forthcoming). Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics (Under contract with Routledge).
- Cowie, Christopher (2019). Do Constitutive Norms on Belief Explain Moore's Paradox?. Philosophical Studies
- Cowie, Christopher (2018). Companions in Guilt Arguments. Philosophy Compass 13(11): e12528.
- Schleicher, Judith, Schaafsma, Marije, Burgess, Neil D., Sandbrook, Chris, Danks, Fiona, Cowie, Chris & Vira, Bhaskar (2018). Poorer without It? The Neglected Role of the Natural Environment in Poverty and Wellbeing. Sustainable Development 26(1): 83-98.
- Cowie, Christopher (2017). Does the repugnant conclusion have any probative force?. Philosophical Studies 174(12): 3021-3039.
- Cowie, Christopher (2016). Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94(1): 115-130.
- Greenberg, Alexander & Cowie, Christopher (2016). Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
- Cowie, Christopher (2016). Revisionist Responses to the Amoralism Objection: A Reply to Julia Markovits. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19(3): 711.
- Cowie, Christopher (2015). Conservatism in Metaethics: A Case Study. Metaphilosophy 46(4-5): 605-619.
- Cowie, Christopher (2014). A New Explanatory Challenge for Nonnaturalists. Res Philosophica 91(4): 661-679.
- Cowie, Christopher (2014). Epistemic Disagreement and Practical Disagreement. Erkenntnis 79(1): 191-209.
- Cowie, Christopher (2014). In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity. Synthese 191(16): 4003-4017.
- Cowie, C. (2014). Why Companions in Guilt Arguments Won't Work. The Philosophical Quarterly 64(256): 407-422.