Dr Christopher Cowie
(email at email@example.com)
I work in Moral Philosophy. I am interested in whether we can think systematically about value, obligation and reason and, if so, how far it can take us.
I have recently completed a manuscript about the moral error theory: the view that all moral judgments are mistaken. It is entitled Moral Judgment and Epistemic Judgment: The Argument from Analogy. It will be published by Oxford University Press later this year. It is available here and summarised on my personal webpage. An edited collection on a similar theme Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics (with Richard Rowland) is forthcoming with Routledge and available here. A second manuscript entitled The Repugnant Conclusion: A Philosophical Inquiry is due to be be published by Routledge shortly. It is about how we should evaluate outcomes in which the number of people are varied. A full draft is available here. For a full list of my publications see my cv.
Over the next few years I would like to think about: whether our extinction will be a bad thing, how, if at all, we should think about 'absolute' quality of life, and 'first order' arguments for the moral error theory. I would also like to organise a Philosophy Department football team. I probably can't manage all of these, but I've got research leave next year so I'll do my best.
Prior to coming to Durham, I was a Research Fellow at Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge. I took my PhD at Cambridge under the supervision of Professor Hallvard Lillehammer, graduating in 2014, including a visiting scholarship at Princeton. Whilst at Cambridge I was also, briefly, a post-doc for Sir Prof Partha Dasgupta.
- Morality and Epistemic Judgment. Colloqium Talk. University of Zurich. April 2019.
- The Repugnant Conclusion and Quality of Life. British Society for Ethical Theory. Univeristy of Glasgow. July 2019.
- Title TBC. Department Seminar. University of Nottingham. 2019/20.
- Moral Philosophy
- Political Philosophy
- Ethics (MA)
- Moral Theory
- Political Philosophy
- (Forthcoming). Moral and Epistemic Judgment: The Argument from Analogy. (Forthcoming with Oxford University Press in 2019).
- (Forthcoming). The Repugnant Conclusion (Under contract with Routledge).
Chapter in book
- Cowie, Christopher. (Forthcoming). Contemporary Work on Debunking Arguments in Ethics and Mathematics. In Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Routledge.
- Cowie, Christopher & Rowland, Richard (Forthcoming). Introduction. In Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Routledge.
- Cowie, Christopher (Published). The Similarity Hypothesis in Metaethics. In Methodology and Moral Philosophy. Suikkanen, Jussi & Kauppinen, Antti Routledge. 127-147.
- Cowie, Christopher & Greenberg, Alexander (2018). Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity. In Metaepistemology: Realism and Anti-Realism. Kyriacou, Christos & McKenna, Robin Palgrave Macmillan. 173-196.
- Christopher Cowie & Richard Rowland (Forthcoming). Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics (Forthcoming with Routledge).
- Cowie, Christopher (2019). Do Constitutive Norms on Belief Explain Moore's Paradox?. Philosophical Studies
- Cowie, Christopher (2018). Companions in Guilt Arguments. Philosophy Compass 13(11): e12528.
- Schleicher, Judith, Schaafsma, Marije, Burgess, Neil D., Sandbrook, Chris, Danks, Fiona, Cowie, Chris & Vira, Bhaskar (2018). Poorer without It? The Neglected Role of the Natural Environment in Poverty and Wellbeing. Sustainable Development 26(1): 83-98.
- Cowie, Christopher (2017). Does the repugnant conclusion have any probative force?. Philosophical Studies 174(12): 3021-3039.
- Cowie, Christopher (2016). Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94(1): 115-130.
- Greenberg, Alexander & Cowie, Christopher (2016). Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
- Cowie, Christopher (2016). Revisionist Responses to the Amoralism Objection: A Reply to Julia Markovits. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19(3): 711.
- Cowie, Christopher (2015). Conservatism in Metaethics: A Case Study. Metaphilosophy 46(4-5): 605-619.
- Cowie, Christopher (2014). A New Explanatory Challenge for Nonnaturalists. Res Philosophica 91(4): 661-679.
- Cowie, Christopher (2014). Epistemic Disagreement and Practical Disagreement. Erkenntnis 79(1): 191-209.
- Cowie, Christopher (2014). In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity. Synthese 191(16): 4003-4017.
- Cowie, C. (2014). Why Companions in Guilt Arguments Won't Work. The Philosophical Quarterly 64(256): 407-422.