Dr Matthew Tugby
Departmental Impact Officer
12.00-15.00 on Fridays in room 106, 51 Old Elvet (Term-time only)
My core philosophical interests lie in the metaphysics of science and I publish mainly on the topics of dispositions, laws, causation and the problem of universals. I believe that properties are metaphysically fundamental and that they can help to explain many other metaphysical phenomena such as causation, chance, dispositions, laws, modality, and natural kinds. I am a Platonic realist about properties and my current work focuses on how arguments from science might motivate a Platonic metaphysics.
I won the 2015-16 Mind Association Research Fellowship, which provided research leave for work on a monograph called 'Putting Properties First'.
- Metaphysics (especially the topics of essence, identity and individuation, modality, ontological dependence, properties and substance)
- Metaphysics of Science (especially the topics of causation, chance, dispositions, laws and natural kinds)
Chapter in book
- Tugby, Matthew (2016). Mirage Realism Revisited. In Metaphysics and Scientific Realism: Essays in Honour of David Malet Armstrong. Calemi, Francesco, F. Berlin: De Gruyter. 9: 13-30.
- Tugby, Matthew (2016). What Are Dispositional Properties?. In Reality Making. Jago, Mark Oxford: Oxford University Press. 75-98.
- Mumford, Stephen & Tugby, Matthew (2013). What Is the Metaphysics of Science?. In Metaphysics and Science. Mumford, Stephen & Tugby, Matthew Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3-28.
- Tugby, Matthew (2012). The Metaphysics of Pan-dispositionalism. In Properties, Powers and Structures: Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism. Bird, Alexander, Ellis, Brian & Sankey, Howard Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. 165-179.
- Mumford, Stephen & Tugby, Matthew (2013). Metaphysics and Science. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tugby, Matthew (2018). Modal Platonism and the Problem of Negativity. Erkenntnis 83(3): 465-476.
- Tugby, Matthew (2017). Power Worlds and the Problem of Individuation. American Philosophical Quarterly 54(3): 269-281.
- Tugby, Matthew (2017). The Problem of Retention. Synthese 194(6): 2053-2075.
- Tugby, Matthew (2016). On the Reality of Intrinsically Finkable Dispositions. Philosophia 44(2): 623-631.
- Tugby, M. (2016). Universals, Laws, and Governance. Philosophical Studies 173(5): 1147-1163.
- Tugby, Matthew (2015). The Alien Paradox. Analysis 75(1): 28-37.
- Tugby, Matthew (2014). Categoricalism, Dispositionalism, and the Epistemology of Properties. Synthese 191(6): 1147-1162.
- Tugby, Matthew (2013). Causal Nominalism and the One Over Many Problem. Analysis 73(3): 455-462.
- Tugby, Matthew (2013). Graph-theoretic Models of Dispositional Structures. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27(1): 23-39.
- Tugby, M. (2013). Nomic Necessity for Platonists. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2(4): 324-331.
- Tugby, Matthew (2013). Platonic Dispositionalism. Mind 122(486): 451-480.
- Tugby, Matthew (2012). Rescuing Dispositionalism from the Ultimate Problem: Reply to Barker and Smart. Analysis 72(4): 723-731.
- Tugby, Matthew (2010). Simultaneity in Dispositional Interaction?. Ratio 23(3): 322-338.