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1 June 2023 - 1 June 2023

1:30PM - 3:00PM

This event will take place in the Business School room 224 and online via Zoom.

  • This event is free.

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(In)efficiency in Information Acquisition and Aggregation through Prices

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External Economics Seminar Series

Savitar Sundaresan

Imperial College London


(In)efficiency in Information Acquisition and Aggregation through Prices


We study the interaction between the inefficiency in the acquisition of private information and trading in financial markets.
We show that, as the cost of information declines, traders over-invest in information acquisition and trade too much on their private information. We also show that, generically, there exists no policy based on the price of the financial asset and the volume of individual trades that implements efficiency in both information acquisition and trading. Such an impossibility result, however, turns into a possibility result when information acquisition is verifiable, or when taxes can be made contingent on the aggregate volume of trade.


This event is free.