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Durham University

Department of Philosophy

Xi-Yang Guo

Eidos Talk

20th January 2015, 5:30pm Papers are typically about 45 minutes, followed by half an hour of questions, after which we will go to the pub or for some dinner.

Title: No Measure of Knowledge (as such)


Given an account of what knowledge is, an important but neglected further question concerns what it is to know more. Treanor (2012) has argued against some obvious approaches to this "measure problem", settling on a view that to know more is to have knowledge that more closely resembles the world. I argue against Treanor's view, twice over. First, his similarity-based approach is mistaken. Second, his very construal of the measure problem should be rejected. In its place, I offer an approach based on a broadly pragmatic conception of knowledge. Objections are considered, and the thought is put forward, that the pragmatic solution also offers answers to two "value problems" about knowledge - the so-called "Meno problem", and a related problem about the value of theincrease of knowledge.