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Events

In light of the current public health COVID-19 situation, all of our public events have been cancelled, postponed or moved online.

Virtual Seminar: Sequential Primary Election

Wednesday, 3 June 2020
12:00 to 13:15
Matthias Dahm (joint work with Kim-Sau Chung from Hong Kong Baptist University.)
Virtual seminar

A Durham Research in Economic Analysis and Mechanisms (Dream) virtual seminar.

Speaker: Matthias Dahm (joint work with Kim-Sau Chung from Hong Kong Baptist University.)

Join the virtual Zoom seminar here

Abstract:

We examine the incentives of party leaders to establish a sequential or a simultaneous presidential primary process. In our model, the margin of victory of the nominee in the primary election transmits information about the nominee's ability to generate turnout and win the general election. This creates an important unity-concern in the primary election. Unlike in previous work, informative voting is not always an equilibrium of the sequential game and the existence of a sincere-voting equilibrium can, therefore, be seen as the major advantage of the simultaneous primary arrangement. In contrast, the major advantage of the sequential game is the existence of a herding equilibrium which allows hiding party divisions. The optimal primary arrangement is hence the result of a trade-off. The sincere-voting equilibrium of the simultaneous primary aggregates information perfectly identifying the stronger nominee with certainty, while the herding equilibrium of the sequential primary garbles information avoiding to reveal party divisions.

Virtual Seminar: Sequential Primary Election

Wednesday, 3 June 2020
12:00 to 13:15
Matthias Dahm (joint work with Kim-Sau Chung from Hong Kong Baptist University.)
Virtual seminar

A Durham Research in Economic Analysis and Mechanisms (Dream) virtual seminar.

Speaker: Matthias Dahm (joint work with Kim-Sau Chung from Hong Kong Baptist University.)

Join the virtual Zoom seminar here

Abstract:

We examine the incentives of party leaders to establish a sequential or a simultaneous presidential primary process. In our model, the margin of victory of the nominee in the primary election transmits information about the nominee's ability to generate turnout and win the general election. This creates an important unity-concern in the primary election. Unlike in previous work, informative voting is not always an equilibrium of the sequential game and the existence of a sincere-voting equilibrium can, therefore, be seen as the major advantage of the simultaneous primary arrangement. In contrast, the major advantage of the sequential game is the existence of a herding equilibrium which allows hiding party divisions. The optimal primary arrangement is hence the result of a trade-off. The sincere-voting equilibrium of the simultaneous primary aggregates information perfectly identifying the stronger nominee with certainty, while the herding equilibrium of the sequential primary garbles information avoiding to reveal party divisions.

Virtual Seminar: Sequential Primary Election

Wednesday, 3 June 2020
12:00 to 13:15
Matthias Dahm (joint work with Kim-Sau Chung from Hong Kong Baptist University.)
Virtual seminar

A Durham Research in Economic Analysis and Mechanisms (Dream) virtual seminar.

Speaker: Matthias Dahm (joint work with Kim-Sau Chung from Hong Kong Baptist University.)

Join the virtual Zoom seminar here

Abstract:

We examine the incentives of party leaders to establish a sequential or a simultaneous presidential primary process. In our model, the margin of victory of the nominee in the primary election transmits information about the nominee's ability to generate turnout and win the general election. This creates an important unity-concern in the primary election. Unlike in previous work, informative voting is not always an equilibrium of the sequential game and the existence of a sincere-voting equilibrium can, therefore, be seen as the major advantage of the simultaneous primary arrangement. In contrast, the major advantage of the sequential game is the existence of a herding equilibrium which allows hiding party divisions. The optimal primary arrangement is hence the result of a trade-off. The sincere-voting equilibrium of the simultaneous primary aggregates information perfectly identifying the stronger nominee with certainty, while the herding equilibrium of the sequential primary garbles information avoiding to reveal party divisions.