Cookies

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. You can change your cookie settings at any time. Otherwise, we'll assume you're OK to continue.

Events

In light of the current public health COVID-19 situation, all of our public events have been cancelled, postponed or moved online.

Virtual Seminar in Economic Theory: Robust Monopoly Regulation

Thursday, 11 June 2020
16:00 to 17:30
Yingni Guo, Northwestern University
Virtual seminar

Guest speaker: Yingni Guo, Northwestern University. Special guest Panelists: Dirk Bergemann (Yale) and Daniel Garrett (TSE)

Abstract:

We study the regulation of a monopolistic firm using a non-Bayesian approach. We derive the policy that minimizes the regulator’s worst-case regret, where regret is the difference between the regulator’s complete-information payoff and his realized payoff. When the regulator’s payoff is consumers’ surplus, he imposes a price cap. When his payoff is the total surplus of both consumers and the firm, he offers a capped piece-rate subsidy. For intermediate cases, the regulator uses both a price cap and a capped piece-rate subsidy. The optimal policy balances three goals: giving more surplus to consumers, mitigating underproduction, and mitigating overproduction.

The Virtual Seminar in Economic Theory is open to any interested economist worldwide.

Registration:

Join our mailing list here

More about the speaker

Virtual Seminar in Economic Theory: Robust Monopoly Regulation

Thursday, 11 June 2020
16:00 to 17:30
Yingni Guo, Northwestern University
Virtual seminar

Guest speaker: Yingni Guo, Northwestern University. Special guest Panelists: Dirk Bergemann (Yale) and Daniel Garrett (TSE)

Abstract:

We study the regulation of a monopolistic firm using a non-Bayesian approach. We derive the policy that minimizes the regulator’s worst-case regret, where regret is the difference between the regulator’s complete-information payoff and his realized payoff. When the regulator’s payoff is consumers’ surplus, he imposes a price cap. When his payoff is the total surplus of both consumers and the firm, he offers a capped piece-rate subsidy. For intermediate cases, the regulator uses both a price cap and a capped piece-rate subsidy. The optimal policy balances three goals: giving more surplus to consumers, mitigating underproduction, and mitigating overproduction.

The Virtual Seminar in Economic Theory is open to any interested economist worldwide.

Registration:

Join our mailing list here

More about the speaker

Virtual Seminar in Economic Theory: Robust Monopoly Regulation

Thursday, 11 June 2020
16:00 to 17:30
Yingni Guo, Northwestern University
Virtual seminar

Guest speaker: Yingni Guo, Northwestern University. Special guest Panelists: Dirk Bergemann (Yale) and Daniel Garrett (TSE)

Abstract:

We study the regulation of a monopolistic firm using a non-Bayesian approach. We derive the policy that minimizes the regulator’s worst-case regret, where regret is the difference between the regulator’s complete-information payoff and his realized payoff. When the regulator’s payoff is consumers’ surplus, he imposes a price cap. When his payoff is the total surplus of both consumers and the firm, he offers a capped piece-rate subsidy. For intermediate cases, the regulator uses both a price cap and a capped piece-rate subsidy. The optimal policy balances three goals: giving more surplus to consumers, mitigating underproduction, and mitigating overproduction.

The Virtual Seminar in Economic Theory is open to any interested economist worldwide.

Registration:

Join our mailing list here

More about the speaker