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Events

In light of the current public health COVID-19 situation, all of our public events have been cancelled, postponed or moved online.

Economics Analysis and Mechanisms (DREAM) Seminar Series

Thursday, 21 February 2019
15:00 to 16:30
Siyang Xiong, Professor of Economics University of Bristol
Durham University Business School, MHL 224

Guest speaker: Siyang Xiong, Professor of Economics, University of Bristol.

Title: Commitment Design

Abstract:

A simple model of commitment design is proposed, or equivalently, we rigorously introduce a new paradigm (i.e., commitment design) for economic design problems, besides the two current paradigms (i.e., the classical mechanism design and information design). Furthermore, we prove that Pareto efficiency can always be achieved via a commitment protocol. This is in sharp contrast to previous results in the literature, e.g., the impossibility result in Arieli, Babichenko, and Tennenholtz (2017) and the folk theorem in Kalai, Kalai, Lehrer, and Samet (2010).

Find out more about our guest speaker Siyang Xiong here.

Economics Analysis and Mechanisms (DREAM) Seminar Series

Thursday, 21 February 2019
15:00 to 16:30
Siyang Xiong, Professor of Economics University of Bristol
Durham University Business School, MHL 224

Guest speaker: Siyang Xiong, Professor of Economics, University of Bristol.

Title: Commitment Design

Abstract:

A simple model of commitment design is proposed, or equivalently, we rigorously introduce a new paradigm (i.e., commitment design) for economic design problems, besides the two current paradigms (i.e., the classical mechanism design and information design). Furthermore, we prove that Pareto efficiency can always be achieved via a commitment protocol. This is in sharp contrast to previous results in the literature, e.g., the impossibility result in Arieli, Babichenko, and Tennenholtz (2017) and the folk theorem in Kalai, Kalai, Lehrer, and Samet (2010).

Find out more about our guest speaker Siyang Xiong here.

Economics Analysis and Mechanisms (DREAM) Seminar Series

Thursday, 21 February 2019
15:00 to 16:30
Siyang Xiong, Professor of Economics University of Bristol
Durham University Business School, MHL 224

Guest speaker: Siyang Xiong, Professor of Economics, University of Bristol.

Title: Commitment Design

Abstract:

A simple model of commitment design is proposed, or equivalently, we rigorously introduce a new paradigm (i.e., commitment design) for economic design problems, besides the two current paradigms (i.e., the classical mechanism design and information design). Furthermore, we prove that Pareto efficiency can always be achieved via a commitment protocol. This is in sharp contrast to previous results in the literature, e.g., the impossibility result in Arieli, Babichenko, and Tennenholtz (2017) and the folk theorem in Kalai, Kalai, Lehrer, and Samet (2010).

Find out more about our guest speaker Siyang Xiong here.