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Our People

Dr Bibhas Saha

Associate Professor (Reader) in Economics

Biography

Bibhas Saha is an applied micro-economist specializing in the area of betting markets, corruption, privatization and development economics. He has published in journals like Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Development Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Economics Letters, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Journal of Comparative Economics, Economica, Review of Development Economics, and Journal of Economics among others.

After obtaining PhD in Economics from the University of Southern California, USA in 1990, he joined the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, India. There he worked on several applications of the incentive theory and information economics, which included bargaining with endogenous side choice, countervailing incentives in bureaucratic corruption and trade union bargaining.

Later from 2005 to 2014 he worked at the School of Economics at the University of East Anglia. His recent work is mostly devoted to studying fixed odds betting markets in the presence of match-fixing risk. His research has shown that the risk of match-fixing can substantially alter the nature of betting competition and lead to unpredictable outcomes. He also studies problems of education, child labour and microfinance in developing countries.

Research Interests

  • Betting Markets
  • Corruption
  • Mixed Oligopoly
  • Development Economics

Research Groups

Publications

    Chapter in book

  • Saha, B. (2019). Household Self-Employment Eliminates Child Labour.. In Opportunities and Challenges in Development: Essays for Sarmila Banerjee. Simanti Bandyopadhya & Mousumi Dutta Springer.
  • Saha, B. & Saha, S. (2018). Failing to Learn: India's Schools and Teachers.. In Changing the Indian Economy: Renewal, Reform and Revival. Prasad, R., Rowley, C. & Banerjee, A.N. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 55-75.
  • Saha, B. (2015). From rigidity to flexibility.. In Labour, Employment and Economic Growth in India. Ramaswamy, K.V. Delhi: Cambridge University Press. 221-238.
  • Saha, B. & Pal, R. (2014). Labour markets: Balancing freedom and protection.. In Handbook of the Indian Economy in the 21st Century Understanding the Inherent Dynamism. Goyal, A. Oxford University Press, New Delhi.
  • Saha, B., Babu, P.G. & Kavi Kumar, K.S. (2003). Clean development mechanism: issues and options. In India and Global Climate Change Perspectives on Economics and Policy from a Developing Country, Resources for the Future Press, Resources for the Future. Toman, M.A., Chakravorty, U. & Gupta, S. Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, also Oxford University Press, 2004, New Delhi.
  • Saha, B. (2003). Industrial Labour: Five Essays on the Industrial Development in India. In Block 10, Units 30-34. Indira Gandhi National Open University, New Delhi.
  • Saha, B. & Jayati, S. (2000). Human Capital, Employment and Worker Well-being in India. In Economic Reforms for the Poor’. Gangopadhyay, S. & Wadhwa, W. Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi. 197-232.
  • Saha, B. (2000). Severance pay, wage effects and entry deterrence. In Issues in Development Economics, Orient Longman, Hyderabad. Gupta, G., Gupta, M.R. & Moitra, B. 1-19.
  • Saha, B. & Ghosh, S. (2000). Strike threats and wage settlements. In Issues in Development Economics, Orient Longman, Hyderabad. Gupta, G., Gupta, M.R. & Moitra, B. 20-36.
  • Saha, B. & Babu, P.G. (1997). Joint implementation: A bargaining approach. In Climate change and North-South Cooperation: Indo-Canadian Cooperation in Joint Implementation. Parikh, J. Culpeper, R., Runnalls, D. & Painuly, J.P. Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Company Limited, New Delhi. Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, India, and North South Institute, Canada.: 232-255.
  • Saha, B. & Sen, A. (1996). Layoff compensation and entry deterrence. In Economic Theory, Trade and Quantitative Economics. Sen, A., Banerjee, A. & Chatterjee, B. University of Calcutta. 108-122.
  • Saha, B. (1995). Forming or reforming the exit policy. In The mid-year review of the economy, 1994-95. Parikh, K. India International Centre and Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi. 200-222.
  • Saha, B. (1992). Exit policy: problems and options. In Indian Merchants' Chamber and Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research. 91-108.
  • Journal Article

  • Saha, B. & Roy, S. (2019). Goal Setting as a Motivator for Student Performance: Evidence from Lab Experiments . Journal of Higher Education Theory and Practice 19(3): 153-165.
  • Pal, S. & Saha, B. (2019). Enhancing Excellence: Socially Motivated Private Schools of Nepal. Journal of Development Studies 55(5): 765-785.
  • Saha,B. & Sangwan, N. (2019). Credit Where Credit's Due: The Enabling Effects of Empowerment in Indian Microfinance. . World Development 122: 537-551.
  • Chatterjee, I. & Saha, B. (2017). Bilateral delegation in duopoly wage and employment bargaining.. Managerial and Decision Economics 38(4): 607-621.
  • Chowdhury, S.M., Jeon, J.Y. & Saha, B. (2017). Gender Differences in the Giving and Taking Variants of the Dictator Game.. Southern Economic Journal 84(2): 474-483.
  • Bag, P. K. & Saha, B. (2017). Match-Fixing in a Monopoly Betting Market.. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 26(1): 257-289.
  • Bag, P.K. & Saha, B. (2017). Corrupt Bookmaking in a Fixed Odds Illegal Betting Market. . Economic Journal 127(601): 624-652.
  • Pal, R. & Saha, B. (2016). Entry Threats and Inefficiency in `Efficient Bargaining'. Scottish Journal of Political Economy 63(3): 258-277.
  • Ghosh, A., Mitra, M. & Saha, B. (2015). Privatization, underpricing and welfare in the presence of foreign competition.. Journal of Public Economic Theory 17(3): 433-460.
  • Pal, R. & Saha, B. (2015). Pollution Tax, Partial Privatization and Environment. Resource and Energy Economics 40: 19-35.
  • Saha, B. & Pal, R. (2014). Mixed duopoly and environment. Journal of Public Economic Theory 16(1): 96-118.
  • Chatterjee, I. & Saha, B. (2013). Bilateral Delegation in Wage and Employment Bargaining in Monopoly.. Economics Letters 120(2): 280-283.
  • Saha, B. (2013). Institutions or geography: Which matters most in economic development? Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics 25(1-2): 69-89.
  • Saha, B., Sen, K. & Maiti, D. (2013). Trade openness, labour institutions and flexibilisation: Theory and evidence from India. Labour Economics 24: 180-195.
  • Saha, B. & Sensarma, R. (2013). State ownership, credit risk and bank competition: a mixed oligopoly approach. Macroeconomics and Finance in Emerging Market Economies 6(1): 1-13.
  • Saha, B. (2012). Does privatization improve the environment? Revisiting the monopoly case. Economics Letters 115(1): 97-99.
  • Saha, B. & Kanti Bag, P. (2011). Match-Fixing under Competitive Odds. Games and Economic Behavior 73(2): 318-344.
  • Saha, B. & Sharma, T. (2011). Interest rate discrimination, tenancy and cost sharing. Indian Growth and Development Review 4(2): 153-165.
  • Saha, B. & Sensarma, R. (2011). Academic specialization and returns to education: Evidence from India. Journal of Education and Work 24(5): 501-520.
  • Saha, B. & Sensarma, R. (2011). Mixed Ownership, Managerial Incentives and Bank Competition. Bulletin of Economic Research 63(4): 385-403.
  • Saha, B. (2010). Product innovation and stability of collusion. Economics Bulletin
  • (2009). Mixed ownership in a mixed duopoly with differentiated products. Journal of Economics 98(1): 25-43.
  • Saha, B. & Saha, S.B. (2009). Private tutoring, school education and government policy. Review of Market Integration 1(3): 375-408.
  • Saha, B. & Kumar, A. (2008). Spatial competition in a mixed duopoly with one partially privatized firm. Journal of Comparative Economics 36(2): 326-341.
  • Saha, B. & Sensarma, R. (2008). The redistributive role of managerial incentives in a mixed duopoly. Economics Bulletin 12(27): 1-10.
  • Saha, B. & Pal, R. (2008). Union-Oligopoly Bargaining and Entry Deterrence: A Reassessment of Limit Pricing. Journal of Economics 95(2): 121-147.
  • Saha, B. & Pal, R. (2006). Wage commitment, signalling and entry deterrence or accommodation. LABOUR 20(4): 625-650.
  • Saha, B. & Thampy, T. (2006). Extractive bribe and default in subsidized credit programs. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 60(2): 182-204.
  • Saha, B. , Dasgupta, P. & Sensarma, R. (2006). School dropout and informal apprenticeship. India Macroeconomics Annual 88-125.
  • Saha, B. (2006). Labour institutions in India and China: A tale of two nations. Journal of South Asian Development 1(2): 179-205.
  • Saha, B. & Sensarma, R. (2004). Divestment and bank competition. Journal of Economics 81(3): 223-247.
  • Saha, B. (2003). Harassment, corruption and tax policy: a comment. European Journal of Political Economy 19(4, November): 893-897.
  • Saha, B. (2001). Red tape, incentive bribe and the provision of subsidy. Journal of Development Economics 65(1): 113-133.
  • Saha, B. & Sarkar, S. (1999). Schooling, informal experience and formal sector earnings. Review of Development Economics 3(2): 187-199.
  • Saha, B. & Majumdar, S. (1998). Job security, wage bargaining and duopoly outcomes. Journal of International Trade and Economic Development 7(4): 389-403.
  • Saha, B. & Babu, P.G. (1996). Efficient emission reduction through joint implementation. Environment and Development Economics 1: 445-464.
  • Saha, B. (1995). Side choice and bargaining with asymmetric information. Economics 62: 521-539.
  • Saha, B. & Pan, I. (1994). Industrial disputes in India: an empirical analysis. Economic and Political Weekly 29(18): 1081-1087.
  • Saha, B. (1993). Implicit contracts under job-security regulations. Keio Economic Studies xxx(1): 53-64.
  • Saha, B. & Sen, A. (1992). Trade Union Bargaining, Privatization and Adjustment Measures. Keio Economic Studies xxix(2): 15-23.

Contact Details

Associate Professor (Reader) in Economics
+44 191 3345433