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Department of Mathematical Sciences

Seminar Archives

On this page you can find information about seminars in this and previous academic years, where available on the database.

Statistics Seminars: Adversarial Risk Analysis

Presented by Prof David Banks, Duke University, Durham, USA

26 May 2015 14:00 in CM221

ARA is a Bayesian approach to strategic decision-making. One builds a model of one's opponents,
expressing subjective uncertainty about the solution concept each opponent uses, as well as their utilities,
probabilities, and capabilities. Within that framework, the decision-maker makes the choice that maximizes
expected utility. ARA allows the opponent to seek a Nash equilibrium solution, or a mirroring equilibrium, or
to use level-k thinking, or prospect theory, and so forth, and it allows the decision-maker to relax the
common-knowledge assumption that arises in classical game theory. The methodology applies to corporate
competition and counter-terrorism. The main ideas are illustrated in the context of auctions, the Borel game
La Relance, and a toy counter-terrorism example.

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