Biomathematics Seminar: Evolutionary game theory as a framework for modelling the evolution of cooperation
9 December 2008 12:00 in CG91 (Chemistry Building)
Cooperation between unrelated individuals in animal and human societies is an intriguing issue for researchers representing various disciplines. The game theory describes this problem as the "Prisoner's Dilemma" game. In this game, a payoff-effective strategy of cooperation is strictly dominated, which means that defection earns the player a higher payoff independently on the strategy of the co-player.
Introducing stochasticity ("mutations") to spatial, dynamical models of the "Prisoner's Dilemma" gives a possibility of analysing the game based on the Markov chains theory, and identifying stochastically stable states, i.e. the states that have a positive probability in a stationary state of the dynamics in the limit of no mutations. The application of this approach allowed us to analytically confirm the earlier results based on numerical simulations showing the possibility of persistence of the cooperative strategy in the spatial "Prisoner's Dilemma" game.
Further directions of research on the evolution of cooperation include the analysis of the properties of the "Prisoner's Dilemma" game with multiple players, and with different types of spatial configuration.
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