Staff profile

Sophie Gibb is Professor in the Department of Philosophy, University of Durham. Her research interests lie within contemporary metaphysics (in particular, ontology) and the philosophy of mind (in particular, the mental causation debate). Her current central research topics are concerned with the ontology of the mental causation debate, dualist accounts of psychophysical causation, the powers theory of causation and the trope/ universal debate. She is Associate Editor for the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

Research Grants and Awards

• Principal investigator in an AHRC-funded two-year project (£165,000) on 'The New Ontology of the Mental Causation Debate' (co-investigator Professor E. J. Lowe, Durham University), 2008-10.
• Investigator (and leader of the philosophy of mind work group) in a John Templeton Foundation funded three-year project (£1.6 million approx.) on emergence (project leader Professor Robin Hendry, Durham University), 2013-16.
• Principal Investigator for an AHRC Network Grant, 'Emergence: Where is the Evidence?' (co-investigator Professor Robin Hendry, Durham University), Dec. 2014-16.

Administrative Duties

• Metaphysics, in particular, the categories of being, causation, laws and powers.
• The philosophy of mind, in particular, the mental causation debate.

Authored book

• Being in Mind
  Gibb, S. Being in Mind. Oxford University Press

Book review

• 'Tropes: Objects, Properties and Mental Causation' by D. Ehring
  Gibb, S. (2012). 'Tropes: Objects, Properties and Mental Causation' by D. Ehring. Analysis, 72(4), 850-851. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ans099
• 'The Mind in Nature' by C. B. Martin
  Gibb, S. (2009). 'The Mind in Nature' by C. B. Martin. Analysis, 69(2), 386-388. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anp023
• 'Physical Realization' by Sydney Shoemaker
  Gibb, S. (2009). 'Physical Realization' by Sydney Shoemaker. Mind, 118(469), 207-211. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzp010
• 'Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again' by M. Rowlands
  Gibb, S. (2005). 'Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again' by M. Rowlands. Philosophical books, 46(3), 282-284. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.2005.00373k.x

Chapter in book

• The Ontology of E. J. Lowe's Substance Dualism
  Carruth, A., & Gibb, S. The Ontology of E. J. Lowe's Substance Dualism. In A. Carruth, S. Gibb, & J. Heil (Eds.), Ontology, Modality, Mind: Themes from the Metaphysics of E. J. Lowe. Oxford University Press
• Causal Closure Principles
  Gibb, S. (2019). Causal Closure Principles. In S. Gibb, R. Findlay Hendry, & T. Lancaster (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Emergence. Routledge
• Introduction
  Heil, J. (2018). Introduction. In A. Carruth, S. Gibb, & J. Heil (Eds.), Ontology, Modality, and Mind: Themes from the Metaphysics of E. J. Lowe (1-13). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198796299.003.0001
• The Mental Causation Debate and Qua Problems
  Gibb, S. (2017). The Mental Causation Debate and Qua Problems. In M. Paoletti, & F. Orilia (Eds.), Philosophical and scientific perspectives on downward causation (265-277). Routledge
• Tropes and the Generality of Laws
  Gibb, S. (2015). Tropes and the Generality of Laws. In G. Galluzzo, & M. Loux (Eds.), The problem of universals in contemporary philosophy (156-172). Cambridge University Press
• Mental Causation and Double Prevention
  Gibb, S. (2013). Mental Causation and Double Prevention. In S. Gibb, E. Lowe, & R. Ingthorsson (Eds.), Mental causation and ontology (193-214). Oxford University Press
• Introduction
  Gibb, S. (2013). Introduction. In S. Gibb, E. Lowe, & R. Ingthorsson (Eds.), Mental causation and ontology (1-17). Oxford University Press

Edited book

• The Routledge Handbook of Emergence
  Gibb, S., Hendry, R., & Lancaster, T. (Eds.). (2019). The Routledge Handbook of Emergence. Routledge
• Ontology, Modality, Mind: Themes from the Metaphysics of E. J. Lowe
  Carruth, A., Gibb, S., & Heil, J. (Eds.). (2018). Ontology, Modality, Mind: Themes from the Metaphysics of E. J. Lowe. Oxford University Press
• Mental Causation and Ontology
  Gibb, S., Lowe, E., & Ingthorsson, R. (Eds.). (2013). Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press

Journal Article

• Physical Determinability
  Gibb, S. (2015). Physical Determinability. Humana.mente, 29, 69-90
• The Causal Closure Principle
  Gibb, S. (2015). The Causal Closure Principle. Philosophical Quarterly, 65(261), 626-647. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv030
• VIII—Defending Dualism
  Gibb, S. (2015). VIII—Defending Dualism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 115(2pt2), 131-146. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2015.00388.x
• Mental Causation
  Gibb, S. (2014). Mental Causation. Analysis, 74(2), 327-338. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ant117
• The Causal Criterion of Property Identity and the Substraction of Powers
  Gibb, S. (2014). The Causal Criterion of Property Identity and the Substraction of Powers. Erkenntnis, 79(1), 127-146. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9481-0
• The Entailment Problem and the Subset Account of Property Realization
  Gibb, S. (2014). The Entailment Problem and the Subset Account of Property Realization. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92(3), 551-566. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2013.857701
• Non-reductive physicalism and the problem of strong closure
  Gibb, S. (2012). Non-reductive physicalism and the problem of strong closure. American Philosophical Quarterly, 49(1), 29-42
• Causal Closure Principles and the Laws of Conservation of Energy and Momentum.
  Gibb, S. (2010). Causal Closure Principles and the Laws of Conservation of Energy and Momentum. Dialectica, 64(3), 363-384. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2010.01237.x
• Explanatory Exclusion and Causal Exclusion
  Gibb, S. (2009). Explanatory Exclusion and Causal Exclusion. Erkenntnis, 71(2), 205-221. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-008-9150-x
• Is the Partial Identity Account of Property Resemblance Logically Incoherent?
  Gibb, S. (2007). Is the Partial Identity Account of Property Resemblance Logically Incoherent?. Dialectica, 61(4), 539-558 (Awarded the Dialectica Annual Essay Prize). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2007.01121.x
• Why Davidson is not a Property Epiphenomenalist
  Gibb, S. (2006). Why Davidson is not a Property Epiphenomenalist. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 14(3), 407-422. https://doi.org/10.1080/09672550600858346
• Space, Supervenience and Entailment
  Gibb, S. (2006). Space, Supervenience and Entailment. Philosophical Papers, 35(2), 171-184. https://doi.org/10.1080/05568640609485177
• The Problem of Mental Causation and the Nature of Properties
  Gibb, S. (2004). The Problem of Mental Causation and the Nature of Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82(3), 464 - 476. https://doi.org/10.1080/713659879