Staff profile

About Me

I am originally from New Jersey. I received my BA in philosophy from Rutgers University in 2004 and my doctorate in philosophy from Bowling Green State University in 2012. Between 2012 and arriving in Durham in 2018, I taught at Virginia Tech, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and Georgetown University.

• Metaethics
• Normative Ethics
• Applied Ethics (esp. Business Ethics)
• Epistemology

Book review

• Review of Methodology and Moral Philosophy
  Faraci, D. (online). Review of Methodology and Moral Philosophy. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews,
• Review of Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability
  Faraci, D. (2018). Review of Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. Analysis, 78(2), 377-381. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/any019
• Review of Moral Psychology & Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics
  Faraci, D. (2015). Review of Moral Psychology & Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews,
• Review of David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism
  Faraci, D. (2012). Review of David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism. Journal of Value Inquiry, 46(2), 259-267. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-012-9329-x

Chapter in book

• Ethical Judgment and Motivation
  Faraci, D., & McPherson, T. (2017). Ethical Judgment and Motivation. In T. McPherson, & D. Plunkett (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of metaethics (308-323). Routledge
• On Leaving Room for Doubt: Using Frege-Geach to Illuminate Expressivism's Problem with Objectivity
  Faraci, D. (2017). On Leaving Room for Doubt: Using Frege-Geach to Illuminate Expressivism's Problem with Objectivity. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Oxford studies in metaethics (244-264). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198805076.003.0010
• Huck vs. Jojo: Moral Ignorance and the (A)symmetry of Praise and Blame
  Faraci, D., & Shoemaker, D. (2015). Huck vs. Jojo: Moral Ignorance and the (A)symmetry of Praise and Blame. In J. Knobe, T. Lombrozo, & S. Nichols (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy (7-27). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780198718765.003.0002
• Heroes and the Ethics of Time Travel: Does the Present Matter?
  Faraci, D. (2009). Heroes and the Ethics of Time Travel: Does the Present Matter?. In W. Irwin, & D. Johnson (Eds.), Heroes and Philosophy: Buy the Book, Save the World (140-154). John Wiley and Sons

Journal Article

• Better but Wrong: Assessing Conflicts Between the Deontic and the Evaluative
  Faraci, D. (online). Better but Wrong: Assessing Conflicts Between the Deontic and the Evaluative. Philosophia, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-025-00816-x
• On Leaving Space for Altruism
  Faraci, D., & Jaworski, P. M. (online). On Leaving Space for Altruism. Public Affairs Quarterly, 35(2), https://doi.org/10.2307/48616068
• We Have No Reason to Think There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes
  Faraci, D. (2020). We Have No Reason to Think There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes. Mind, 129(513), 225-234. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzy054
• Good Selves, True Selves: Moral Ignorance, Responsibility, And The Presumption Of Goodness
  Faraci, D., & Shoemaker, D. (2019). Good Selves, True Selves: Moral Ignorance, Responsibility, And The Presumption Of Goodness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 98(3), 606-622. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12470
• Wage Exploitation and the Nonworseness Claim: Allowing the Wrong, to Do More Good
  Faraci, D. (2019). Wage Exploitation and the Nonworseness Claim: Allowing the Wrong, to Do More Good. Business Ethics Quarterly, 29(2), 169-188. https://doi.org/10.1017/beq.2018.28
• Moral Perception and the Reliability Challenge
  Faraci, D. (2019). Moral Perception and the Reliability Challenge. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 16(1), 63-73. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20170002
• Groundwork for an Explanationist Account of Epistemic Coincidence
  Faraci, D. (2019). Groundwork for an Explanationist Account of Epistemic Coincidence. Philosophers' Imprint, 19(4), 1-26
• Hybrid Non-Naturalism Does Not Meet the Supervenience Challenge
  Faraci, D. (2017). Hybrid Non-Naturalism Does Not Meet the Supervenience Challenge. Journal of ethics & social philosophy, 12(3), 312-318. https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v12i3.279
• A Hard Look at Moral Perception
  Faraci, D. (2014). A Hard Look at Moral Perception. Philosophical Studies, 172(8), 2055-2072. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0397-6
• To Inspect and Make Safe: On the Morally Responsible Liability of Property Owners
  Faraci, D., & Jaworski, P. M. (2013). To Inspect and Make Safe: On the Morally Responsible Liability of Property Owners. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 17(4), 697-709. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9473-9
• Do Property Rights Presuppose Scarcity?
  Faraci, D. (2013). Do Property Rights Presuppose Scarcity?. Journal of Business Ethics, 125(3), 531-537. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-013-1866-0
• Brown on Mackie: Echoes of the Lottery Paradox
  Faraci, D. (2012). Brown on Mackie: Echoes of the Lottery Paradox. Philosophia, 41(3), 751-755. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-012-9397-y
• First-Personal Authority and the Normativity of Rationality
  Coons, C., & Faraci, D. (2010). First-Personal Authority and the Normativity of Rationality. Philosophia, 38(4), 733-740. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9250-0
• Insanity, Deep Selves, and Moral Responsibility: The Case of JoJo
  Faraci, D., & Shoemaker, D. (2010). Insanity, Deep Selves, and Moral Responsibility: The Case of JoJo. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1(3), 319-332. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-010-0026-z