The Emergence of Islamic State in Pakistan

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**Abstract:** The Islamic State (al-Dawla al-Islamiyya, IS), also known as ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham); ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) or Da’esh (Islamic Nation of Iraq and Al-Sham), has, according to FBI Director James Comey, become the greatest international terrorist threat, surpassing al-Qaeda in terms of influence and activity. Having gained control of large swathes of Iraq and Syria, the IS has openly proclaimed its aim of establishing a world-wide Caliphate, characterised by the implementation of a strict Wahhabi-Salafi interpretation of Shariah. Having the support of affiliated groups, and individual “lone-wolf activists”, the IS has carried out terrorist activities in various countries including Nigeria, Egypt and Tunisia. Extremely wealthy, disciplined and well organised the IS, possessing a first rate propaganda apparatus, has been successful in recruiting jihadi fighters – both men and women – from around the world. Despite air strikes by a US led coalition the IS has proven to be highly resilient, achieving major military victories, and able to extend its influence overseas, inspiring terrorist acts in France, Belgium, Tunisia and elsewhere. This article, after briefly explaining the history, beliefs and ideology of the IS considers the presence of the IS in Pakistan and Afghanistan, countries vital for maintaining the geopolitical stability of the South Asian region, yet nations already troubled by the rigours of militant Islam. Following an examination of the emergence of the IS in the Af-Pak region, consideration is given to relevant key issues: the nature of the rift that has emerged between al-Qaeda and the IS; the reasons why certain elements of the Pakistan Taliban have joined the IS while other Taliban groups are actively opposed to it; and the response so far by the Pakistani authorities to the menace of the IS ideology. The article concludes with suggestions for policy-makers and decision-makers relating to the seriousness or otherwise of the IS threat.

**Keywords:** Islamic State; Da’esh; Al-Khorasan; Afghanistan; Pakistan; Taliban; al-Qaeda; Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi; Musab Al-Zarqawi; Wahhabism

**Introduction: What is the IS?**

The IS is an extreme jihadist group claiming legitimacy as a proto-Islamic state. It began in about 2006, under the leadership of the Jordanian militant Musab Al-Zarqawi, as the ISI, the Islamic State of Iraq ((Dawlat al-’Iraq al-Islamiyya), part of al-Qaeda in Iraq, one of numerous jihadist groups opposing President Bashar al-Assad of Syria. Following Al-Zarqawi’s death in 2006, ISI, under new leaders Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, became a jihadist group associated with Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN). Following the deaths of the previous leaders in a raid carried out by Iraqi forces in April 2010, ISI emerged as a separate faction led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (real name Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri).
During the Syrian civil war, between March 2011 and March 2013, the group under al-Baghdadi’s control, extended its influence capturing several strategic sites including the city of Raqqa in north-east Syria. By April 2013 al-Baghdadi’s group, driven by the goal of establishing an international Islamic Caliphate or kingdom, changed its name to the ISIL, then ISIS, and later simply to the IS. Organised by former commanders of Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi army and the ruling Baathist party, the IS further extended the land under its control capturing key localities in Iraq including Ramadi, Mosul, and Tikrit. On 29 June 2014, al-Baghdadi, claiming to be a direct descendent of the prophet Muhammad, and acknowledged by his supporters as the promised Mahdi (the “Guided one”), formally declared an international Caliphate with him as amir al-mu’minin, “commander of the faithful”.4 By March 2015, the IS, with an effective media propaganda system, had an army numbering at least 30,000 volunteers, including women and children, and, adopting the black battle flag used by the prophet Muhammad, controlled large areas of Iraq and Syria. In August 2014 the US commenced air-strikes against the IS in Syria and Iraq, later forming a coalition of anti-IS nations including Britain, France, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Canada.5

The IS has carried out numerous acts of barbarity including the persecution and killing of large numbers of Yazidis (an ancient Middle Eastern religion based on Zoroastrianism and Islamic Sufism) regarded by al-Baghdadi and his group as atheists and apostates; the mass execution of captured Syrian soldiers and similar atrocities mainly on Shi’a Muslims, who are similarly regarded as non-Muslim; and the slaughter of Iraqi Christians. Numerous westerners have been executed by the IS, usually by de-capitation, including several American, British and two Japanese citizens, and a Jordanian pilot, who was burned to death. The deaths of these hostages were videoed and published on the internet. In February 2015 IS affiliates in Libya beheaded 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians.6 The IS claimed responsibility for the Bardo museum attack in Tunis in March 2015.7 Later, in June, the IS released videos of the drowning of alleged spies in a cage; and others blown up in a car by a rocket propelled grenade (RPG). More recently the IS has broadcast videos showing their supporters throwing homosexuals to their deaths from roof tops. IS supporters have carried out terrorist attacks in Sydney, Australia; Ottawa and Montreal, Canada; Copenhagen, Denmark; Paris, France; and various localities in America. Such terrorist activities have included the slaughter of tourists on a beach in Tunisia; and suicide bombings in Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Kuwait.

The success of the IS is partly due to the fact it has a highly effective propaganda and recruitment system. Muslims worldwide are able to read, and some are influenced by, Dabiq, a glossy informative magazine, published monthly online which effectively presents the groups ideology and beliefs. The magazine, legitimizing all the IS’s dogma and practices by reference to the Quran and hadith, presents the group as a utopian fulfilment of Islamic eschatology and calls all Muslims to leave their country of residence and live in a so-called perfect state under Shariah law. Another reason for the success of the IS can be seen in the fact that the group is unquestionably the “world’s richest terrorist organization” with a reported budget, in 2014, of $2 billion, money gained from donations, oil smuggling, and a richest terrorist organization.

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antiquities trafficking, ransom payments, and tax collection. As well as committing acts of brutality the IS is guilty of acts of cultural vandalism and iconoclasm, as seen in the destruction of holy sites, including mosques and Islamic shrines, regarded by the IS as idolatrous. Various archaeological relics have been demolished or sold on the black market, in particular, relics from the ancient Assyrian cities of Nimrud and Hatra, and Palmyra.

**IS belief and practice**

Adopting the dogmas of Jihadi-Salafism the IS, a Sunni jihadist group, is the precocious offspring of Wahhabism, a strict interpretation of Islam founded by Muhammad Ibn Abdal Wahhab in Arabia in the eighteenth century. Although all Muslims believe in the importance of *tawhid* (the unity of God, absolute monotheism) the IS, as with Wahhabis generally, apply the doctrine in extremis. Such extremism is seen in its condemnation of holy sites as *shirk* (associating God with physical things), and idolatry, things regarded as innocuous by other mainstream Muslims, and in its condemnation of various practices as *bida’,* harmful innovations. Similarly, the IS is extreme in its denunciation and rejection of the *jahili* (ignorant, immoral) practices of western civilisation, including democracy and voting. The intolerance, and rigidity of the IS in its exegesis of the Quran and Shariah, is seen in the movement’s use of execution as punishment for apostasy and blasphemy; amputation for theft, and lashings for various offences such as inappropriate dress-wear.

Influenced by the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence; the *takfiri* doctrine of Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328 CE), and the more recent publication, Abu Bakr Haji’s The Management of Savagery, (published online in 2004), the IS, believing itself to represent the only “true” Islam, rejects all other faiths, even the practices of other Muslims as non-Muslim. Shi’a Muslims for example are rejected as apostates and persecuted accordingly, not only for doctrinal reasons but in the belief that the Shi’a, so-called “reactionists”, are guilty of idolatry and apostasy, and allegedly conspire with the United States and secular Arab rulers to limit Sunni power in the Middle East.

The IS, refusing to recognise international borders especially those created in the Middle East by the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, and the Treaty of Sèvres 1920, aims at establishing a global Caliphate which, rejecting “the *taghut* of man-made laws”, is to be based solely on Shariah. Characterised by a bi-polar world view, the IS declares, “there are only two camps: *dārul-Islām* the camp of truth and its followers, and *dārul-kufr* the camp of falsehood and its factions”. In establishing this Caliphate the IS practices the “Prophetic methodology”, rigidly following the example of Muhammad and his companions, and attempts to reinstitute the so-called “golden age” of Islam, that of seventh century Arabia. The IS regards *Hijra* (emigration) as *wajib* (an individual obligation), where all Muslims are called to declare *bay’āt* (pledge of allegiance) to al-Baghdadi and, following the example of Muhammad leaving Mecca for Medina in 622 CE, leave their homes and travel to the Caliphate. Eschatological in emphasis, the IS declares itself to be *at-Tā’ifatul-Mansūrah* (the victorious group) which will participate in *Al-Malahim*, the final apocalyptic battle, which it believes will occur at Dābiq (or al-A’māq) near Aleppo.

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The IS teaches that jihād is fard ‘ayn (an individual obligation) and qu’ād, (abandonment of jihād), is a great sin. It advocates both “defensive” and “aggressive” jihād, taking the “struggle” against western kufr powers to their own countries and for Muslims (regarded as the “knights of Tawḥīd”), to fight the “Zionist Crusaders” (Jews and westerners). Supporters overseas are encouraged to carry-out nīkayāh (injury to unbelievers); tawḥih (mayhem) in their country of residence, or tamkin (consolidation) operations aimed at destabilizing tawḥīdī (idolatrous, atheistic tyrannical rulers).  

The presence and activity of the IS in the Af-Pak region

On 26 January 2015, Abu Muhammad al Adnani, the official spokesperson for the IS, announced the “expansion” of the IS into the lands of “Khorasan”, declaring former Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commander Hafez Saeed Khan as the “governor” of the Khorasan province, and Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim as the deputy governor. By July, the growing presence of the IS on the Af-Pak border was confirmed by the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the foreign intelligence agency of India, with claims that the IS had about 4,000 members in Afghanistan, mainly in the Farah and Nangarhar provinces. Ashraf Ghani, the Afghan President, citing global terrorist networks like the IS as one of the “four drivers of Afghan insecurity”, described the IS as a “man-eater Bengal tiger”, a “terrible threat”, which needs to be “dealt [with] regionally”. Acknowledgement of the IS presence in Pakistan has been more ambivalent however. In May 2015, for example, Federal Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, categorically denied the presence of the group in Pakistan, declaring that the armed forces would never allow the IS to put its “footsteps” in that region. Similarly, a few weeks later the Pakistan Foreign Office officially stated that the IS has “no operational links” in Pakistan, and the threat posed by the IS to South Asia is merely abstract. However, other recent reports claim that the IS has established a Wilayah, or chapter, in Pakistan, and has recruited more than 12,000 supporters mainly from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region and the Kurram agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

Signs of IS support in Pakistan have been relatively minor but worthy of note. Graffiti supporting the IS has been seen in various localities including Rawalpindi, Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar and Bannu. During May-June of this year, police in the Gujranwala area arrested

11 Dabiq, op.cit.
one student and registered cases against 10 others for pro IS wall chalking. In November 2014, four IS flags appeared on poles outside a factory in the town of Taxila, while in Lahore, shortly after, two men were arrested for putting up Islamic State posters. The black IS flag has repeatedly been seen in Kashmir, particularly in Jammu and the Anantnag district, although some have dismissed this merely as “nothing but a publicity stunt” by the Pakistani government to keep the issue of Kashmir “in the media attention, and to embarrass India”. In November 2014, the extremist all-girl students of Jamia Hafsa, a madrassa in the Red Mosque Network, Islamabad, released a video in support of the IS, urging all Pakistani jihadis to join forces with the terrorist organization. The girls reassured al-Baghdadi with the words: “We pray for you every night, here in the land of Pakistan”.

At present the IS in Pakistan seems to be comparatively small, with sporadic activity. According to Pakistan’s Dawn news there are about 370 Islamic State operatives in the country. In May 2015 the group claimed responsibility for the massacre of Ismaili Shi’a Muslims on a bus in Karachi that killed at least 43 people and injured dozens more. According to A Brief History of the Islamic state Caliphate (ISC); The Caliphate according to the Prophet, a 32 page document recently found in Pakistan, the aim of the IS is to wage a full scale attack on India; thereby provoking “an apocalyptic confrontation with America”. Although regarded by the CIA as authentic, other agencies, such as the Indian Intelligence Bureau, has dismissed the document as “the handwork of senseless IS men”, or even as a forgery. There is evidence that the IS is using Pakistan as a base for international attacks. In July 2015 three IS supporters were arrested in Peshawar for planning a terror attack in London on the 10th anniversary of the July 7 bombings, as well as planning attacks on military targets in Pakistan. There have been allegations, mainly from India, that Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate, (ISI) is funding the IS, in a bid to use it as another proxy force

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mainly in Afghanistan or Kashmir. However, others reject this idea suggesting that the ISI would not be associated with the IS as this would jeopardise the fragile but important link it has with the Pakistan Taliban. At grassroots level, throughout Pakistan, it is believed that the IS is supported by the US and Israel to divide Muslims and keep Islam weak.

The relationship of the IS with the Af-Pak Taliban

The extension of the IS into Afghanistan and Pakistan is limited partly by the ambivalent relationship the group has with the Af-Pak Taliban. This ambivalence is due to various factors. Although the Taliban and the IS embrace a similar ideological framework, based on a strict Deobandi interpretation of Islam, there are marked differences in theological emphasis. The Taliban generally are parochial in outlook, their Pashtun tribalism, Hanafi based beliefs, their goal of removing western (especially American) influence from Pakistan and the removal of a western backed government regarded as being apostate and non-Muslim, stands in sharp contrast to the extreme Hanbali-Salafi ideology of the IS and its global ambitions of establishing Islam worldwide. The Taliban regard many of the activities of the IS as unacceptable, even barbaric. In August 2015 certain Taliban leaders, on jihadi social media forums, expressed their disapproval of an IS video that appeared to show militants blowing up bound and blindfolded Afghan prisoners with explosives. Another reason for Taliban reluctance to link with the IS is the Taliban fear of jeopardising its ties with the Pakistani military establishment and the ISI, where, as generally known, it has considerable support. It is generally accepted that the Taliban is used by the ISI, and is supported by it, so much so that the Haqqani network, has been referred to as a “veritable arm of Pakistani intelligence”. The majority of the Taliban gave bay’āt (allegiance) to Mullah Muhammed Omar, regarding him as head of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan since 1996. However, with the death of Mullah Omar reported at the end of July (although it is believed he actually died in April 2013) it is reported that sections of the Taliban have pledged allegiance to the IS.

The animosity between the Taliban and the IS has been vocal and vociferous. In January 2015, the IS issued a fatwa in which inter alia, al-Baghdadi denounced Mullah Omar as a fool and illiterate warlord, rejecting his authority, stating that he [al-Baghdadi], is the only rightful

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leader of all Muslims. 34 In an essay written by the TTP in May 2015 the Taliban rejected the IS Caliphate and the leadership of al-Baghdadi. 35 On 20 June 2015, in a letter signed by the Taliban deputy leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor and addressed to al-Baghdadi, the Taliban, concerned at the IS’s “growing prominence in Afghanistan”, 36 warned the leader of the IS against waging a parallel insurgency in that country. 37 The Taliban insisted that “jihad against the Americans and their allies must be conducted under one flag and one leadership”. The letter stressed the need for unity stating: “The Islamic Emirate (Taliban) does not consider the multiplicity of jihadi ranks beneficial either for jihad or for Muslims”. The Taliban letter warned the IS, “your decisions taken from a distance will result in (the IS) losing support of religious scholars, mujahideen (those engaged in jihad) and in order to defend its achievements the Islamic Emirate will be forced to react”. The letter further indirectly threatened the IS warning it not to interfere in Afghanistan and Pakistan stating: “The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan from a brotherhood point of religion wants your goodness and has no intention of interfering in your affairs. Reciprocally, we hope and expect the same from you” 38. The letter, published on the Taliban website in Pashto, Urdu, Arabic and Dari, did not elaborate on its threat. During the past six months there have been several major clashes between the Af-Pak Taliban and supporters of the IS as seen in the fighting in Nangahar’s Achin and Bati Kot districts in Afghanistan on the Pakistan border. 39 Despite the animosity that exists between the two groups various militant factions have defected to the IS including from within Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ); the Tehreek-e-Khilafat movement in Karachi and factions of the TTP; the East Turkistan Islamic Movement”, “Jamat-e-Ahrarul Islam” and the Tehreek-e- Khilafat. Recently, Usmon Ghazi, leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), took an oath of allegiance to al-Baghdadi. 40 Others however dismiss the significance of such defections as “a disgruntled rump of the Taliban” joining a self proclaimed Caliphate. 41

The IS and al-Qaeda

Even from the time of its inception the relationship between the IS and al-Qaeda has been strained. Initially the group which later became the IS fell into disfavour with al-Qaeda due to

39 ‘Taliban in Afghanistan tells Islamic State to stay out of country’, Ibid.
its unwillingness to communicate or consult with, and its failure to give bay’āt (loyalty) to, the parent terrorist group. The two groups had disagreed in 2013 over the status of Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN), with the IS stating that JAN had been disbanded while al-Qaeda regarded it as an affiliated group. Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of al-Qaeda, objected strongly, not only to the extreme violence and takfiri ideology adopted by the IS, but also to the involvement of the IS in Syria, stating its activity should be confined to Iraq only. The IS openly disobeyed al-Qaeda directives “not to target the Shi’a masses”. Al-Zawahiri has refused to recognise al-Baghdadi and his claim to be the amir al-mu’minin. Due largely to the growing influence of the IS, the influence of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan has significantly declined. In September 2014, partly as a counter attack to the claims of the IS, al-Qaeda announced the formation of a new affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), proclaiming Mullah Omar as Supreme Leader, either unaware of, or for logistical reasons, ignoring his previous demise. In March-April 2015 there were puzzling, and uncorroborated reports that al-Zawahiri was considering stepping down as the leader of al-Qaeda, and that he had advised members of the group to join other Islamist groups, including the IS. The IS has called on Taliban fighters in the Af-Pak region to defect from al-Qaeda, and on wives of al-Qaeda fighters in Syria to leave their husbands. The IS claims that all militants with other rebel groups involved in the Syrian conflict who refuse to pay allegiance to it, including al-Qaeda’s official off-shoot, the Nusra Front, are to be considered infidels. In August 2015, partly as an act of defiance against the IS, and in an attempt to legitimize Mullah Omar’s successor, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, as leader of the entire Taliban movement, al-Zawahiri made a pledge of allegiance to the Pakistan Taliban.

The response so far against the IS

With the presence of the IS now recognised in the Af-Pak region by the Pakistanis, as well as the Afghan government, the fight against the extremist group is now on, particularly so in Afghanistan. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, during his visit to the United States in March 2015, called on the Taliban to join with the Kabul government against the IS, and said that any Taliban who switched allegiance to the IS would earn the “wrath of Afghanistan’s religious leaders”. Military attacks against the IS seem to have been successful in taking out key figures within the group. In February 2015 for example, a NATO drone strike killed Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim, a former Taliban commander and Guantánamo detainee with

rules to the IS, in the Helmand area of Afghanistan. In another US drone strike on 7 July 2015 in the Afghan province of Nangahar, Shahidullah Shahid and Gull Zaman, key IS leaders, were killed. Three days later, on 10 July, Hafiz Saeed Khan, the top IS leader in Afghanistan and Pakistan was killed in another U.S. drone strike in the Achin district of Nangahar Province. Similarly in Pakistan, it is believed that Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, one of the leading IS militant leaders in that country was reportedly killed on 16 April 2015 after a bomb he was handling exploded in Toor Dara in the Tirah Valley. In July 2015, the Pakistan government, although denying the presence of the IS in Pakistan, pronounced it would take action against individuals and organizations that have sympathy for the IS. The sources further said that the first phase will entail identifying the individuals and organizations that have the “soft spot” for the terrorist organization. In late August, in a move which clearly testifies to the growing concern by the Pakistani authorities over the IS threat, the Pakistani government formally proscribed the activities of the IS.

Conclusions

It is now generally acknowledged by all political parties concerned that the IS has become a “clear and present danger” in the Af-Pak region. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, during his visit to the United States in March 2015, remarked concerning the IS: "If we don’t stand on the same line united, these people are going to destroy us". In facing this threat policy makers need to bear in mind the following points:

- Unlike other terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda, the IS has shown it can function rapidly and effectively in other countries, quickly establishing an operational basis and recruiting militant factions or “lone-wolf” operators.
- As such there is a real danger of the IS rapidly becoming a real threat further destabilizing an important area of South Asia, presenting serious implications not only for Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also to neighbouring countries such as India, Russia, and other areas of Central Asia for which the containment of extremism and the stability of Af-Pak region, are of paramount importance. China, for example, faces the growing problem of terrorism, particularly from Uyghur Muslim groups potentially inspired and supported by the IS.
- Policy makers need to realise that the Af-Pak area, parts of which is termed “Khorasan”, is very important to the IS, as in Islamic eschatology it is predicted that a Muslim army

56 “Islamic State blamed for Afghan suicide bombing killing 35”, Mail Online, 18 April 2015, op.cit.
[flying a black flag] will arise in this region in the last days, and will defeat several Kufr armies before it reaches Jerusalem.  

- In June 2015 the IS boasted in its magazine Dabiq that, with billions of dollars in the bank, it can “call on [its] wilayah in Pakistan to purchase a nuclear device through weapons dealers with links to corrupt officials in the region”. It also claimed “if not a nuke, what about a few thousand tons of ammonium nitrate explosive? That’s easy enough to make.” As such the safeguarding of the Pakistani nuclear armoury is of the utmost importance.

- Following the official pronouncement of Mullah Omar’s death, the Taliban has become further weakened by divisions and internal squabbling, presenting a fruitful area of recruitment for the IS. Even Mullah Mohammad Yaqoub (Mullah Omar’s son) and Mullah Abdul Manan Akhund (Omar’s brother) initially rebelled against Mullah Mansoor as the new leader, although both have now allegedly changed their minds and sworn allegiance to Mansoor.

- Those who refuse to join with the IS may well adopt copy-cat tactics and carry out terrorist acts to affirm their existence as a rival groups to the IS.

- Talking with contacts in Pakistan there are genuine fears that Pakistan may become a centre for IS-Taliban rivalry and conflict.

- Pakistan is continuing to play a double game, of officially condemning terrorism yet unofficially using terrorist groups to further Pakistan foreign and domestic policy.

- In order to defeat the IS, as with all terrorist groups, there is a real need to present an effective counter-narrative, a narrative which undermines the aggression and intolerance of a rigid, literalist exegesis of the Quran which usually ignores the all important context of a passage. Examples of such counter-narratives can be seen in recent schemes developed by the Indian government of using moderate Muslims and experts in Islamic theology, and using “NGOs and civil society groups to curb the stigma of alienation among the minority communities”. In particular the Indian government sees the need “to go undercover in cyberspace, the hunting ground for the IS”.

- There is a need to use, and extend, the powers created to fight terrorism under the National Action Plan (NAP), introduced in Pakistan following the massacre of school children and teachers at a school in Peshawar in December 2014. This must include the blocking of websites; banning of hate literature; the dismantling of the communication network of terrorists; monitoring of social media accounts associated with the IS and other terrorist groups.

- But as well as adopting such counter-terrorism strategies, there is a continuing need to prevent radicalisation at its source by undertaking economic and social engagement in Pakistan such as the extension of education and employment generally.

- There is the need for the military, policy-makers and practitioners alike to understand the ideology behind the IS specifically, and militant Islam generally, and the reasons giving rise to such militancy. Military action, although achieving certain objectives, is clearly not the all encompassing solution to the IS problem. Winning hearts and minds can achieve

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57 Recorded in certain ahadith, see Al-Bukhari 5:59 : Hadith 561.
much more than boots on the ground. Only by “knowing” and understanding IS, can we overcome it.