Noël Carroll and Margaret Moore (Temple University):
‘Feeling Movement: Dance and Music’
This paper is concerned with establishing the possibility of a certain scenario for the aesthetic experience of the combination of a certain type of music – specifically music that engenders the feeling of movement in listeners – with a certain type of dance – namely, dance that is intended as a performative interpretation of the music. With regards to this sort of music, we develop a modified expression theory, though our focus is primarily on the clarification of the feelings of movement undergone by the audience rather than the artist. We attempt to ground the plausibility of our case by reference to contemporary psychological research.

Thomas Cochrane (University of Nottingham):
‘A Simulation Theory of Musical Expression’
Several theorists compare our ability to recognise emotional qualities in music with our ability to recognise the emotions of other people. As such, recent developments in the cognitive science of empathy and emotion recognition (e.g. the nature of mirror neurons, the role of arousal in empathy) have equally significant impact on the question of musical expression. I present this connection as a simulation theory of musical expression. I argue that musical works ‘hijack’ the simulative mechanism by musically presenting movement that is treated by the listener's brain as equivalent to bodily movements (including both outward behaviours and inner changes). As well as detailing the sub-personal mechanisms at work here, I also characterize the minimal conscious experience of musical expression. I describe this as getting a sense of a body attached to the music in one of several characteristic ways.

David Cooper (Durham University):
'Beautiful People and Beautiful Things'
This talk sympathetically considers the idea, of which there are many versions, that the recognition of things as beautiful derives from appreciation of, or attraction to, human bodily and behavioural features. After a brief discussion of some 'naturalistic' versions of this idea, such as those of Darwin and Freud, discussion centres on a more ancient thought, resurrected by Kant and Schiller. This is the thought that things are found beautiful in virtue of their relationship to human bodily expressions of moral qualities.
Amy Coplan (Fullerton University, California):
‘The Low Road to Affect: Why Movies Are So Good at Arousing Emotion’
I examine non-cognitive affective engagement with narrative fiction film, and focus on emotional contagion, mood, automatic reflexes, and the intensification of emotional experiences through non-cognitive processes. I argue that film successfully elicits these non-cognitive affects by controlling spectators’ direct sensory perceptions and through the use of certain cinematic techniques, including the push-in, the reverse dolly zoom, close-ups of varying sizes, and hyper-and surrealistic sound design. I identify and discuss representative examples of these techniques that show that they effectively and reliably produce immediate affective arousal. I further argue that we often experience more, and more intense emotion and affect in response to film than we do in ordinary experience or in response to literary narratives and that film’s ability to elicit non-cognitive affective responses is one of the primary reasons for this.

Gregory Currie (University of Nottingham):
‘The Body’s Response to Pictures: On the Psychology and Neuroscience of Visual Aesthetic Experience’
I am skeptical about the possibility of any kind of neural foundation for the aesthetic. But we should certainly be open in our thinking about the nature of aesthetic experience to whatever total science might indicate. Arguably, aesthetics was more open in this respect a hundred years ago, and I will begin with a superficial tour of a group of thinkers whose writings helped to found the notion of empathy. They were a disparate and unsystematic bunch, but they were as interested in the idea of empathy for understanding art and the aesthetic as they were concerned with what we now would consider the proper domain of that concept—our relations with other people.

Stephen Davies (Auckland University):
‘Cross-cultural Sensitivity to Music’s Expressiveness’
In this paper I note that instrumental music expresses emotions such as sadness and happiness and that the music of different cultures share important organizational and other features. If music’s expressiveness is grounded in these musical universals, we might speculate that musical expressiveness, like displays of the basic affect programs discussed by psychologists, are appreciable across cultures. A critical review of psychologists’ cross-cultural studies of recognition of music’s expressive qualities is equivocal, however. The low number of such studies and their methodological weaknesses leave the issue in doubt.
Ellen Dissanayake (Washington University):
‘Genesis and Development of “Making Special”: Is the Term Relevant to Aesthetic Psychology and Philosophy?’
The term ‘making special’ is often used as a metonym for an emerging ethological hypothesis about the evolution of a behaviour of art. Here I present a history of the hypothesis in my own thought and reconstruct the phylogeny of the phenomenon in human evolution. I conclude that the arts are integral to human lives and that humans are inherently ‘artifying’ creatures. Questions addressed by the hypothesis – how, when, and why artifying became a universal cognitive and emotional component of human nature – are psychological matters. If philosophers wish to ask and answer these questions, then my hypothesis is relevant to their endeavours.

Norman Freeman (University of Bristol):
‘Varieties of Pictorial Judgement: Issues of Representational Authority’
As the themes in this conference attest, pictures are necessarily plurifunctional. One of those functions is that of representational depiction. We start with depiction as (a) the representation of something as having a visual appearance, by means of (b) display of another visual appearance in a marked surface. The questions immediately arise of how we can tell when a representational response to a picture is warranted, and how far we can allow a representational interpretation to proceed. Does anyone have the authority to tell a viewer when their interpretation is right? There is evidence on when and how children engage with those issues of pictorial interpretation. To adults, such formulations might seem trivial, tedious or wrongly cast. But those issues are of great concern to young children: the early engagement forms the bedrock of our culturally diversified iconophilia. The interesting question is why it should be so. An evolutionary perspective looks likely to help us to an answer.

Peter Lamarque (University of York):
‘On Keeping Psychology Out of Literary Criticism’
The paper casts a critical eye over attempts to incorporate psychology into literary criticism over the past century. On this issue there appears to have been a long drawn-out tussle between the romantics and the modernists, the latter against, the former in favour of, psychological accounts of literature and literary value. Each side put up some strong arguments but in the end it seemed that the modernists won the day. But now there is a new romanticism re-emerging, in the form of theories of emotion and literature. Prominent among these is the work of Jenefer Robinson. But is there enough in Robinson’s theory to make literary critics think again? I suspect not.
**Chris McManus (UCL):**

‘Beauty is Instinctive Feeling’
I will start by briefly criticising grand psychological theories of art and aesthetics, typically based in neuroscience or evolutionary psychology. Instead I will look in detail at what Darwin called the ‘instinctive feeling’ of beauty, and its exploration in the Fechnerian experimental tradition of preferences for simple figures such as rectangles, and will show that the much beloved golden section actually plays little role in explaining the range of stable preferences that occur. I will end with an experiment looking at the paintings of Mondrian, and preferences for originals vs. pseudo-Mondrians.

**Jesse Prinz (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill):**

‘Emotion and Aesthetic Value’
A growing body of empirical evidence, from psychology and cognitive neuroscience, indicates that emotions arise in the context of aesthetic evaluation. Building on this evidence, I argue that emotion actually plays two roles: emotions can occur as response to works of art, as when a work induces sadness or amusement, and, more controversially, emotions also constitute our sense appraisal of an artwork as good – what I call the feeling of appreciation. But what is appreciation? Is it a basic emotion or can it be reduced to some other emotion that is more fundamental? After critically surveying several possibilities, I propose that appreciation is a form of wonder.

**William Seeley (Franklin & Marshall College):**

‘Imagining Crawling Home: A Case Study in Cognitive Science & Aesthetics’
Philosophical accounts of narrative fictions can be divided into two types. *Experiential accounts* argue that we come to comprehend narrative fictions by imaginatively projecting ourselves into depicted events and adopting the perspectives of their characters from a first person point of view. *Inferential accounts* argue to the contrary that we understand narrative fictions inferentially, from a third-person point of view, as outside observers. Recent psychological research suggests a means to evaluate this debate. Verbal assessment and visual matching measures demonstrate that the apparent extent of landscapes is influenced by the energetic and emotional costs of actions. Interestingly, these effects are limited to cases in which participants anticipate an increase in the energetic/emotional costs of actions they intend to perform themselves. This suggests that, if the experiential account is sound, one should find similar effects across changes in the interpretation of the energetic/emotional costs of depicted actions in paintings.
Dorothy G. Singer (Yale University):
‘The Contributions of Pretend Play to Later Adult Consciousness’
The beginnings of make-believe play in children from about two years of age starts with transitional objects, play with soft toys, or imaginary playmates. The roles of pretending and story-telling play contribute to enjoyment and to cognitive, social, and emotional skills. Adults are the nurturers and enhancers of such play. Aspects of adult consciousness are wakeful perception; identification, labelling, and encoding; guided imagery, mental trial actions, and playfulness. The features of childhood play may be seen to foreshadow an array of functions of ongoing conscious thought, especially its narrative components, and following Baars’ theory, its role as a ‘theatre’ for prioritizing, decision-making, and creativity.

Johan Veldeman (University of Antwerp):
‘Pictorial Twofoldness and Perceptual Psychology’
I will be concerned with the tension created by two intuitions which are both plausible yet appear mutually incompatible. The first is called ‘perceptualism’, which is the idea that depiction should be grounded on a theory of visual perception. The second is Richard Wollheim’s intuition that depiction is marked by what he calls ‘seeing-in’, that is, a distinctive ‘twofold’ experience, involving the simultaneous awareness of the picture’s surface properties and the picture’s subject. Perceptualism prescribes that pictorial experience be treated as largely continuous with ordinary visual experience. Seeing-in, on the other hand, appears quite unlike seeing things face-to-face and seems to resist an explanation in purely perceptual terms. I shall explore the ways in which both strands can be made compatible. Moreover, I shall consider how this might allow us to readdress Wollheim’s insistence upon treating pictorial twofoldness as involving ‘two aspects of a single experience’.

Dahlia Zaidel (UCLA):
‘Neuroscience of Visual Art, Biology, and Brain Evolution’
We have a great deal to learn about art’s appearance from sensory impairments and central brain damage in established artists. Keeping in mind that multiple factors are responsible for the appearance of visual art, here I will focus on how pictorial representation could be affected by the health status of the eyes in famous artists, on the lessons from brain damage in established artists, and on the biological and evolutionary significance of pictorial representations.
Nick Zangwill (Durham University):
‘Music & Aesthetic Realism’
I examine the aesthetic and non-aesthetic concepts that are involved in our experience and understanding of music. I make a sharp distinction between what we say about aesthetic thought and experience and what we say about aesthetic talk about music. The linguistic description is metaphorical, involving imaginative redeployment of non-aesthetic concepts; but the thought about the music does not. It is cognitive and not imaginative. I give an account of the relation between the aesthetic and non-aesthetic concepts of, for example, ‘delicacy’, such that it is intelligible that we use the word in descriptions of music, and such that there is the right kind of connection between the concepts, even though they are distinct.