INTERRODUCTION

Throughout much of the twentieth century, a 15-45km wide strip of territory parallel to Greece’s northern land boundaries has been designated a “surveillance zone”.1 subject to significant security-related regulations and restrictions (Figure 1). The aim of this article is to assess the impact of the surveillance zone on the economic development of Greek borderlands, particularly in the vicinity of the Bulgaria – Greece boundary within the Prefecture of Xanthi.

The existence of the border surveillance zone in Greece represents an anachronism when set against the background of European Union (EU) policies. These include the aim of overcoming the negative aspects associated with borderlands development through the removal of internal borders within the Union and the encouragement of cooperation across the EU’s external boundaries. This process is associated with the EU’s fundamental objective of eventual economic and monetary union within the Union. To that end a requirement exists that there be economic convergence between member states and growing similarity in development both between and within them.

From the outset it was realised that the areas where some of the greatest divergencies could be observed were the peripheral, borderland, regions. It was also recognised that the politically induced seclusion of areas was one of the key reasons for the failure of many regional policies aimed at addressing the problems of borderlands undertaken at a national level in promoting cross-border cooperation. The first initiative along these lines was the Interreg programme, introduced in 1990. Its relative success, as well as growing concern over regional disparities as an important obstacle to integration, resulted in the continuation of the programme with the inauguration of Interreg II concurrently with a number of other smaller complementary initiatives, such as Phare, Tacis; Recite and Overture/Ecos.2
Considerable attention has also been devoted to the external borderland of the EU. These areas are viewed as the ‘gates’ of the EU connecting the Union with countries which, in spite the fact that they are currently experiencing a degree of political and social instability expressed in various forms and severity, will in due course provide the scope for the gradual expansion of the EU. The EU has therefore tried to promote the economic development of these areas and foster the growth of transboundary links as a prelude to their eventual integration into the EU proper.

In this context, the surveillance zone in northern Greece, with its associated military restrictions, represents a national policy profoundly inconsistent with those of the European Union ideal.

The difficulties associated with the analysis of the surveillance zone are numerous. A significant impediment is the understandable reluctance of many of the interested parties – the inhabitants of the area under study as well as their representatives, civil servants working in the area etc., to disclose information or even personal opinions that might prove helpful in analysis. This is the case because the issues of the surveillance zone as well as that of the status of the (Muslim) Pomak minority (over half of whom live in the surveillance zone) are among the ‘sacred cows’ of Greek society and therefore sensitive issues to address. In fact, issues related to ethnicity have historically been the cause of significant tensions, not only in the southern Balkans area but throughout the whole of Eastern Europe, and are therefore always approached with extreme caution.

The surveillance zone is a product of the last major redistribution of territory in the Balkans which took place in the 1920s, when the Treaty of Lausanne (1924) determined Greece’s present-day northern borders. Amidst the instability of these early years one of the measures suggested and finally implemented was the surveillance zone. This was first introduced in 1936 by the military dictatorship in power at the time. The 15-45km-wide surveillance zone was therefore defined to the north by Greece’s boundaries with Albania, the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Bulgaria and Turkey and to the south by internal boundaries within Greece which have varied over time.

When the surveillance zone was established, the regulation of movement both into the zone and within it fell to the army administration of the area, with the determination of the exact limits of the border zone being the responsibility of the Committee for Military Security of the Surveillance Zone. 3 In extreme cases these authorities could impose stricter regulations, or even forbid entry to certain categories of person. In practice this meant that quite a large area which until then had been integrated into the economy of the country, suddenly came under a number of significant restrictions, the most important of which were:

- A pass, issued by the police, was required to enter the surveillance zone. Some people, Greeks as well as foreigners considered to be dangerous for the national security, were forbidden entry. This pass was a sort of ‘passport’, for internal use only, that had to be shown at the checkpoints (bara) controlled by the army.
- The inhabitants of the surveillance zone had to carry a special identity card.
- Within the surveillance zone a special work permit was required for all professions.
- No one was allowed to enter or leave the surveillance zone or to move from one village to another within the surveillance zone from 12 midnight to 5 a.m.
- No one was allowed to migrate into the surveillance zone, or migrate from one village within the surveillance zone to another, without a permit to do so from
the relevant Prefecture issued on the advice of the Committee for Military Security.

- The Committee for Military Security in each Prefecture could expel all those considered a security risk from the surveillance zone for up to five years.
- All civil servants and local authority employees were obliged to collaborate closely with the Committee for Military Security regarding issues which were perceived to be of importance for military security. Failure to do so might lead to dismissal.
- It was necessary to present a “loyalty certificate” (pistopioitiko koinonikon fronimaton), issued by the police, for every legal transaction in the area (1948-1974). It is, however, worth mentioning that such certificates were widely used in Greece at that period.
- State-owned areas within the surveillance zone, be they mineral resources, forests, vineyards, fields or plantations, fell under the exclusive administration of the military authorities. Their administration was not subject to the relevant national legislation applying to such areas elsewhere in the country (i.e. Public Estates, Forest Code and Public Accounting). The military authorities were permitted to let the areas without an auction or to cultivate them and use their products for the needs of the army.

Gradually, and particularly since the fall of the military dictatorship in 1974, Greek governments have abandoned the stance that the major military threat to the country came from the north (i.e. from the communist countries). Hence, gradually and informally, the area encompassed by the surveillance zone was reduced and restrictions were lifted. Nevertheless, it is important to note that although several changes have been made to the legislation concerning the surveillance zone since its introduction, these laws have never been officially repealed for any area along the borders.

As has already been mentioned, the surveillance zone was initially supposed to be a defence zone. The limits of this zone were, however, always somewhat ill-defined. This is not to imply that the selection of the areas covered by the zone was left to chance. On the contrary, it appears that there is a clear relationship between the areas included in the surveillance zone and the distribution of minority populations. For example, half of the Pomaks in Greece live within the surveillance zone – 19,291 people out of 38,000 (Papagiannakis et al., 1994: 47).

It can be argued that this was the case because of the negative association between minorities and the defence of the country – a view widely held in Greece. In this context it should be highlighted that ethnically mixed populations exist all along Greece’s northern borders. Moreover, many of these communities traditionally migrated across these borders with their livestock. As Drury (1991: 16,18) argues:

…it is not remotely accurate to regard the Greco-Bulgarian border as one which neatly divides Greeks from Bulgarians. Whilst this may legally be true in terms of citizenship, evidence on the ground suggests otherwise.

Furthermore, in the frontier regions,

…we find major concentrations of Turks, Pomaks and ‘Macedonians’ as well as Sarakatsani and Gypsies. Combined, these transform ethnic Greeks and Bulgarians into a minority, sometimes a negligible one, within much of the frontier zone. And when we note how many of these Greeks and Bulgarians have been imported into the area during this century we are reminded that this is a classically mixed frontier region, characterised by this very complexity, through which the international
boundary cuts, not ‘naturally’ as its physical alignment suggests, but harshly. Both states have found it hard to extend their core values to these mountains.

It is possible to distinguish two stages in the role of the surveillance zone. In the first period, up to the mid-1970s the role of the zone was primarily a military one. In the second period from the mid 1970s to the present, however, the surveillance zone was abolished in practice in most areas, although the relevant legislation was never repealed. It remained in force in areas characterised by high minority concentrations and its role became primarily a political one.

The last areas affected were some of the northern parts of the Prefectures of Xanthi and Rodopi in Thrace, areas mainly inhabited by the Pomaks, one of the oldest indigenous minorities. In November 1995 as a goodwill gesture the Defence Minister lifted the last military checkpoint (bara) of the surveillance zone in Xanthi, supposedly putting an end to this situation. It is important, however, to note that the barricade was lifted for Greek nationals only, and most importantly, everything else remained as before (i.e. the operation of the ‘Cultural Offices’, the unofficial discrimination against the minority people and so forth).

Thus, from the mid-1970s on, and particularly since events in Eastern Europe dating from 1989, the Greek authorities came to realise that, at least from a Military perspective, the surveillance zone was becoming obsolete. Furthermore, the concept of the Surveillance Zone was becoming difficult to defend, since it was no longer one of NATO’s fronts against communism. Greek sovereignty was no longer threatened by her northern neighbours, and so the focus of defence policy moved elsewhere, especially to Greece’s eastern borders with Turkey.

Nevertheless, there remained a few enclaves in which strict controls were still in force until very recently. This reinforces the contention that the surveillance zone ceased to exist as a military buffer, and was converted into an instrument for the political manipulation of the Greek citizens living there, thus coming to resemble areas akin to reservations or homelands.

The remainder of this paper will be devoted to a specific case study so as to illustrate the points outlined in detail. It is intended that this will demonstrate some of the reasons why the Surveillance Zone was established and its implications for the area in question and Greek society as a whole. The reason for the selection of Xanthi as the case study area is that until very recently (late 1997), this area was explicitly considered as part of the Surveillance Zone and thus subject to all related restrictions (bara, permits etc.).

The study area, Zone A, lies within the southern reaches of the Rhodopi mountains which present a formidable barrier to north-south movement across the border between Bulgaria and Greece. In any case, from the mid-1940s to 1986 all (legal) land movement between the two countries was restricted to the Koulata/Promachon rail and road border crossing which is situated at the south-west corner of Bulgaria (see Figure 1), practically shutting off the whole Thrace region from its northern neighbour. Land use in the area is dominated by agriculture and forestry together with some mineral extraction (primarily lead, manganese and zinc).

The surveillance zone frontier in the Prefecture of Xanthi has shifted three times since its establishment in 1936 (see Figure 2). Nearly 30 years have passed since the first boundary change, and the area which was part of the zone until 1967 appears to be back on a ‘typical’ development path. Focus will therefore rest on the development of the area included in the second boundary established in 1967. It can be argued that this date marks the shift from the internal boundary of the zone within
Greece being determined on the basis of military criteria to one delimited primarily with reference to political considerations. Indeed, all the villages within the 1967 line are populated predominantly by Pomaks.

In order to evaluate the impact of the surveillance zone on development, the study area can be compared with the western part of the Prefecture of Xanthi which boasts similar environmental characteristics but falls outside the limits of the surveillance zone as defined in 1967 (but had been a part of the zone in the 1936-67 period) and is predominantly inhabited by a Christian population (Zone B – Figure 2). This comparison presents a scenario which in all respects but one – population numbers – overwhelmingly favours the Christian-inhabited area outside the surveillance zone.

**ECONOMY**

The economy of the study area can be described as practically a subsistence economy in the sense that the inhabitants cultivate very small plots of mountainous land. Mechanisation in agriculture is minimal with work being done with the assistance of horses and mules. Each family grows potatoes (6.7% of cultivated land) and beans, and possesses a sheep, a goat or a cow and a few chickens, all for its own use. In addition they cultivate oriental (Basma) tobacco (a highly labour-intensive crop) which is the most significant tradeable product (54.5% of cultivated land); rye (5.6%), corn (3.9%), wheat and barley.

In contrast, although the economy of Zone B outside the surveillance zone is also largely based on agriculture and until the 1950s was reliant on oriental tobacco crops,
today agriculture has been modernised and the economy chiefly depends on horticulture, plants for animal feed and fruit.

A range of social indices, outlined in Table 2, indicate that the economy of the Zone A lags significantly behind that of the neighbouring Zone B. Furthermore, public spending on public works per person in 1991 was 19 times lower in the study area than the comparable area outside the zone (Table 2).

The economic activities of the Muslim minorities are extremely limited and to a significant extent confined to a closed economic circuit, that is, a ‘parallel economy’. A significant portion of the Muslim minority consists of tradesmen whose activities are, almost exclusively, confined to the minority. On the other hand, some Pomaks from the surveillance zone, dispose of their products (potatoes, etc.) at the larger markets and bazaars of Xanthi.

Muslim minorities in general were exploited economically and this is even truer for the Pomaks in the surveillance zone, whose isolation made exploitation easier, as fear of repercussions was practically absent. The Greek Christians who have been exploiting them economically are nicknamed “Tourkodieti”, that is people who make extra profits (which were very often significant) from the minorities for assistance in the provision of state regulated services such as driving licences and building permits. They are usually civil servants and people in the services and professions (architects, civil engineers etc.). Moreover, the very existence of the surveillance zone gave birth to peculiar monopolistic conditions, since traders who planned to enter the area in order to sell their products had to obtain a permit from the police. The criteria used for the issue of these permits were ambiguous and often at the discretion of the policemen, which actually meant that legal and other impediments were in some cases more easily evaded than in others.

Housing conditions in the study area are poor, not only because the people are poor but mainly because the houses have generally been ‘illegally’ built, as few if any of the minority people in the area have title deeds for their property (land or house). Anyone wanting a building permit had to procure a document from the local authority certifying that he had owned the land since 1923, and on the basis of this certificate he was allowed to get a building permit. Meanwhile, in the neighbouring area outside the limits of the surveillance zone, ruined and abandoned housing coexists with modern developments. This testifies to out-migration from the area towards urban centres and abroad coupled with return migration resulting in the erection of new housing.

Although there was a relatively limited degree of out-migration from the study area, its population has diminished by 6.7% in the 1961-91 period – this compares with an average of 15.6% for the mountainous areas of Xanthi Prefecture as a whole and the staggering 50.5% for mountainous areas predominantly inhabited by Christian populations. Zone B illustrates the point. A number of villages in the area are totally deserted (e.g. Kaliva, Kastanitis; Kalo Nero, Margaritis and Lykodromio) while many others have largely become ‘summer resorts’ or second homes for retired people from the area. The remaining population is ageing, including many retired returned migrants who often only live in the area for part of the year (Table 3). In addition, large amounts of land lie fallow because their owners are absent and the low returns make the exploitation of the land (i.e. the renting of the land) unprofitable.

In a sense it could be argued that the surveillance zone policy has produced a positive outcome, in that the locals remained in their mountain villages, which is a rather unusual phenomenon for Greece, where extreme depopulation is the rule. Today this constitutes the major strength for the development of the area.
The relatively limited migration from the study area was primarily due to a feeling of insecurity among the Pomaks, leading to the creation of very tight bonds within their communities. The relatively low mobility of the minority and the resulting seclusion inevitably created an alienation of the minority, which tended to reinforce low mobility. According to the members of the minority the population of the study area stayed together in order to educate their children ‘properly’ and to maintain their religious worship. Nevertheless, during the last few years in which the discrimination against them has significantly been reduced, out-migration has increased.

Furthermore, the Pomaks did not follow other Greeks in the massive emigration of the 1960s, primarily to Germany, due to two seemingly contradictory reasons. On the one hand the Pomaks feared that if they did emigrate they would lose their right to return to Greece. On the other hand, such emigration, based on bilateral agreements between Greece and the other countries involved (i.e. Germany, Belgium, etc.), was at least partially controlled by the Greek state, which obstructed emigration on the part of such groups (e.g. people had to produce a loyalty certificate, issued by the police).

**PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE**

Provision of the basic physical infrastructure in Zone A such as roads, electricity, telecommunications and schooling was found to be very poor in comparison to Zone B, even though considerable improvements have been made since 1991. For instance, there are no sewers and no rubbish disposal in the study area, while electricity consumption is much lower than in Zone B. The poor road network in the area, and in some cases the absolute lack of a road network, represents a major obstacle to the development of the study area – a problem which is shared by Zone B, however, to a lesser extent.

**PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT**

Within the study area no Pomaks were employed in the Greek civil service (in the public service, or in the Communes – not even in the Communes inhabited exclusively by Pomaks; or to the medical station in Echinos, etc.), not even at the lowest clerical level (such as a cleaner). There was no apparent policy to encourage employment of the locals in the wider public sector. The same finding did not hold true for locals in relation to public service in Zone B. The only exception, of course, is the elected municipal representatives (mayors, counsellors) who are not appointed.

**DEVELOPMENTAL EFFORTS AND STATE SUPPORT**

Attempts to develop the economy of the study area have been hampered by the mountainous nature of the terrain; the paucity of the area’s physical infrastructure (particularly roads); the difficulties experienced by locals in order to acquire the necessary permits; the lack of capital in the area and difficulties in gaining access to capital from outside; incentives available elsewhere along the border; and by perceptions of non-locals that areas adjacent to the border are unsafe and used as ghettos.

Even under Interreg I and II no provisions for developmental assistance were made for the study area. Moreover, the Greek government was reluctant to open a road to Bulgaria through Exinos. Instead, strong pressure was exerted from Christian members of parliament of all parties in the area to open the road through Livaditis, an almost deserted village (10 inhabitants) in the Christian dominated Zone B. In contrast, quite serious attempts have been made to encourage industry in Zone B with some success (e.g. a carpet-manufacturing firm in Stavroupolis, a charcoal-producing factory between Dafnonas and Neochori, a rubber sole factory and a cheese-making dairy cooperative in Neochori) based on the extremely favourable incentives legislation that existed for the area since 1976 (Labrianidis and Papamichos,1990).
Several other projects also received state support in Zone B:

- The financing of the colonisation of the deserted village of Livaditis in the late 1960s. People were given land, cash to build houses and to live for few months, as well as the right to grow potatoes for seed production. To help them the Ministry of Agriculture built and operated a warehouse to process and preserve potatoes for seed production. The whole operation was a complete failure and the village was again abandoned in the 1970s.
- Introduction of the cultivation of Virginia tobacco (Komnina, Paschalia, Dafnonas, etc.). The state financed the purchase of drying rooms for the Virginia tobacco.
- Creation of a ‘forest village’, 20km north of Livaditis next to the borders. 14 wooden houses have been built controlled by the forestry Department to encourage the development of tourism in the area.

However, only recently was it decided that one of the perpendicular connections of Egnatia highway (connecting Igoumenitsa at the west coasts of Greece with the Greek-Turkish borders in eastern Greece) with the road networks of the neighbouring countries will pass through Exinos. This development possibly marks an active inversion of the official policy, since this is the first time that the area (in fact since its incorporation to Greece), is becoming an integral part of the country’s development strategic planning, irrespective of political considerations.

The surveillance zone had two roles: military and political control. The military role was to protect the country from possible hostile actions of external enemies. The political role was threefold:

(a) political control of a distrusted minority;
(b) political/electoral control of a heavily dependent population in favour of Greek parties in government and
(c) economic control/exploitation of the area through the handling of permits (building, working, trading, driving licences, etc.), renting of state-owned or confiscated land and of mineral resources.

The consequences of this treatment in the surveillance zone are:

- A lack of investment, since conditions in the area are atypical (e.g. no free movement of capital and labour), quite apart from the fear (at least until the 1970s) that a war might break out with the northern neighbours which would have extremely unfavourable implications for the area;
- A lack of modernisation of the economy, as shown by traditional activities (agriculture and livestock farming) which themselves lacked modernisation;
- A tendency to become self-sufficient, in order to cope with isolation;
- A lack of employment opportunities, which led the most active part of the population to migrate from this zone for long periods of the year or to be involved in commuting; and,
- A tendency to become a ghetto. This was manifested in a suspicious attitude towards the ‘outside’ world (rejection of the education system etc.) and led to the exploitation of the zone by certain individuals with access to the political leadership of the surveillance zone administration.

The above-mentioned factors in turn further marginalised the economic structure of the zone.

If the Greek government’s strategy was to break up the existing concentration of minorities in the surveillance zone, it is more than obvious that it failed. In fact, the degree of cohesion of the minorities grew immensely within the zone preventing the
depopulation that happened spontaneously in mountain areas all over Greece. If, on the other hand, the strategy was exclusively to restrict the minorities in the existing areas of concentration, it once again seems to have failed. The lack of development and poor living standards did result in some out-migration from the surveillance zone. The only ‘strategy’ which, at least implicitly, seems to have existed was to make the life of the minorities difficult.

On the whole, the policy of the surveillance zone is a typical case of the inability of the Greek state to draw up and implement a consistent policy with clearly defined aims. As a result the policy had unattended adverse effects. Probably the most glaring failure of the Greek governments towards the minorities was the fact that having three distinct Muslim groups according to the Lausanne Treaty of 1924 – the Pomaks, gypsies and those of Turkish origin – all three of which were hostile to Turkey, the Greek authorities eventually turned them all into a ‘Turkish minority group.’ Hence, one might argue that the surveillance zone policy had the opposite effects to the ones that it was initially introduced for.

1 Surveillance zone or controlled zone [epitiroumeni zoni]
2 Recite, Interg I and II and Overture/Ecos were inter-regional cooperation actions, the former concerning cooperation within the EU and the latter with non-EU countries, while Interreg dealt with both cases. Phare and TACIS are programmes aiming at providing assistance to central and eastern European (CEE) countries and newly industrialising states (NIS) respectively in order to overcome their transition-related problems.
3 The Committee for Military Security (CMS – Epitropi Stratiotikis Asfaleias) of each prefecture was a body composed of five members representing the police, the army and the government, as the respective prefects were always the heads of the committees.
5 This is not the only such case where legislation has remained, however inoperative (e.g. Greece in 1974 entered into a “state of emergency”, due to the Turkish invasion in Cyprus, and has remained in this state ever since.
6 The Cultural Offices (COs – Politistika Grafeia) are based on all three prefectures of Thrace (Xanthi, Rodopi and Evros) and are supervised by a central office located in Kavala. The COs are departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and therefore act as representatives of the Ministry in the region. Apart of the issues regarding the Ministry, until very recently their jurisdiction included the allocation of permits for houses, stores, cars or tractors, based mainly in information they collected. Since 1992, however, the abnormalities and the discrimination caused by this authority have been made obvious and the relevant restrictions are gradually being abolished.
7 One of the disadvantages of this situation was that nobody was eligible to receive a farmer’s early retirement pension, since a prerequisite for that was to have such a certificate.
8 For years now an investor has wanted to open a petrol filling station in Exinos, but is not being given a permit.
9 For example, there is no bank in the area, not even a branch of the state-owned Agricultural Bank of Greece. This is a serious problem for farmers in the area, since they are forced to travel to Xanthi for all their transactions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Table 1: Selected social indices concerning the mountainous area of the Prefecture of Xanthi, 1991.
(A): surveillance zone inhabited by Pomaks and
(B): area outside the surveillance zone inhabited by Christian orthodox

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>(A)</th>
<th>(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>inhabitants/telephone (1988)</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>asphalted roads as % total area (1988)</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>electric consumption/person (Mwh) (1988)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>persons/dwelling (1991)</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>irrigated land % of total cultivated land</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public spending on public works/person</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>122.2</td>
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</table>


Table 2: Evolution of population in the mountainous area of the Prefecture of Xanthi, 1961-1991.
(A): surveillance zone inhabited by Pomaks and
(B): area outside the surveillance zone inhabited by Christian orthodox

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commune</th>
<th>Number of villages</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kotyli</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,080</td>
<td>2,356</td>
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<tr>
<td>Myki</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4,694</td>
<td>6,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Echinos</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3,269</td>
<td>3,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thermon</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,779</td>
<td>1,396</td>
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<tr>
<td>Geraka</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,007</td>
<td>569</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kymeria</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3,109</td>
<td>2,807</td>
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<tr>
<td>Satron</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2,652</td>
<td>1,068</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oreou</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2,088</td>
<td>1,308</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub Total</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>20,678</td>
<td>19,291</td>
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<tr>
<td>(B)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stavroupolis</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,962</td>
<td>1,043</td>
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<tr>
<td>Komninon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>564</td>
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<tr>
<td>Karofitou</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>347</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paschalias</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>165</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dafnonas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Total</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5,025</td>
<td>2,488</td>
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<td>Prefecture of Xanthi</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountainous</td>
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<td>26,122</td>
<td>22,044</td>
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<tr>
<td>Semi-mountainous + plains&lt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>64,151</td>
<td>68,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>210</td>
<td>90,273</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (a) Including the city of Xanthi
Source: NSSG Population census. years 1961 and 1991,
Table 3: Returned migrant families from Germany that reside in the area permanently (I) or reside elsewhere and occasionally visit the area (e.g. during vacations) (II), in 1992.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commune</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stavroupolis</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dafnonas</td>
<td>25(^a)</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karyofito</td>
<td>1(^b)</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komnina</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neochori</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pascalia</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
(a) 9 from Athens, 6 from Thessaloniki
(b) 1 from Thessaloniki
(c) Basically in Athens, Thessaloniki, Xanthi and to a lesser extend in Drama
(d) Almost exclusively in Germany
It is estimated that the average family size is 3 persons.
Source: Loukakis et al. (1993, 58).