Prof Angel Hernando-Veciana, PhD in Economics, University College London
Prof. Angel Hernando-Veciana has held academic positions in Universidad de Alicante (assistant professor), Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (assistant and associate professor) and University College London (funded by a Marie Curie postdoc from the European Commission).
His work on mechanism design, information economics and auction theory has been published in the top journals of economic theory: Journal of Economic Theory, Theoretical Economics, Games and Economic Behavior and Economics Letters.
His work has contributed to the understanding of the implications of bidders’ asymmetries in auctions, competition among auctioneers, and more recently to the design of interest benchmarks like the LIBOR and mechanisms to allocate refugees.
He has also been principal researcher of several research projects funded by the Spanish government and private institutions and has played a leading role in the production of online courses.
Prof. Angel Hernando-Veciana has a PhD in Economics (2001) from the University College London. Before joining Durham University Business School in 2018, he held the position of Associate Professor of Economics at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid in Spain. His field of specialization is microeconomic theory, in particular mechanism design, information economics and auction theory. He has published several scientific papers in the top publications of his area of research: Journal of Economic Theory, Theoretical Economics, Games and Economic Behavior and Economics Letters.
- Auction Theory
- Information Economics
- Mechanism Design
- Microeconomic Theory
- 1: Hernando-Veciana, Angel & Tröge, Michael (2019). Cheap Talk and Strategic Rounding in Libor Submissions. Review of Financial Studies
- 2: Beker, Pablo F. & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel (2015). The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints. Journal of Economic Theory 155: 234-261.
- 3: Hernando-Veciana, A. & Michelucci, F. (2018). Inefficient Rushes in Auctions. Theoretical Economics 13(1): 273-306.
- 4: Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio (2017). On the efficiency of the first price auction. Economics Letters 156: 159-161.
- 5: Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio (2014). On the optimality of not allocating. Economics Letters 125(2): 233-235.
- 6: Hernando-Veciana, A. (2018). Auctions. In Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II. Corchon, L. & Marini, M. Edward Elgar. 2: 318-337.
- Börgers, Tilman, Hernando-Veciana, Angel & Krähmer, Daniel (2013). When are signals complements or substitutes?. Journal of Economic Theory 148(1): 165-195.
- Hernando-Veciana, Ángel (2012). Comment on: “Auctions with a buy price: The case of reference-dependent preferences”. Games and Economic Behavior 74(1): 235-239.
- Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio (2011). Second best efficiency and the English auction. Games and Economic Behavior 73(2): 496-506.
- Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Tröge, Michael (2011). The insider's curse. Games and Economic Behavior 71(2): 339-350.
- Hernando-Veciana, Ángel (2009). Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids. Games and Economic Behavior 65(2): 372-405.
- Hernando-Veciana, Ángel (2006). On the Sub-optimality of Entry Fees in Auctions With Entry. Review of Economic Design 10(1): 53-61.
- Hernando-Veciana, Ángel (2005). Competition among auctioneers in large markets. Journal of Economic Theory 121(1): 107-127.
- Hernando-Veciana, Ángel (2004). Successful uninformed bidding. Games and Economic Behavior 48(1): 29-53.