Publication detailsKamei, K. & Putterman, L. (2017). Play it Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning from Finitely-Repeated Dilemma Games. The Economic Journal 127(602): 1069-1095.
- Publication type: Journal Article
- ISSN/ISBN: 0013-0133, 1468-0297
- DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12320
- Keywords: Cooperation, Reputation, Voluntary contribution, Public goods, Sorting, Endogenous grouping, Group formation, Experiment.
- Further publication details on publisher web site
- Durham Research Online (DRO) - may include full text
Author(s) from Durham
Often the fuller the reputational record people's actions generate, the greater their incentive to earn a reputation for cooperation. However, inability to “wipe clean” one's past record might trap some agents who initially underappreciate reputation's value in a cycle of bad behaviour, whereas a clean slate could have been followed by their “reforming” themselves. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate what subjects learn from playing a finitely repeated dilemma game with endogenous, symmetric partner choice. We find that with a high cooperation premium and good information, investment in cooperative reputation grows following exogenous restarts, although earlier end-game behaviours are observed.