Publication detailsFrench, S. & Vickers, P. (2011). Are There No Things That Are Scientific Theories? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62(4): 771-804.
- Publication type: Journal Article
- ISSN/ISBN: 0007-0882, 1464-3537
- DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axr011
- Further publication details on publisher web site
- Durham Research Online (DRO) - may include full text
Author(s) from Durham
The ontological status of theories themselves has recently re-emerged as a live topic in the philosophy of science. We consider whether a recent approach within the philosophy of art can shed some light on this issue. For many years philosophers of aesthetics have debated a paradox in the (meta)ontology of musical works (e.g. Levinson ). Taken individually, there are good reasons to accept each of the following three propositions: (i) musical works are created; (ii) musical works are abstract objects; (iii) abstract objects cannot be created. However it seems clear that, if one wants to avoid inconsistency, one cannot commit to all three. Following up recent developments courtesy of Cameron ([2008a]), we consider how one might respond to the corresponding set of propositions in the (meta)ontology of scientific theories.