Publication detailsLi, Daniel Z. (2016). Disclosure or not, when there are three bidders? Economics Bulletin 36(1): 349-354.
- Publication type: Journal Article
- ISSN/ISBN: 1545-2921
- Further publication details on publisher web site
- Durham Research Online (DRO) - may include full text
Author(s) from Durham
This paper provides a more general sufficient condition than Hummel and McAfee (2015) for optimal information disclosure in auctions when there are three bidders. We show that the optimal disclosure policy is related to the skewness of the distribution of bidders' valuations. Specifically, if the distribution is skewed to the left (right), it is optimal for the seller to reveal full (no) information to the bidders. And if it is symmetric, then there's no difference between revealing information or not.