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Durham University

Research & business

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Publication details

Li, Daniel Z. (2016). Disclosure or not, when there are three bidders? Economics Bulletin 36(1): 349-354.

Author(s) from Durham

Abstract

This paper provides a more general sufficient condition than Hummel and McAfee (2015) for optimal information disclosure in auctions when there are three bidders. We show that the optimal disclosure policy is related to the skewness of the distribution of bidders' valuations. Specifically, if the distribution is skewed to the left (right), it is optimal for the seller to reveal full (no) information to the bidders. And if it is symmetric, then there's no difference between revealing information or not.