Publication details for Dr Timo HeinrichBrosig-Koch, J. & Heinrich, T. (2014). Reputation and mechanism choice in procurement auctions: An experiment. Production and Operations Management 23(2): 210-220.
- Publication type: Journal Article
- ISSN/ISBN: 1059-1478, 1937-5956
- DOI: 10.1111/j.1937-5956.2012.01365.x
- Further publication details on publisher web site
Author(s) from Durham
We experimentally study the role of reputation in procurement using two common mechanisms: price-based and buyer-determined auctions. While buyers are bound to buy from the lowest bidder in price-based auctions, they can choose between bidders in buyer-determined auctions. Only the latter buyers can consider the reputation of bidders. We find that bidders supply higher quality in buyer-determined auctions leading to higher market efficiencies in these auctions. Accordingly, buyers prefer the buyer-determined auction over the price-based auction, while only half of the bidders do so. A more detailed analysis of buyers' and bidders' behavior and profits provides insights into their mechanism choice.