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Department of Philosophy

Professor E. J. Lowe

Photo by Tuomas Tahko

Jonathan was born in Dover, England, on 24thMarch 1950. He went to Cambridge to read Natural Sciences in 1968, but changed to History after one year and was awarded a BA (first class) in 1971. After that, he switched to Philosophy and moved to Oxford, where he was awarded his BPhil and DPhil degrees in 1974 and 1975 (supervised by Rom Harré and Simon Blackburn respectively). After a brief period teaching at Reading, Jonathan joined the Department of Philosophy at Durham in 1980, where he stayed for the rest of his career. He was promoted to Senior Lecturer in 1990, Reader in 1992 and then Professor in 1995. During his time at Durham, Jonathan established himself as one of the world’s leading philosophers, publishing eleven single-authored books, four co-edited collections and well over 200 articles in journals and edited volumes. His scholarship was strikingly broad, ranging from early modern philosophy through to the interpretation of quantum mechanics. His most important and sustained contributions were to philosophy of mind, philosophical logic and especially metaphysics.

Jonathan adopted a realist conception of metaphysics as an autonomous discipline concerned with the fundamental structure of reality, as exemplified by his important book The Possibility of Metaphysics (OUP, 1998). Metaphysics, he maintained, should take common sense as its starting point, while at the same time acknowledging that aspects of common sense will need to be revised or abandoned. It should also retain a healthy respect for science but resist scientism, as the role of metaphysics is to illuminate features of reality that empirical scientific enquiry inevitably presupposes. It is therefore the most fundamental form of enquiry and - as Jonathan also emphasised – something that is extremely difficult to do. But, he insisted, there are no cheap short-cuts, and no piecemeal solutions to metaphysical problems. Metaphysics is to be done systematically and patiently. Jonathan’s approach drew inspiration from Aristotle and Locke, amongst others, both of whom retained a foothold in common sense. His metaphysical writings addressed a range of themes, including volition, personhood, agency, mental causation, identity, truth, essentialism, vagueness, and ontological categories. One of his many notable achievements was the formulation of a new ‘four-category ontology’, which he proposed as a metaphysical foundation for all empirical scientific thought. Developed over several years, its most detailed statement appears in The Four-Category Ontology (OUP, 2006). All entities (actual and possible) are assigned to one of the following ontological categories: object (or individual substance); kind; attribute; mode (or individual accident). Jonathan argued that this achieves the best balance between parsimony and explanatory power, providing a unitary account of identity and individuation, causation, dispositions and tendencies, laws, possibility, necessity and truth-making. It also reflects intuitive classificatory practices and the structure of natural language. The relationship between ontology, language and thought is further developed in his last book, Forms of Thought (CUP, 2013), which focuses on the notions of reference, predication, identity, modality and conditionality. Amongst other things, the book works towards an account of the logical form of propositional thoughts that complements the four-category ontology. Jonathan was working on two further book projects: a systematic defence of essentialism and a development of his ideas on emergent dualism.

Throughout his life, Jonathan was guided by a kind of faith in our ability to discover the fundamental structure of reality through metaphysical thought. He was spurred on by a constant sense of puzzlement, fascination and bewilderment at the existence and nature of reality, and would not let extraneous considerations distract him from a resolute search for truth. Those of us who knew Jonathan will remember him not just as a gifted and committed philosopher but also as an exceptionally kind, caring and generous person. He was an accomplished teacher, who did everything he possibly could to encourage, nurture and inspire his students, many of whom have gone on to have successful academic careers. He was similarly supportive of his colleagues at Durham and of the wider philosophical community. Philosophers from all over the world came to depend on him as a mentor and referee, and he would spend many hours most weeks writing carefully crafted letters of support. It was a privilege to work with Jonathan. He was always a keen participant in research events, at Durham and elsewhere, where he exercised his astonishingly refined critical skills and offered numerous insightful comments, without ever being dismissive. Even with his eminence in the profession and the many associated demands on his time, he insisted on doing his fair share (and usually more than his fair share) of administrative and teaching work. He was a reassuring presence in the department, who was always on hand to offer support, advice and consolation to colleagues. We are diminished by the loss of an outstanding philosopher and a great friend.

Jonathan died on the 5th January 2014, after several months of illness. He leaves his wife, Susan, and their two adult children, Rebecca and Tim.


PUBLICATIONS

Books

 

1. Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms (Aristotelian Monograph Series, No. 10), Oxford & New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989, pp. vi + 210. Reviews: P. F. Snowdon, Philosophical Books 32, 1991, 37-9; H. W. Noonan, Philosophy 66, 1991, 248-9; G. Engelbretsen, Iyyun 40, 1991, 100-105; P. Simons, Mind 101, 1992, 581-2; M. Baur, Review of Metaphysics 46, 1992, 166-8; F. J. Pelletier, History and Philosophy of Logic 13, 1992, 125-8

 

2. Locke on Human Understanding, London & New York: Routledge, 1995, pp. x + 203. Reviews: A. Miller, Locke Newsletter 26, 1995, 141-55; P. Snowdon, Mind 105, 1996, 348-51; B. Maund, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74, 1996, 528-30; N. Unwin, Philosophical Books 38, 1997, 97-8; E. Barbanell, Canadian Philosophical Reviews 15, 1995, 410-12; D. W. Hamlyn, Philosophical Investigations 20, 1997, 155-9; D. Doering, Jahrbuch zur Liberalismus-Forschung 8, 1996, 251-2; A. Nelson & L. Nolan, Philosophia 27, 1999, 665-8

 

3. Subjects of Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. x + 209. Reviews: K. Sutherland, Times Higher Education Supplement, Oct. 11, 1996, 21; J. Heil, Times Literary Supplement, Jan. 10, 1997, 27; G. Madell, Philosophy 72, 1997, 147-50; J. Brown, Philosophical Books 39, 1998, 56-8; K. Paprzycka, Canadian Philosophical Reviews 17, 1997, 45-7; J. L. Bermudez, Philosophical Quarterly 49, 1999, 272-5; U. Uus, Journal of Consciousness Studies 6, 1999, 90-1; C. Macdonald, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60, 2000, 224-8; C. J. L. Talmage, Dialogue 37, 1998, 631-3

 

4. The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity and Time, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. viii + 275. Reviews: F.Jackson, Times Literary Supplement, Apr. 9, 1999, 33; K. Hawley, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50, 1999, 478-82; S. McLeod, History and Philosophy of Logic 20, 1999, 141-3; E. Olson, Mind 109, 2000, 967-9; M. D. Gossiaux, Review of Metaphysics 54, 2000, 159-60; S. Shalkowski, Philosophical Books 41 (2000), 275-8; J. Heil, Philosophical Review 110, 2001, 91-4; G. Rosenkrantz, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64, 2002, 728-36; R. Le Poidevin, International Philosophical Quarterly 42, 2002, 546-7. Italian language version: La possibilità della metafisica: sostanza, identità, tempo, ed. & trans. S. Galvan, A. Corradini & C. L. De Florio, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2009.

 

5. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. xiii + 318. Reviews: M. di Francesco, Il Sole 24 Ore, 292, Oct. 29, 2000, 34; B. Benham, Metapsychology Online Reviews, Oct. 11, 2000; St.E. Cuypers, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 63, 2001; J. Gosling, International Philosophical Quarterly 4, 2001, 253-5; H. Langsam, Philosophical Books 42 (2001), 229-31; S. Crawford, Times Literary Supplement, 5167, Apr. 12, 2002, 29; B. Majors, Review of Metaphysics 56, 2002, 438-9; D. Heider, Filosoficky-Casopis 51, 2003, 1035-44. Spanish language version: Filosofia de la mente, trans. O. Fernandez Prat, Idea Books, 2000, pp. 281. Estonian language version: Sissejuhatus vaimufilosoofiasse, trans. T. Hallap,Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 2008, pp. 331. Persian language version: Nashr-e Markaz Publishing Company, 2010.

 

6. A Survey of Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. xiii + 402. Reviews: T. Crane, Times Higher Education Supplement, May 31, 2002; G. Keil, Zeitschrift fur Philosophische Forschung 57, 2003, 320-4; H. Clement, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 67, 2005, 347-8; A. M. Nguyen, Teaching Philosophy 29, 2006, 384-7

 

7. Locke, London & New York: Routledge, 2005, pp. xiii + 220. Reviews: J. Hill, Locke Studies 6, 2006, 211-18; M. Stuart, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 13/6/2006; W. E. Morris, Philosophical Books 49, 2008, 48-50

 

8. The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. xiv + 222. Reviews: I. Johansson, Dialectica 60, 2006, 513-18; R. Wasserman, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 11/4/2006; D. W. Mertz, The Modern Schoolman 84, 2006, 79-81; P. van Inwagen, Times Literary Supplement, 5415, Jan. 12, 2007, 22; S. Bostock, Philosophical Books 48, 2007, 274-7; J. Westerhoff, Mind 116, 2007, 759-62; B. C. Look, Review of Metaphysics 60, 2007, 666-8; P. Bricker, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87, 2009, 675-8; A. R. Thompson, Polish Journal of Philosophy 3, 2009, 143-7

 

9. Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. xvi + 222. Reviews: M. Griffith, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 15/6/2009; I. Persson, Times Literary Supplement, 5559, Oct. 16, 2009, 9; A. Gyr, Metaphysica 10, 2009, 215-21; B. P. Göcke, Philosophy 85, 2010, 302-306; R. Clarke, Mind 119, 2010, 820-3; A. Buckareff, Philosophy in Review 30, 2010, 276-9; L. O’Brien, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89, 2011, 172-4

 

10. More Kinds of Being: A Further Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms, Malden, MA & Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. xii + 227. Reviews: G. S. Rosenkrantz, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 12/8/2010

 

11. Forms of Thought: A Study in Philosophical Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. xii + 213.

 

12. Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, London & New York: Routledge, 2013, pp. x + 207. [Revised and expanded edition of 2 above]

 

 

Edited volumes

 

1. Analytic Philosophy Without Naturalism, ed. A. Corradini, S. Galvan & E. J. Lowe,London &New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. xiii + 266.

 

2. Psycho-Physical Dualism Today: An Interdisciplinary Approach, ed. A. Antonietti, A. Corradini & E. J. Lowe, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield (Lexington Books), 2008, pp. xv + 241.

 

3. Truth and Truth-Making, ed. E. J. Lowe & A. Rami, Stocksfield: Acumen, 2009, pp. x + 262. Reviews: D. Efird, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 17/8/2009; J. Dodd, Analysis Reviews 70, 2010, 567-71

 

4. Mental Causation and Ontology, ed. S. C. Gibb, E. J. Lowe & R. D. Ingthorsson, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. viii + 272.

 

 

Articles in journals and contributions to edited volumes  

 

1. Neither intentional nor unintentional, Analysis 38, 1978, 117-18

2. Indicative and counterfactual conditionals, Analysis 39, 1979, 139-41

3. For want of a nail, Analysis 40, 1980, 50-2

4. Peacocke and Kraemer on Butler’s Problem, Analysis 40, 1980,113-18

5. Active and passive euthanasia: an objection, Philosophy 55, 1980, 550-1 

6. Reply to Davis, Analysis 40, 1980, 187-90 

7. Sortal terms and natural laws, American Philosophical Quarterly 17, 1980, 253-60 [Prize Essay]

8. An analysis of intentionality, Philosophical Quarterly 30, 1980, 294-304

9. Against an argument for token identity, Mind 90, 1981, 120-1

10. “All actions occur inside the body”, Analysis 41, 1981, 126-9

11. Indirect perception and sense data, Philosophical Quarterly 31, 1981, 330-42

12. Laws, dispositions and sortal logic, American Philosophical Quarterly 19, 1982, 41-50

13. The paradox of the 1,001 cats, Analysis 42, 1982, 27-30

14. Reply to Geach, Analysis 42, 1982, 31

15. Intentionality and intuition: a reply to Davies, Analysis 42, 1982, 85

16. On being a cat, Analysis 42, 1982, 174-7

17. Intentionality: a reply to Stiffler, Philosophical Quarterly 32, 1982, 354-7

18. On the alleged necessity of true identity statements, Mind 91, 1982, 579-84

19. Instantiation, identity and constitution, Philosophical Studies 44, 1983, 45-59

20. A simplification of the logic of conditionals, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 24, 1983, 357-66

21. On the identity of artifacts, Journal of Philosophy 80, 1983, 220-32

22. Reply to Hornsby on actions, Analysis 43, 1983, 140-1

23. A note on a response of Hornsby’s, Analysis 44, 1984, 196-7

24. Wright versus Lewis on the transitivity of counterfactuals, Analysis 44, 1984, 180-3

25. Reply to Baldwinon de re modalities, Mind 94, 1985, 101-3

26. “If A and B, then A”, Analysis 45, 1985, 93-8

27. Sortal terms and absolute identity, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64, 1986, 64-71

28. Necessity and the will in Locke’s theory of action, History of Philosophy Quarterly 3, 1986, 149-63 [reprinted in U. Thiel (ed.), Locke: Metaphysics,Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002, 247-61]

29. Reply to Wright on conditionals and transitivity, Analysis 45, 1985, 200-2

30. What do we see directly?, American Philosophical Quarterly 23, 1986, 277-85

31. The topology of visual appearance, Erkenntnis 25, 1986, 271-4 

32. Miracles and laws of nature, Religious Studies 23, 1987, 263-78

33. Reply to Dale, Analysis 46, 1986, 83-5

34. Substance, An Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. G. H. R. Parkinson,London: Routledge, 1988, 255-78

35. Noonan on naming and predicating, Analysis 46, 1986, 159

36. The indexical fallacy in McTaggart’s proof of the unreality of time, Mind 96, 1987, 62-70

37. Not a counterexample to modus ponens, Analysis 47, 1987, 44-7 

38. On a supposed temporal/modal parallel, Analysis 46, 1986, 195-7

39. Reply to Over, Analysis 46, 1986, 200

40. What is the “problem of induction”?, Philosophy 62, 1987, 325-40

41. Lewis on perdurance versus endurance, Analysis 47, 1987, 152-4 [reprinted in H. Noonan (ed.), Identity, Aldershot:Dartmouth, 1993, 311-13]

42. Reply to Noonan, Analysis 47, 1987, 201-3

43. Reply to Le Poidevin and Mellor, Mind 96, 1987, 539-42

44. Substance, identity and time, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 62, 1988, 61-78

45. What is a criterion of identity?, Philosophical Quarterly 39, 1989, 1-21 [reprinted in H. Noonan (ed.), Identity, Aldershot:Dartmouth, 1993, 435-55]

46. The problems of intrinsic change: rejoinder to Lewis, Analysis 48, 1988, 72-7

47. David Lewis, Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, ed. H. Burkhardt & B. Smith,Munich: Philosophia, 1991, 453-4

48. Impredicative identity criteria and Davidson’s criterion of event identity, Analysis 49, 1989, 178-81

49. Conditionals, context and transitivity, Analysis 50, 1990, 80-7 

50. Real selves: persons as a substantial kind, Human Beings, ed. D. Cockburn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 87-107 [Review: C. Gill, Philosophical Quarterly 42, 1992, 502-4]

51. Objects and criteria of identity, A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, ed. R. Hale & C. Wright, Oxford & Cambridge MA: Basil Blackwell, 1997, 613-33

52. Experience and its objects, The Contents of Experience, ed. T. Crane, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992 [Reviews: T. Sorell, New Scientist, 14 Nov. 1992, 45-6; A.Millar, Mind 102, 1993, 362-6]

53. Contributions to Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, ed. R. E. Asher et al., Oxford & Aberdeen: Pergamon Press & Aberdeen University Press, 1993: a priori; abstract ideas; epistemology; natural kinds; sortal terms [reprinted in Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Language, ed. P. V. Lamarque, Oxford: Elsevier Science, 1997]

54. Jacksonon classifying conditionals, Analysis 51, 1991, 126-30

55. Substance and selfhood, Philosophy 66, 1991, 81-99

56. One-level versus two-level identity criteria, Analysis 51, 1991, 192-4

57. Noun phrases, quantifiers, and generic names, Philosophical Quarterly 41, 1991, 287-300

58. Rationality, deduction and mental models, Rationality, ed. K. Manktelow & D. Over,London: Routledge, 1993, 211-30

59. Primitive substances, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, 1994, 531-52

60. The problem of psychophysical causation, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70, 1992, 263-76 [reprinted in T. O’Connor & D. Robb (eds), Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings,London: Routledge, 2003, 49-64]

61. McTaggart’s paradox revisited, Mind 101, 1992, 323-6

62. Reply to Ramachandran on conditionals and transitivity, Analysis 52, 1992, 77-80

63. Perception: a causal representative theory, New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception, ed. E. Wright,Aldershot: Avebury, 1993, 136-52

64. Comment on Le Poidevin, Mind 102, 1993, 171-3

65. Contributions to The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. T. Honderich, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995: a priori and a posteriori; A-series and B-series; affirmative and negative propositions; analytic and synthetic statements; axiom; being; Bennett; capacity; Carnap; cat, Schroedinger’s; class; contingent and necessary statements; Dummett; existence; existential proposition; fact; generalization; identity, criterion of; Jackson; kind, natural; Kripke; Mellor; mereology; mode; monism and pluralism; names; necessary and sufficient conditions; necessity, epistemic; necessity, logical; necessity, metaphysical; nominalism; ontology; particulars and non-particulars; philosophical logic; potentiality; propensity; Ramsey; realization; recursion, definition by; redundancy theory of truth; reflective equilibrium; rigid designator; self; semantic theory of truth; specious present; Stalnaker; Strawson; things; thought experiments; time; time preference; time travel; truth; universals; Wiggins

66. Self, reference and self-reference, Philosophy 68, 1993, 15-33

67. Are the natural numbers individuals or sorts?, Analysis 53,1993, 142-6

68. Vague identity and quantum indeterminacy, Analysis 54, 1994, 110-14

69. The causal autonomy of the mental, Mind 102, 1993, 629-44 

70. Ontological dependency, Philosophical Papers 23, 1994, 31-48 

71. Die Metaphysik und ihre Möglichkeit, Metaphysik—Neue Zugänge zu alten Fragen, ed. J. Brandl, A. Hieke & P. Simons, St. Augustin: Academia Verlag, 1995, 11-32 

72. The truth about counterfactuals, Philosophical Quarterly 45,1995, 41-59

73. The problem of the many and the vagueness of constitution, Analysis 55, 1995, 179-82

74. Coinciding objects: in defence of the “standard account”, Analysis 55, 1995, 171-8

75. Tense and persistence, Questions of Time and Tense, ed. R. Le Poidevin,Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, 43-59

76. The metaphysics of abstract objects, Journal of Philosophy 92, 1995, 509-24

77. There are no easy problems of consciousness, Journal of Consciousness Studies 2, 1995, 266-71 [reprinted in Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem, ed. J. Shear,Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1997, 117-23]

78. Why is there anything at all?, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 70, 1996, 111-20

79. John Locke; Identity, Encyclopedia of Empiricism, ed. D.Garrett & E. Barbanell,Westport,CT:Greenwood Press, 1997, 172-7, 206-15

80. Reply to Noonan on vague identity, Analysis 57, 1997, 88-91

81. John Locke, Companion to the Philosophers, ed. R. L. Arrington, Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, 369-75 [reprinted in The World’s Great Philosophers, ed. R. L. Arrington,Oxford: Blackwell, 2003, 195-202]

82. Ontological categories and natural kinds, Philosophical Papers 26, 1997, 29-46

83. Philosophical logic, The Map of Contemporary British and American Philosophy, ed. Ouyang Kang, People’s Press [China], 2005, 479-519 [in Chinese] 

84. Conditional probability and conditional beliefs, Mind 105, 1996, 603-15

85. Why there are no easy problems of consciousness [abstract], History and Philosophy of Psychology Newsletter 22, Spring 1996, 17-18 

86. Concreta: substance—introduction, Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings, ed. S. D. Hales,Belmont,CA:Wadsworth, 1999, 371-6

87. Personal experience and belief: the significance of external symbolic storage for the emergence of modern human cognition, Cognition and Material Culture: The Archaeology of Symbolic Storage, ed. C. Scarre & C. Renfrew, Cambridge: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research, 1998, 89-96

88. Whose rationality? Logical theory and the problem of deductive competence, Cahiers de Psychologie Cognitive/Current Psychology of Cognition 16, 1997, 140-6

89. Entity, Identity and Unity, Erkenntnis 48, 1998, 191-208

90. Form without Matter, Ratio 11, 1998, 214-34 [reprinted in Form and Matter: Themes in Contemporary Metaphysics, ed. D. S. Oderberg,Oxford: Blackwell, 1999]

91. Contributions to The Fontana/Norton Dictionary of Modern Thought, ed. A. Bullock and S. Trombley, 3rd edn, London: Harper Collins, 1999: behaviourism; conventionalism; meaning; nominalism; realism; relativism

92. Self, agency and mental causation, Journal of Consciousness Studies 6, 1999, 225-39 [reprinted in The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will, ed. B. Libet, A. Freeman & K. Sutherland, Thorverton: Imprint Academic, 1999]

93. Contributions to The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. R. Audi, 2nd edn,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999: Armstrong, Dummett

94. Abstraction, properties and immanent realism, Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: Metaphysics, ed. T. Rockmore,Bowling Green,OH:PhilosophyDocumentationCenter, 1999, 195-205

95. Commentary on A. J. Hamilton’s ‘False Memory Syndrome and the Authority of Personal Memory Claims’, Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 5, 1998, 309-10

96. Vague identity and quantum indeterminacy: further reflections, Analysis 59, 1999, 328-30

97. In defence of the simplicity argument, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78, 2000, 105-12

98. Individuation, Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, ed. M. J. Loux & D. W. Zimmerman,Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press, 2003, 75-95

99. Causal closure principles and emergentism, Philosophy 75, 2000, 571-85

100. Identity, composition, and the simplicity of the self, Soul, Body and Survival, ed. K. J. Corcoran,Ithaca,NY: Cornell University Press, 2001, 139-58

101. Locke, Martin and substance, Philosophical Quarterly 50, 2000, 499-514 [reprinted in John Locke: Critical Assessments of Leading Political Philosophers, 2nd Series, Volume III: Metaphysics, ed. P. Anstey,London &New York: Routledge, 2006]

102. Event causation and agent causation, Grazer Philosophische Studien 61, 2001, 1-20

103. Properties, modes and universals, The Modern Schoolman 74, 2002, 137-50

104. Ontic indeterminacy of identity unscathed, Analysis 61, 2001, 241-5

105. Dispositions and laws, Metaphysica 2, 2001, 5-23

106. Metaphysical nihilism and the subtraction argument, Analysis 62, 2002, 62-73

107. Kinds, essence and natural necessity, Individuals, Essence and Identity: Themes of Analytic Metaphysics, ed. A. Bottani, M. Carrara & P. Giaretta,Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002, 189-206

108. A defence of the four-category ontology, Argument und Analyse, ed. C. U. Moulines & K. G. Niebergall, Paderborn: Mentis, 2002, 225-40

109. Is knowing a state of mind? Critical notice of T. Williamson’s Knowledge and its Limits, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10, 2002, 483-9

110. Substantial change and spatiotemporal coincidence, Ratio 16, 2003, 140-60

111. The rational and the real: some doubts about the programme of ‘rational analysis’, Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality, ed. J. L. Bermudez & A. Millar,Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002, 175-85

112. Recent advances in metaphysics [abstract], Formal Ontology in Information Systems: Collected Papers from the Second International Conference,New York: ACM Press, 2001, 1

113. Material coincidence and the cinematographic fallacy: a response to Olson, Philosophical Quarterly 52, 2002, 369-72

114. Locke: compatibilist event-causalist or libertarian substance-causalist? Critical study of G. Yaffe’s Liberty Worth the Name: Locke on Free Agency, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68, 2004, 688-701

115. La connaissance metaphysique, Revue de metaphysique et morale, 2002, 453-71

116. A serious look at serious naturalism: review essay on W. L. Craig & J. P. Moreland (eds), Naturalism: A Critical Analysis, Philosophia Christi 4, 2002, 197-2002

117. In defense of medium-sized specimens of dry goods, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68, 2003, 704-10

118. Personal agency, Minds and Persons, ed. A. O’Hear,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 211-27

119. 3D/4D equivalence, the twins paradox, and absolute time, Analysis 63, 2003, 114-23 [co-author Storrs McCall]

120. Substance causation, persons, and free will, Persons: An Interdisciplinary Approach, ed. C. Kanzian, J. Quitterer & E. Runggaldier, Vienna, 2003, 76-88

121. Metaphysical realism and the unity of truth, Monism, ed. A. Bachli & K. Petrus,Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2003, 109-23

122. Recent advances in metaphysics, Facta Philosophica 5, 2003, 3-24

123. Some formal ontological relations, Dialectica 58, 2004, 297-316

124. Physical causal closure and the invisibility of mental causation, Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, ed. S. Walter & H.-D. Heckmann,Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2003, 137-54

125. Identity, Individuality and Unity, Philosophy 78, 2003, 321-36

126. Entries in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 2nd edn, ed. T. Honderich, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005: animalism in personal identity; causal asymmetry or direction; counterpart theory; disquotation; emergence; essentialism; frame problem; modal realism; modality and metaphysics; presentism; probabilistic causality; reasoning, psychology of; slingshot arguments; tense; time’s arrow; truth (revised); zombies

127. Indeterminist free will, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70, 2005, 681-90 [co-author Storrs McCall]

128. The four-category ontology: reply to Kistler, Analysis 64, 2004, 152-7

129. Non-Cartesian dualism, Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology, ed. J. Heil,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, 851-65

130. Powerful particulars: review essay on J. Heil’s From an Ontological Point of View, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72, 2006, 466-79

131. Lois et dispositions, La structure du monde: objets, proprietes, etats de chose: Renouveau de la metaphysique dans l’ecole australienne de philosophie, ed. J.-M. Monnoyer, Paris: J. Vrin, 2004, 299-313

132. Vagueness and endurance, Analysis 65, 2005, 104-112

133. Is conceptualist realism a stable position? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71, 2006, 456-61

134. How are ordinary objects possible? The Monist 88, 2005, 510-33

135. Ideational theories of meaning, Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, Second Edition, volume 5, ed. K. Brown,Oxford: Elsevier, 2006, 483-5

136. Syntax and ontology: reflections on three logical systems, The Old New Logic: Essays on the Philosophy of Fred Sommers, ed. D. S. Oderberg,Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 2005, 49-65

137. Can the self disintegrate? Personal identity, psychopathology, and disunities of consciousness, Dementia: Mind, Meaning and the Person, ed. J. Hughes, S. Louw & S. Sabat,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, 89-103

138. The particular–universal distinction: a reply to MacBride, Dialectica 58, 2005, 335-40

139. Could volitions be epiphenomenal? Forthcoming [now appearing as Chapter 4 of Personal Agency]

140. Dualism, Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, ed. B. McLaughlin, A. Beckermann & S. Walter, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 66-84

141. Obituary of W. von Leyden, Locke Studies 5, 2005, 17-18

142. Dualism, Encyclopedia of Neuroscience, ed. M. D. Binder, N. Hirokawa & U. Windhorst, Berlin: Springer, forthcoming [now published]

143. Identity, vagueness and modality, Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes from the Philosophy of Gareth Evans, ed. J. L. Bermudez,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 290-310

144. Agent causation/Jonathan Bennett, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edn, ed. D. M. Borchert, Detroit: Macmillan, 2006, vol. 1, 88-90, 549-50

145. Rational selves and freedom of action, Analytic Philosophy Without Naturalism, ed. A. Corradini, S. Galvan & E. J. Lowe, London & New York: Routledge, 2006, 163-77

146. Endurance versus perdurance and the nature of time, Philosophical Writings 10, 2005, 45-58

147. The 3D/4D controversy: a storm in a teacup, Nous 40, 2006, 570-8 [co-author Storrs McCall]

148. Ontological dependence, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. N. Zalta, 2005 [revised 2009], http://plato.stanford.edu

149. Substance and identity, Substanz: Neue Überlegungen zu einer klassischen Kategorie des Seienden, ed. K. Trettin,Frankfurt: Klostermann Verlag, 2005, 33-51

150. Metaphysics, Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy, ed. D. Moran, Abingdon &New York: Routledge, 2008, 438-68

151. Needs, facts, goodness and truth, The Philosophy of Need, ed. S. Reader,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, 161-73

152. Truthmaking as essential dependence, Metaphysics and Truthmakers, ed. J.-M. Monnoyer,Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2007, 237-59

153. How real is substantial change? The Monist 89, 2006, 275-93

154. Interview with Jonathan Lowe, Discourse: Learning and Teaching in Philosophical and Religious Studies 5, 2005, 17-28

155. Radical externalism or Berkeleyrevisited?, Journal of Consciousness Studies 13, 2006, 78-87 [reprinted in A. Freeman (ed.), Radical Externalism: Honderich’s Theory of Consciousness Discussed,Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2006, 78-87]

156. Non-Cartesian substance dualism and the problem of mental causation, Erkenntnis 65, 2006, 5-23

157. In defence of the autonomous mind, SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review 5, 3, 2006, 31-8, http://lgxserver.uniba.it/lei/mind/swifpmr/0520063.pdf

158. Does the descriptivist/anti-descriptivist debate have any philosophical significance? Philosophical Books 48, 2007, 27-33

159. Endurantism versus perdurantism and the nature of time, Revista di Filosofia Neoscolastica 4, 2006, 713-727 [revised and expanded version of 146]

160. Illusions and hallucinations as evidence for sense data, The Case for Qualia, ed. E. Wright,Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 2008, 59-72

161. A problem for a posteriori essentialism concerning natural kinds, Analysis 67, 2007, 286-92

162. Between agent causationism and volitionism: a middle path, Agency and Causation in the Human Sciences, ed. F. Castellani & J. Quitterer,Paderborn: Mentis, 2007, 77-88

163. A defence of anti-conceptualist realism, Belief and Metaphysics, ed. C. Cunningham & P. Candler, London: SCM-Canterbury Press, 2007, 291-322

164. Sortals and the individuation of objects, Mind and Language 22, 5, 2007, 514-33

165. Coincidence, The Handbook of Mereology, ed. H. Burkhardt, J. Seibt & G. Imaguire, München: Philosophia Verlag, forthcoming

166. Essentialism, metaphysical realism, and the errors of conceptualism, Philosophia Scientiae 12, 2008, 9-33

167. How are identity conditions grounded?, Persistence, ed. C. Kanzian,Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2008, 73-89

168. Two notions of being: entity and essence, Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics, ed. R. Le Poidevin,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 23-48

169. Modes of exemplification, Gustav Bergmann: Phenomenological Realism and Dialectical Ontology, ed. B. Langlet & J.-M. Monnoyer,Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2009, 173-91

170. Against disjunctivism, Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, ed. A. Haddock & F. Macpherson,Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008, 95-111

171. The ontological argument, The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion, ed. C. Meister & P. Copan,London &New York: Routledge, 2007, 331-40

172. Critical notice of Fabrice Correia’s Existential Dependence and Cognate Notions, Grazer Philosophische Studien 73, 2006, 255-8

173. A defence of non-Cartesian substance dualism, Psycho-Physical Dualism Today: An Interdisciplinary Approach, ed. A. Antonietti, A. Corradini & E. J. Lowe, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield (Lexington Books), 2008, 167-83

174. Immanent Universals, Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 18, 2007, 623-36

175. Formal ontology and the revival of metaphysics, Metaphysics Today: Problems and Prospects, ed. M. Lutz-Bachmann & T. Schmidt,Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 2007, 76-93

176. Substance dualism: a non-Cartesian approach, The Waning of Materialism: New Essays, ed. R. C. Koons & G. Bealer, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 439-61

177. Individuation, A Companion to Metaphysics, 2nd edn, ed. J. Kim, E. Sosa & G. Rosenkrantz, Malden, MA & Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, 28-36

178. David Wiggins, A Companion to Metaphysics, 2nd edn, ed. J. Kim, E. Sosa & G. Rosenkrantz, Malden, MA & Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, 625-7 

179. Vagueness and metaphysics, Vagueness: A Guide, ed. G. Ronzitti, Dordrecht: Springer, 2011, 19-53

180. The rationality of metaphysics, Stance and Rationality, ed. O. Bueno & D. P. Rowbottom, special issue of Synthese 178, 2011, 99-109

181. Tropes and perception, Tropes, Universals and the Philosophy of Mind: Essays at the Boundary of Ontology and Philosophical Psychology, ed. S. Gozzano & F. Orilia,Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2008, 175-92

182. Athroniaeth meddwl: teuddiadau a themâu diweddar [Philosophy of mind: recent trends and themes], Cred, llên a diwylliant: cyfrol deyrnged Dewi Z. Phillips, ed. E. G. Matthews, Talybont: Y Lolfa, 2012, pp. 67-96 [in Welsh]

183. Locke on language and meaning, A Companion to Locke, ed. M. Stuart,Oxford: Blackwell, forthcoming

184. John Locke, The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, ed. S. Bernecker & D. Pritchard, London & New York: Routledge, 2011, 687-96

185. ‘If 2 = 3, then 2 + 1 = 3 + 1’: Reply to Heylen and Horsten. Philosophical Quarterly 58, 2008, 528-31

186. What is ‘conditional probability’?, Analysis 63, 2008, 218-23

187. La métaphysique comme science de l’essence, Métaphysique contemporaine: propriétés, mondes possibles, et personnes, ed. E. Garcia & F. Nef,Paris: J. Vrin, 2007, 85-117

188. Reply to Bird on a posteriori essentialism, Analysis 68, 2008, 345-7

189. The metaphysical foundations of natural science, Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 43, 2008, 6-22

190. Dualismo delle sostanze non cartesiano, L’uomo a due dimensioni: il dualismo mente-corpo oggi, ed. A. Lavazza, Milano: Bruno Mondadori, 2008, 185-207

191. New directions in metaphysics and ontology, Axiomathes 18, 2008, 273-88

192. The definition of endurance, Analysis 69, 2009, 277-80 [co-author Storrs McCall]

193. The determinists have run out of luck — for a good reason, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77, 2008, 745-8 [co-author Storrs McCall]

194. Free agency, causation, and action explanation, New Essays on the Explanation of Action, ed. C. Sandis,Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 338-55

195. An essentialist approach to truth-making, Truth and Truth-Making, ed. E. J. Lowe & A. Rami, Stocksfield: Acumen, 2009, 201-16

196. Dualism, The Oxford Companion to Consciousness, ed. T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans & P. Wilken, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 244-8

197. Serious endurantism and the strong unity of human persons, Unity and Time in Metaphysics, ed. L. Honnefelder, E. Runggaldier & B. Schick, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009, 67-82

198. Another dubious counterexample to conditional transitivity, Analysis 70, 2010, 286-9

199. Why my body is not me: the unity argument for emergentist self-body dualism, Emergence in Science and Philosophy, ed. A. Corradini & T. O’Connor, New York & London: Routledge, 2010, 127-48

200. Action theory and ontology, A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, ed. T. O’Connor & C. Sandis, Malden, MA & Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 3-9

201. On the individuation of powers, The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and their Manifestations, ed. A. Marmodoro, London & New York: Routledge, 2010, 8-26

202. Critical notice of G. Strawson’s Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics, Analysis Reviews 71, 2011, 587-92

203. How not to think of powers: a deconstruction of the ‘dispositions and conditionals’ debate, The Monist 94, 2011, 20-34

204. Ontological categories: why four are better than two, in J. Cumpa & E. Tegtmeier (eds), Ontological Categories, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2011, 109-26

205. Personal identity, in J. Garvey (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Philosophy of Mind, London & New York: Continuum, 2011, 203-19

206. Locke on real essence and water as a natural kind: a qualified defence. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85, 2011, 1-19

207. Naturalism, imagination, and the scientific worldview, in C. Taliaferro & J. Evans (eds), Turning Images in Philosophy, Science, and Religion: A New Book of Nature, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, 91-113

208. Experience of change and change of experience, in C. Kanzian, W. Löffler & J. Quitterer (eds), The Ways Things Are: Studies in Ontology, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2011, 121-30.

209. Body, soul and self, Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica CIII, 2, 2011, 201-15.

210. A neo-Aristotelian substance ontology: neither relational nor constituent, in T. E. Tahko (ed.), Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 229-48

211. Against monism, in P. Goff (ed.), Spinoza on Monism, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, 92-112

212. Free will and rational choice, in J. B. Stump & Alan G. Padgett (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Science and Christianity, Malden, MA & Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012, 421-9

213. Essence and ontology, in L. Novak, D. D. Novotny, P. Sousedik & D. Svoboda (eds), Metaphysics: Aristotelian, Scholastic, Analytic, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2012, 93-111

214. Individuation, reference, and sortal terms, in A. Raftopoulos & P. Machamer (eds), Perception, Realism, and the Problem of Reference, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 123-41

215. Asymmetrical dependence in individuation, in F. Correia & B. Schnieder (eds), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 214-33

216. Mumford and Anjum on causal necessitarianism and antecedent strengthening, Analysis 72, 2012, pp. 731-5

217. The probable simplicity of personal identity, in G. Gasser & M. Stefan (eds), Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 137-55

218. Categorial Predication, Ratio 25, 2012, 369-86 [reprinted in Classifying Reality, ed. David S. Oderberg, Malden, MA & Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, 5-22]

219. Non-Cartesian substance dualism, in B. P. Göcke (ed.), After Physicalism, Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2012, 48-71

220. A new modal version of the ontological argument, in M. Szatkowski (ed.), Ontological Proofs Today, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2012, 179-91

221. Mereological extensionality, supplementation, and material constitution, The Monist 96, 2013, 131-48

222. Branching time and temporal unity, in F. Correia and A. Iacona (eds), Around the Tree: Semantic and Metaphysical Issues Concerning Branching and the Open Future, Dordrecht: Springer, 2013, 73-80

223. Complex reality: unity, simplicity and complexity in a substance ontology, in C. Svennerlind, J. Almäng and R. Ingthorsson (eds), Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on his Seventieth Birthday, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2013, 338-57

224. The will as a rational free power, in R. Groff and J. Greco (eds), Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism, New York: Routledge, 2013, 172-85

225. Substance causation, powers, and human agency, in S. C. Gibb, E. J. Lowe and R. D. Ingthorsson (eds), Mental Causation and Ontology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 153-72

226. What is the source of our knowledge of modal truths?, Mind 121, 2012, 919-50

 

 

Book reviews

 

1. J. O. Urmson’s Berkeley and G. J. Warnock’s Berkeley, British Journal of 18th Century Studies 6, 1983, 89-90 

2. P. Jones’s Hume’s Sentiments, British Journal of 18th Century Studies 7, 1984, 139-40

3. T. V. Morris’s Understanding Identity Statements, Philosophical Books 26, 1985, 252-4

4. J. Bennett’s A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, British Journal of 18th Century Studies 9, 1986, 116-17

5. R. C. Stalnaker’s Inquiry, Philosophical Books 27, 1986, 101-3 

6. R. J. Delahunty’s Spinoza, Durham University Journal 78, 1986, 392-3

7. G. Forbes’ The Metaphysics of Mind, Mind 95, 1986, 135-8

8. G. Schlesinger’s The Intelligibility of Nature, Philosophical Books 27, 1986, 234-6

9. K. Konyndyk’s Introductory Modal Logic, Philosophical Books 28, 1987, 165-6

10. D. Berman (ed.), George Berkeley: Essays and Replies, Durham University Journal 80, 1987, 164-5

11. S. G. Shanker (ed.), Philosophy in Britain Today, History of the Human Sciences 1, 1988, 132-4

12. W. Garnett’s The Springs of Consciousness, Durham University Journal 80, 1988, 366

13. D. Lewis’s Philosophical Papers Volume II, Mind 97, 1988, 484-7

14. A. Brennan’s Conditions of Identity, Philosophical Books 30, 1989, 103-6

15. D. Berman’s A History of Atheism in Britain, Durham University Journal 81, 1989, 333-4

16. F. L. Will’s Beyond Deduction, Philosophy 64, 1989, 424-5

17. S. Wolfram’s Philosophical Logic: An Introduction, Philosophical Books 31, 1990, 34-5

18. H. Noonan’s Personal Identity, Mind 99, 1990, 477-9

19. K. Campbell’s Abstract Particulars, Philosophical Quarterly 41, 1991, 104-6

20. D. H. Sanford’s If P then Q: Conditionals and the Foundations of Reasoning, Philosophical Books 32, 1991, 31-2

21. G. Strawson’s The Secret Connexion, M. Tooley’s Causation, and E. Fales’ Causation and Universals, Philosophical Quarterly 41, 1991, 494-8

22. M. A. Box’s The Suasive Art of David Hume, Durham University Journal 83, 1991, 316-17

23. P. Humphreys’ The Chances of Explanation, Isis 82, 1991, 783-4 

24. M. C. Banner’s The Justification of Science and the Rationality of Religious Belief, Religious Studies 27, 1991, 421-2

25. R. Coburn’s The Strangeness of the Ordinary, Mind 101, 1992, 151-3

26. S. Stich’s The Fragmentation of Reason, Philosophical Quarterly 42, 1992, 98-101

27. K. Lambert (ed.), Philosophical Applications of Free Logic, History and Philosophy of logic 13, 1992, 246-7

28. D. Hodgson’s The Mind Matters: Consciousness and Choice in a Quantum World, Philosophical Books 34, 1993, 33-4

29. D. H. Mellor’s Matters of Metaphysics, Philosophy 67, 1992, 268-70

30. W. Spohn et al. (eds), Existence and Explanation, History and Philosophy of Logic 14, 1993, 130-1

31. A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), A. J. Ayer: Memorial Essays, Philosophy 69, 1993, 107-8

32. P. Bailhache’s Essai de Logique Deontique, History and Philosophy of Logic 14, 1993, 249-50

33. T. Williamson’s Identity and Discrimination, Mind 102, 1993, 210-12

34. C. A. J. Coady’s Testimony: A Philosophical Study, Philosophy 68, 1993, 413-15

35. A. Newman’s The Physical Basis of Predication, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55, 1995, 490-2

36. J. Heil’s The Nature of True Minds, Philosophical Books 35, 1994, 56-7

37. D. Braine’s The Human Person, Philosophy 69, 1994, 244-6

38. M. Dummett’s Origins of Analytical Philosophy, Philosophy 69, 1994, 246-8

39. R. Nozick’s The Nature of Rationality, Philosophical Quarterly 45, 1995, 397-9

40. R. I. G. Hughes (ed.), A Philosophical Companion to First-Order Logic, History and Philosophy of Logic 15, 1994, 255-6

41. G. Rosenkrantz’s Haecceity, Mind 104, 1995, 202-5

42. T. C. Potts’ Structures and Categories for the Representation of Meaning, History and Philosophy of Logic 16, 1995, 140-1

43. H. Robinson’s Perception, Philosophy 70, 1995, 463-6

44. H. Harris (ed.), Identity, Philosophical Quarterly 47, 1997, 395-7

45. Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vols 1 & 2, Philosophical Books 38, 1997, 30-1

46. F. P. Ramsey’s Notes on Philosophy, Probability and Mathematics, ed. M. C. Galavotti, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48, 1997, 300-1

47. R. A. Wilson’s Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds, History and Philosophy of Psychology Newsletter 26, 1998, 19-20

48. T. Pink’s The Psychology of Freedom, Philosophy 73, 1998, 305-7

49. J. Copeland (ed.), Logic and Reality, History and Philosophy of Logic 19, 1998, 179-81

50. M. Tooley’s Time, Tense, and Causation, Philosophical Books 40, 1999, 45-7

51. M. Jubien’s Contemporary Metaphysics and M. J. Loux’s Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction, European Journal of Philosophy 6, 1998, 365-8

52. A. Biletzki and A. Matar (eds), The Story of Analytic Philosophy: Plot and Heroes, History and Philosophy of Logic 20, 1999, 64-5

53. U. Meixner’s Axiomatic Formal Ontology, Studia Logica 64, 2000, 137-40

54. A. Gallois’s Occasions of Identity, Mind 109, 2000, 354-7

55. I.Harris’s The Mind of John Locke, The Seventeenth Century, forthcoming

56. D. Lewis’s Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, History and Philosophy of Logic 20, 1999, 138-9

57. E. Castellani (ed.), Interpreting Bodies: Classical and Quantum Objects in Modern Physics, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51, 2000, 353-5

58. N. Jolley’s Locke: His Philosophical Thought, Locke Newsletter 30, 1999, 145-8

59. F. Jackson’s Mind, Method and Conditionals: Selected Essays, Mind 110, 2001, 211-15

60. J. Etchemendy’s The Concept of Logical Consequence, History and Philosophy of Logic 21, 2000, 236-7

61. J. Kim’s Mind in a Physical World, American Journal of Psychology 114, 2001, 303-08

62. J. Foster’s The Nature of Perception, Times Literary Supplement 5151, Dec. 21, 2001, 24

63. R. Mason’s Before Logic, Philosophical Books 43, 2002, 41-3

64. D. Owens’s Reason without Freedom, Ratio 15, 2002, 309-11

65. A Pyle (ed.), The Dictionary of Seventeenth-Century Philosophers, The Seventeenth Century, forthcoming

66. R. L. Epstein’s Five Ways of Saying ‘Therefore’, History and Philosophy of Logic 23, 2002, 147-8

67. B. O’Shaughnessy’s Consciousness and the World, Philosophy 77, 2002, 283-7

68. D. Cockburn’s An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, T. Crane’s Elements of Mind and K. T. Maslin’s An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, Times Higher Education Supplement, May 31, 2002, iv

69. D. Davidson’s Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Philosophy 78, 2003, 555-8

70. W. G. Lycan’s Real Conditionals, Philosophical Books 44, 2003, 177-8

71. K. Hawley’s How Things Persist, Philosophical Quarterly 53, 2003, 613-16

72. D. Wiggins’s Sameness and Substance Renewed, Mind 112, 2003, 816-20

73. J. Baggini & P. Fosl’s The Philosopher’s Toolkit, Times Higher Education Supplement, Oct. 24, 2003, 31

74. J. C. Beall & B. C. van Fraassen’s Possibilities and Paradox: An Introduction to Modal and Many-Valued Logic, History and Philosophy of Logic 25, 2004, 329-30

75. G. Molnar’s Powers: A Study in Metaphysics, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55, 2004, 817-22

76. J. Bennett’s A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals, Philosophical Books 46 (2005), 158-60

77. H. Lillehammer & G. Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds), Real Metaphysics, European Journal of Philosophy 16, 2008, 134-8.

78. C. H. Conn’s Locke on Essence and Identity, Locke Studies 4, 2004, 243-53

79. U. Meixner’s The Two Sides of Being, Erkenntnis 62, 2005, 290-4

80. J. W. Yolton’s The Two Intellectual Worlds of John Locke, Locke Studies 5, 2005, 223-6

81. T. Crane & K. Farkas (eds), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology, Times Higher Education Supplement, May 27, 2005, xi

82. U. Meixner’s The Two Sides of Being, Journal of Consciousness Studies 13, 2006, 115-18

83. D. Davidson’s Truth, Language, and History and Truth and Predication, Times Higher Education Supplement, April 7, 2006, 26

84. J. C. Beall & B. Armour-Garb (eds), Deflationism and Paradox, History and Philosophy of Logic 29, 2008, 279-80

85. P. Mackie’s How Things Might Have Been, Mind 116, 2007, 762-6

86. R. Martin & J. Barresi’s The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self, Journal of Consciousness Studies 14, 2007, 125-7

87. J. Hawthorne’s Metaphysical Essays, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 15/1/2007

88. B. Greetham’s Philosophy, Times Higher Education Supplement, May 25, 2007, xix

89. Peter Unger’s All the Power in the World, Philosophical Quarterly 58, 2008, 745-7.

90. L. Newman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human Understanding”, Locke Studies 7, 2007, 213-23

91. E. Olson’s What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, Analysis Reviews 69, 2009, 388-90

92. R. Sorensen’s Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows, Times Higher Education magazine, March 20, 2008, 46-7

93. R. Sorensen’s Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows, Philosophy 84, 2009, 615-19

94. D. Oderberg’s Real Essentialism, Philosophical Quarterly 60, 2010, 648-52

95. C. B. Martin’s The Mind in Nature, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17, 2009, 609-11

96. M. E. Reicher (ed.), States of Affairs, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 15/10/2009

97. J. Schloss & M. Murray (eds), The Believing Primate, Faith and Philosophy 29, 2012, 243-7

98. D. M. Armstrong’s Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 20/1/2011(reprinted in French in Revue Étudiante de Philosophie Analytique 3, 2011, 65-72)

100. S.-J. Savonius-Wroth, P. Schuurman & J. Walmsley (eds), The Continuum Companion to Locke, Locke Studies 11, 2011, 173-5