The Great Lakes Conflict and Spatial Designs for Peace:
A Neorealist Analysis

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Introduction

This article discusses proposed solutions to the regional conflict affecting areas of Eastern Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Tanzania. It begins with an analysis of the structural conditions, the geostrategic designs of various actors and the discursive formations that foment conflict. This generates a list of factors for a matrix that is used to evaluate eight major proposals for peace. Two proposals that address the problem of ill-fitting political boundaries earned higher overall scores than those that rely only on force or new distributions of power.

This approach may be described as a neorealist analysis (Bhaskar 1989; Sayer 1992; Pratt 1995; Griggs 1996). Neorealism breaks with the classical or 'naive' realism that has characterised much work among political geographers and boundary specialists (Glassner 1993; Werlen 1993: 201). It also rejects certain postmodern arguments that all 'reality' can be reduced to intersubjective communication, interpretation and meaning. Similar to 'realists', neorealists aim for an adequate explanation to advise policy makers and role players but each object of inquiry has a specific ontology to consider. Neorealists would see boundaries as a social construction rather than an intransitive 'reality' that can be objectively known.

The Structural Conditions of Conflict

Structure refers to relatively immobile social, physical, or economic factors that either constrain or facilitate the geostrategies and discursive practices of key actors. Three such factors in the present situation are:

- irrational political boundaries
- land shortages and environmental stress and,
- ethnically differentiated access to power and wealth.

Political Boundaries

In pre-colonial times rigid political boundaries separating states did not exist. There was only the hilly, fertile, well-watered, malaria-free and defensible plateau that overlapped the boundaries of today's Burundi, Rwanda, eastern Zaire, south-west Uganda, and northwest Tanzania. The Berlin Conference delimitations of 1884 and subsequent boundary adjustments in 1910 had two major impacts: firstly, the traditional Kingdoms of Rwanda and 'Urundi' were reduced in size and left without sufficient resources for healthy economic development; and secondly substantial numbers of Tutsis and Hutus were left as minorities within Uganda, Tanzania, and Zaire.

Colonial boundaries that may have served German and Belgian interests left modern Rwanda and Burundi as tiny landlocked countries with little mineral wealth except scattered nickel deposits. Lucrative mineral deposits were left on the Zairean side of the border. In most years tea and coffee accounts for 70% or more of foreign exchange while close to two million Rwandese and Burundians rely on international aid for food. Neither country is in a position to compete on the world market.

Within Rwanda and Burundi the ethnic distribution is approximately 85% Hutu, 14% Tutsi and 1% Twa. About two million of an estimated 15 million Hutus and Tutsis are located directly outside the boundaries of Rwanda and Burundi. Some 400,000 Tutsis trace their ancestry to eastern Zaire's North Kivu (the 'Banyarwanda') and South Kivu provinces (the 'Banyamulenge'). Between 750,000 and one million Hutus are located on the Tanzanian boundary with Rwanda and Burundi. Tens of thousands of both Tutsis and Hutus reside along the Rwanda-Uganda boundary because of the 1910 cession of the Kisoro sub-district to Uganda.

The situation of Hutus and Tutsis living on the boundaries of much larger and more ethnically

diverse states has helped to destabilise neighbouring countries, offered a justification for expansionism and a tool for demagoguery. Zaire's September 1996 effort to 'repatriate' ethnic Tutsis to Rwanda despite their centuries-old ancestry in Kivu triggered the current round of fighting (the Banyamulenge rebellion). Similar problems could occur along the Tanzanian border with Rwanda and Burundi where Hutu militias launch cross-border raids (Van Eck, 1996).

Land Shortages

Burundi and Rwanda could easily have the highest percentage of disturbed, overpopulated land in Africa. Discounting uninhabitable areas (e.g. 10% of Rwanda's 26,338km² is National Park), the population density within Rwanda and Burundi exceeds 400 persons per km².

Land scarcity, degraded soils, and a limited food supply were problems already noted in pre-colonial times. Colonial policy then intensified this environmental and demographic stress by encouraging large-scale coffee and tea plantations. Through various policies of taxation, the German and Belgian administrators destroyed subsistence farming and communal ownership to force most of the rural population into coffee production. Consequent land shortages decreased per capita food production.

Although complicated by many factors such as high annual population growth rates (3.5%), the political economy imposed by colonialism still contributes substantially to environmental degradation and conflict over scarce land. When the price of coffee plummeted during the 1980s, Rwanda lost 90% of its grasslands as land-hungry farmers expanded into new and often environmentally-sensitive areas (World Bank, 1995).

Much of the ethnic conflict in the region today is tied to the hope of gaining land whether by territorial expansion, genocide, or expelling certain ethnic groups. At different times both Hutu and Tutsi leaders have called for a 'Greater Rwanda' with reference to Zaire's North Kivu, which belonged in part to Belgian ruled Ruanda-Urundi before 1910. In early 1996 Hutus at Masisi massacred ethnic Tutsis in an attempt to reclaim land there. Key Hutu leaders living in Dar-es-Salaam have called on Tanzania to annex Burundi. Tutsis claimed the houses, plots, and property of nearly two million Hutus expelled by the RPF in 1994.

Ethnic Class Divisions

Ethnically-differentiated access to resources, wealth and power has been entrenched since pre-colonial times. First, Hutu farmers settled among the indigenous hunter-gatherers (the Twa) and then Tutsi cattle herders arrived in the sixteenth century. The Tutsi adopted the language, beliefs, and customs of the Hutu but enforced class divisions based mainly on phenotype (the Tutsis tend to be taller with thin set features and the Hutu shorter with wide-set features). The Tutsis perceived themselves as a warrior caste whose role was to defend the land and the Hutu farmers as labouring 'serfs'. After four centuries of cultural indoctrination, many Tutsis still seek to rule over the less educated rural Hutus while the latter seek to drive out their 'oppressors'.

German and Belgian colonisers reinforced these class divisions by favouring the Tutsis with educational opportunities and positions in the administration. Large tracts of land expropriated for the production of tea and coffee were worked by Hutus under the supervision of Tutsi overseers. Today the relative success of the Tutsis in agriculture, business and mining contributes to their military strength (well-armed) but also exposes them to ethnic animosities and demagoguery. The Hutu have had few economic alternatives other than labouring on plantations run by the Tutsis or engaging in illegal cross-border trade in ivory, gold, diamonds, heroin, and guns. This makes for a political economy riven with ethnic conflict because the group in charge of the army, police, or security forces controls this mode of production.

## Actors and their geostrategic interests

War, refugees, sanctions, and environmental damage can be perceived as catastrophic for some but it can create geostrategic opportunities for others such as expanded influence in a region or enlarging a state's territory. Key political actors, their alliances, and their geostrategic interests can be assessed according to: firstly the six central African states directly involved in the conflict (Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, and Sudan); and secondly extra-regional actors.

Directly Involved Actors

The geostrategic interests of Zairean Tutsis, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda were laid bare in October 1996 with the creation of a pro-Tutsi controlled 300km strip of eastern Zaire from Uvira in the south to Goma in the north (Figure 1). Since then, pro-Tutsi militias have moved northward along the Ugandan border widening and extending the buffer zone between Zaire and the three allied states of Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. As the

map illustrates the positioning of pro-Tutsi forces is mirrored to the east by Hutu militias operating from bases within Tanzania. This geostrategic configuration along with Zaire's impending collapse, Tanzania's support for Hutu militias, Ugandan support for pro-Tutsi forces and Sudanese support for anti-Ugandan forces could result in a major conflagration. War and huge refugee movements could involve a score of states and affect more than 100 million African people.

Figure 1: Occupied Territory and Militia Movements

Zaire, a country of 40 million people with an area the size of Western Europe, has been fragmenting along ethnic and provincial lines for more than three decades. Since 1965 dictator Mobutu Sese Seko has played the colonial game of divide and rule while siphoning off billions of dollars from the national treasury to Swiss bank accounts. This fuelled clashes between army units, tribes, provinces, and neighbouring states. Mass refugee movements from Burundi/Rwanda into Zaire from 1993 through 1996 destabilised its eastern border area and set off a civil war that could lead to the collapse of the Mobutu regime and bring its army into full-scale war with neighbouring states.

Refugee camps along Zaire's eastern borders with Burundi and Rwanda received more than one-million people fleeing reprisals from the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) following the April 1994 genocide of the Tutsis. The camps offered food, shelter, recruits, and human shields for 55,000 former Rwandese forces (ex-FAR) and the *Interahamwe* militia credited with the massacres. At the same time, Burundi's Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD), the military wing of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD), established themselves in the camps. This group rejects sharing power with the Tutsi minority in Burundi (The Hutu majority party FRODEBU won the 1993 multi-party elections but was forced to share power with the Tutsis). These militias have formed alliances with Zaire's armed forces and certain ethnic groups in the area (e.g. Bufalero, Warega, Tembo, Hunde, and Babembe).

The Hutu militias found uneasy refuge in eastern Zaire with its complex ethnic rivalries and militant groups plotting the overthrow the Zairean government. By September-October 1996 the experienced guerrilla leader Laurent Kabila had organised several large pro-Tutsi militias into an umbrella body called the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Kinshasa (AFDL). Kabila is a Katangan (not a Tutsi) and heads other organisations and militias such as the Parti de la Révolution Populaire (PRP) and its armed wing, Forces Armées Populaires (FAP). Further, the member militias of the AFDL include many non-Tutsi dominated militias (e.g. Nande, Bashi Babwari, Maluba, Kasaï, and others). This complexity leads to many confused news reports and the reader should refer to Table 1 for a sample listing of forces and militias operating in the region.

From September 1996 various AFDL militias were engaged in combat with both the Zairean army and Hutu militias. Suspecting Rwandese backing of the anti-Zairean guerrillas, South Kivu's deputy governor proclaimed that all Banyamulenge were *"foreigners"* and had six days to *"move back"* to Rwanda. This set off the mid-October Banyamulenge rebellion. Kabila led a Banyamulenge-dominated force (Alliance des Forces Démocratiques des Peuples or ADP) on a northward drive from the Mulenge mountains to successfully rout Zaire's army and break up the refugee camps harbouring Hutu militias. Some 600,000 people returned to Rwanda. Others crossed into Tanzania, Burundi, or moved further east into the rainforest. The AFDL consolidated its territorial gains and then advanced northward along the Ugandan border to take Beni.

Uganda's President Museveni is a Tutsi descendant and a solid ally of the AFDL and the Tutsi-dominated regimes in Rwanda and Burundi. Museveni, Kabila, and Paul Kagame – Rwanda's Vice President, Defense Minister and former head of Uganda's military intelligence – share close ties. Tutsis from both Rwanda and Zaire were principal components of the National Resistance Movement that defeated the Obote regime and brought Museveni to power in 1986. In turn, the RPF assumed power in Rwanda with Ugandan support. Tutsi dominance of Rwanda and Burundi could see the fruition of Museveni's long-time ambition to relieve Uganda's landlocked status with a transport route across Rwanda and Burundi to Lake Tanganyika and hence south to the South African rail network.

Uganda occupied an area of Zaire around Beni for two weeks in late 1996 to facilitate the northward advance of the AFDL. This kind of direct military support runs the risk of both enlarging its own civil war and bringing other states into the conflict. Uganda already has 18,000 troops combating more than one set of rebel militias that shell border towns and launch cross-border raids from either eastern Zaire or southern Sudan (e.g. Allied Democratic Army or the Sudan-backed Lord's Resistance Army – the LRA). With US support, Uganda also backs the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The SPLA wants to overthrow Sudan's ruling National Islamic Front which took power by a coup in 1989. Uganda's involvement in Zaire could precipitate Khartoum's direct support for the Zaire/Hutu alliance or the anti-Museveni rebels operating along Uganda's borders.

Tanzania is allied with Hutu militias from Burundi
(e.g. the FDD, Palipehutu, and Frolina). This could
lead to either a Tanzanian invasion of Burundi or
civil war (internal divisions and violent protests are
mounting over support for Hutu militias). Tanzania
provides Hutu rebels with training bases (one is
near Lake Victoria) and refugee camps from which
the militias launch cross-border attacks. Should
Burundian soldiers cross the border, Tanzania has
warned it will use its army to counter-attack. The
total economic blockade of Burundi that limits the
resources available for protecting its boundaries
was also engineered from Dar-es-Salaam. Certain
Hutu leaders would like to see Tanzania annex
Burundi and in November 1996 Tanzanian officials
threatened to invade to *"sort things out"* (Van Eck
1996).

It is also possible that Kenya could be drawn into
the war. President Daniel Arap Moi is vociferous in
his opposition to Tutsi-dominated regimes, houses
extremist Rwandan Hutu leaders in Nairobi, and
has supported anti-Museveni rebels in the past.
Diplomatic relations have already deteriorated
between Kenya and Uganda and in July 1996
Kenya closed the Rwandan embassy.

Extra-Regional Actors

Extra-regional actors are those from outside the
conflict area seeking to either ameliorate or exploit
the conditions of war. The role of organisations
such as the United Nations World Food Program,
Doctors Without Borders, and the International
Committee of the Red Cross will not be addressed
here. Few if any governments appear to be involved
for strictly humanitarian reasons and their
geostrategic motives will be examined.

The governments of the United States and the
United Kingdom are concerned about instability in
Zaire but are aligned with Uganda and Rwanda.
The Americans need Uganda's support for their
effort to overthrow the regime in Sudan which is
charged with training Islamic militants and
'terrorists'. This includes funds for forces seeking
to overthrow Sudan from bases inside Uganda.
American special forces have also been assigned to
train the RPF in counter-insurgency techniques.

France is aligned with Zaire and ex-FAR forces.
From 1990 to 1993 elite French forces along with
the Zairean army and the Hutu-dominated FAR
repelled RPF advances in Rwanda. They also
intervened in 1994 to prevent further RPF attacks

on the Hutu. A key French motive is access to the
vast natural wealth of Zaire (i.e. gold, diamonds,
cobalt, copper, huge unfelled forests, vast
hydroelectric potential). France must compete with
a score of other interested states (e.g. US, Canada,
South Africa, Switzerland) and a clear alliance with
Zaire could offer a geostrategic advantage. France
might send troops to protect the mineral-rich Shaba
province on the southern border of South Kivu
where the AFDL has been operating. Since 1960,
the French have intervened more than once to
prevent Shaba's secession as Katanga.

Easy access to military weaponry also fuels the
conflict while enriching certain countries and
dealers. Surplus arms from Mozambique, Angola
and some European countries have reached all sides
at bargain prices. Illegal operators and security
firms in Britain and South Africa have provided
arms and mercenaries (e.g. South African-based
Executive Outcomes) to Hutu militias. Tutsi
militias have received South African arms
shipments intended for Rwanda (Ashworth, 1996;
Misser, 1996). Some of the illegal arms have
arrived in cargo planes chartered by charity
organisations.

Social Constructions and Discursive Formations

Addressed here are two of the most significant
social constructions in the conflict: firstly
representations of genocide as the only alternative
to Hutu/Tutsi conflict; and secondly extra-regional
representations that demonise African political
leaders while locating 'tribalism' and 'ethnic
hatred' as the source of the conflict. Peaceworkers
and researchers must intervene in these discursive
formations because they facilitate mass
mobilisations for 'ethnic cleansing' and misdirect
extra-regional intervention.

The Philosophy of Genocide

Extremist Hutus employ a long-standing philosophy
of genocide known as 'Hutuism'. Tutsis are
represented as 'immigrants' or 'Ethiopians' who
enslaved Hutus, took their land and killed them
without justification. The basic tenet of this
philosophy is that by killing every member of every
Tutsi generation, the Hutus will regain the land they
lost in the sixteenth century Tutsi invasion. This
results in the lack of any distinction between
civilians and soldiers in war and a 'strike first'
policy.

Tutsis engage more often in selective assassinations and massacres than genocide. Perhaps this owes to the hopelessness of eliminating 85% of the population and the Tutsi social construction that Hutus are meant to serve them. In Burundi in both 1972 and 1988, Hutu uprisings were ruthlessly put down by the Tutsi-dominated government. In each case tens of thousands of Hutus were selectively exterminated – the leaders, the better educated, and the elite.

Western Perceptions of Africa

Western actors and media commonly represent the instability of African states as a product of badly behaved dictators running states riven with 'pre-modern' tribalism. Owing to this behaviourist analysis, the promulgated 'cure' is democratic elections and 'nation-state' building based on the Western experience (ignoring the history of massive genocide that made majoritarian democracy possible). This construction perpetuates international prejudice regarding African 'savagery', leads to ethnic conflict because of the cultural complexity of African states, and allows the West to escape responsibility for the severe *structural* damage imposed by colonialism:

* irrational boundaries that contribute to endemic instability;
* export-orientated infrastructure that marginalises Africa within the world economic system;
* western cultural hegemony that has weakened African tradition; and,
* bureaucratic systems of governance that concentrated political power and favoured certain ethnic groups over others (Griggs, 1995).

During the 1990s, Western countries used formidable pressure to encourage African states to *"democratise"* (Purvis, 1996). The result has been rigged elections (e.g. Kenya), military coups (e.g. Nigeria), and the conspicuous hypocrisy of extra-regional actors (e.g. dropping pressure for Zaire to democratise when bases were needed for Western humanitarian agencies in 1994; or ignoring Uganda's rigged elections in 1996 because of economic and strategic cooperation with Museveni).

Rwanda and Burundi both introduced variant forms of multiparty democracy owing to internationally-sponsored negotiations (Arusha 1992-1993) and because 'democratisation' was one of the key terms of international aid. This stimulated extremist Hutus and Tutsis in both countries to form organisations resistant to sharing power. From October 1993 Burundi unravelled with the assassinations of its first Hutu President, members of cabinet and parliament and an ensuing series of violent reprisals against the Tutsis. It all ended in a 1996 coup that suspended 'democracy' to restore order. Rwanda's attempt at democracy ended similarly: a genocide of the Tutsis in 1994 followed by a military coup.

Factors in any solution

The foregoing analysis of the agents, structural conditions, and discourse furnish seven key factors required for an effective resolution to the conflict. These will be listed and then tabled in a matrix to rate the extant peace proposals.

A. Transparency and Consensus

Any solution must be transparent, and appeal directly to affected populations or it lacks legitimacy. Secret negotiations among elite actors is unlikely to eliminate the structural factors and discursive practices that foment conflict. Delegations to Arusha in 1992-3 were only a political elite and their efforts ended in genocide, ethnic massacres, and coups – not entirely surprising since it was mainly limited to groups with a history and interest in exploiting ethnicity. Thus, negotiations must recognise all concerned actors including Hutu and Tutsi intellectuals, civil servants, businessmen and other members of civil society, many of whom have been united against violence but consistently ignored because they lack a militia.

B. A Regional Approach

Several countries in the Great Lakes region are being used as bases, sources of rebel funds and arms, or for diplomatic and other kinds of initiatives that affect the conflict. This involves a delicate web of alliances that demand inclusive negotiations based on the needs of the entire region. Instability within Zaire, refugees in the borderlands, the landlocked status of Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda, and cross-boundary social, economic, and physical linkages require regional consideration.

C. Decentralised Political Structures

Extra-regional actors and conflict resolution practitioners along with all major actors must deal

with the problem of the extreme centralisation of power that characterises government in the region. Rummel (1995) has found empirical and statistical evidence to indicate that the distribution of power (ranging from democracies to dictatorships) is a better predictor of genocide than ethnic antipathies. Furthermore, genocide is often a product of state-directed violence (e.g. Rwanda, 1994) because of the high level of organisation required.

More emphasis must be placed on dismantling the corrupt and inefficient system of bureaucratic power and dictatorships in the region while expanding participation at a grassroots level. The multiplicity of cultures, ethnic groups and nations makes this difficult but extra-regional actors can help by channelling funds and attention to the second and third tiers of government and promoting inter-cultural understanding. Otherwise history has shown that attempts to democratise along majoritarian lines falter because ruling ethnic groups oppress and oppressed ethnic groups seek power by extra-judicial means.

D. Reduce Export Dependency

Solutions should not reinforce dependency on the export of one or two major products to outside countries. Dependency leads to weak civil societies, debt, environmental degradation, food shortages and governments more concerned with outside relations than these problems.

E. Land Reform

Competition for very scarce land can take any form including ethnic hatred. Land reform would:

- facilitate 'democratisation' as economic resources are decentralised and individuals gain a stake in the productive factors of the society;
- free individuals from subservience to monopolies that have been historically privileged by the state;
- replace dependence on international aid with self-sufficient food-production; and
- reduce the high levels of export dependency by encouraging individual initiative and the growth of a small business sector.

F. Intervention into Conflict-Producing Discursive Practices

Radio stations, television, newspapers, and other media should be employed to explain the dangers of

the genocidal philosophies and how they have been perpetrated out of ignorance or nefarious intent. Scholars and political analysts should also improve their understanding of the structural origins of African conflicts and show how the 'rogue and tribe' analysis of African political economy fail to offer a credible account of either past or existing conditions.

G. Softer Boundaries

Resolving conflict over boundaries in Africa may very well begin by perceiving boundaries as membranes across which resources and people flow rather than as rigid containers. The problem of a rigid boundary psychology was illustrated in September 1996 when Zaire incited the Banyamulenge rebellion by declaring that all ethnic Tutsis were *"foreigners"* without rights to property despite centuries of ancestry in the area. A more sophisticated view is to perceive boundaries as soft, flexible, and mobile. One then monitors, manages and adjusts boundaries according to refugee flows, commerce, the need for expanding communications, pollutants, newly-discovered resources and the needs of human cultures. Combined with more decentralised planning, softer boundaries might lead to a confederated Great Lakes Region composed of nations, tribes, city-states and other grassroots structures that give freer play to both local, regional, and global scales of human organisation.

Peace Proposals

Eight significant peace proposals are now assessed according to the factors that emerged from the analysis of structure, actors, and discourse. Figure 2 is a simple matrix that lists the proposed solutions and grades them on a scale of zero to five according to their ability to address the factors listed above (A-G). A perfect score would be 35.

Peacekeeping Forces

This is an extra-regional solution promoted by the United Nations, Canada, the United States and France involving the use of armed forces to protect civilian populations, secure transport routes, protect aid workers, and create havens or corridors for refugees. It has four main problems. First, intervention has a poor record (e.g. Somalia where the UN was forced to withdraw). Second, it cannot

achieve consensus because Rwanda, Burundi, and the AFDL reject the plan while Zaire will only accept it if awarded significant control over the location and activities of the forces. Third, increased destabilisation might result as: armed camps among the refugees are reestablished, local armies break into factional warfare; or contact with Zairean ethnic Tutsis results in fighting (they would regard the forces as foreign invaders). Fourth, the plan fails to address most – if not all – of the underlying causes of conflict and therefore is a temporary solution at best.

Peace-Building Force

This idea, initially suggested by Maina Kiai of the Kenya Human Rights Commission, aims at a mixed intervention of lawyers, clergymen, soldiers, and conflict resolution practitioners organised by the OAU. Many factors are not addressed here (e.g. export dependency) but such an intervention might offer an opportunity to reshape the discursive practices leading to conflict. Consensus on who becomes involved might be difficult since most local actors, including Kenya, are not neutral.

Council of Elders

This proposal, initiated by Bizimana, a Tutsi from Burundi is based on a traditional form of democracy – *bashingantahe*. Mixed groups of mature, respected Hutus and Tutsis adjudicated disputes. It would be difficult to obtain or maintain consensus on reviving such a political structure particularly at a regional scale. It could be implemented at local levels to address certain problems of land reform and reduce the conflict producing discursive practices.

Power Sharing Formula

Coalition governments are tried and failed plans that in the past have ended in coups, massacres, and destabilisation (see above). This is probably because it achieves a compromise between the actors but does little to address underlying structural problems – export dependency, land reform, lack of regional cooperation. It is also addressed to existing state structures and therefore reinforces rather than softens the boundaries between Central African states.

UN-sanctioned Transitional Protectorate

This idea suggested by Francis Kornegay, director of the Africa-America Institute in South Africa, aims for international administration of Rwanda and Burundi. Variations on the theme include issuing a mandate for a UN body, a group of African countries, the SADC or even a Franco-

Figure 2: Grading Peace Proposals According to the Seven Factors

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	Score
Peace-Keeping Forces	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	**1**
Peace-Building Forces	3	3	0	0	0	5	0	**11**
Council of Elders	1	0	0	2	2	4	0	**9**
Power Sharing	4	0	1	0	0	1	0	**6**
Protectorate	0	4	0	0	0	1	1	**6**
Partition	0	0	2	0	3	2	0	**7**
Berlin II Conference	2	5	3	4	3	2	2	**21**
Confederation	3	5	4	4	4	4	5	**29**

African joint management team to manage Rwanda and Burundi. It is paternal and therefore neither transparent nor by consensus. It might help foster some degree of regionalism but it stands to address very few of the underlying structural problems.

Partition into Tutsiland and Hutuland

This idea of breaking the cycle of ethnically-based massacres and revenge by spatially separating the antagonists has some fantasy appeal but it would be nearly impossible to realise. First, segregation within Rwanda and Burundi is a very local matter: either by rural hillside community or rural/urban (more Tutsis in the cities). Second, there is widespread intermarriage (usually Hutu men who marry Tutsi women) and an overwhelming 85% Hutu majority. Thus, the question of who would move where would be as deep a political crisis as the current one. Third, the mass movement of people could be destabilising (e.g. India/Pakistan, 1948). Partition might offer some manner of land reform but little or no change in productivity because there would be no increase in land. The chances of increased decentralisation owing to the removal of ethnic tensions or increased centralisation as tensions increase on a state-to-state level (e.g. India/Pakistan since 1948) are even.

Berlin Two Conference or Restructuring African boundaries

This idea, suggested by a number of international scholars and African intellectuals suggests a conference to re-negotiate Central – and some say all – African boundaries. An effort could be made to rationalise the size of states, distribute resources more intelligibly, further align cultural and political boundaries, and eliminate the landlocked status of states. Any geostrategic designs could be openly discussed such as the proposed annexation of Burundi to Tanzania or annexing Kivu to Rwanda. It offers a regional approach but the result might be a perpetuation of the existing system of states. Such an option has been gaining support in recent years but is still a highly contentious matter.

Confederation in a Central African Regional Organisation

A confederation of autonomous provinces that included at least Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi if not Uganda and Tanzania could allow for decentralisation, softer boundaries, and 'automatic' land reform as people and goods would be free to move. This could be accomplished *without* the contentious problem of redrawing state boundaries.

The internal regions of a former Zaire could be delimited without significant resistance since the post-colonial collapse of Zaire's infrastructure has left many areas operating with *de facto* autonomy. Problems with separatist forces in Uganda and Tanzania (e.g. Zanzibar) could be sorted out with autonomy in a confederation. The end result might be a geography of loosely aligned states, regions and city-states. This idea seems to meet most of the criteria for a good solution but the main obstacle would be finding consensus. Based on recent conferences and reports, this may be building, even within the Organisation of African Unity.

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Table 1: Armed Forces and Militias operating within the Great Lakes Conflict Area

The number of acronyms associated with the militias and armies operating in the conflict area is so vast that most news accounts and even seasoned political analysts confuse these groupings. At least a score of militias are operating in eastern Zaire alone. This is just a partial listing but includes the major groups mentioned in the text and media reports:

PRO-TUTSI FORCES	DESCRIPTION
AFDL: Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Kinshasa.	In media reports this umbrella organisation of militias comes under many anglicised acronyms such as the ADFL (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Zaire). Headed by Laurent Kabila, its chief aim is to destroy the Mobutu regime in Zaire.
RPF: Rwandan Patriotic Front	Also known also as the FPR (Front Patriotique Rwandais) or simply Armée Rwandese. This is Rwanda's Tutsi led army of 45,000 troops, some of Africa's best trained and most battle-hardened.
ADP: Alliance Démocratique des Peuples	The People's Democratic Alliance is composed mainly of Zairean ethnic Tutsis from North and South Kivu. Numerous troops from the RPF also 'deserted' to join these forces. The ADP, led by Déogratias Bugera, is a member of the AFDL.
Burundi's Army	This army includes about 25,000 troops. There are many reports of direct involvement in the fighting but no hard evidence.
FAP: Forces Armées Populaires	This is the armed wing of Laurent Kabila's Parti de la Révolution Populaire formed in 1967. The FAP is largely dominated by the Babwari ethnic group but includes many Banyamulenge. It has been involved in cross-border smuggling of diamonds, precious metals, and other contraband.
CNR: Conseil National de Résistance	A member militia of both the AFDL and ADP. It is dominated by the Maluba ethnic group.
MRL: Mouvement Révolutionnaire pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire	The Bashi ethnic group dominate this AFDL-member militia.
Mai Mai	A tribal witchcraft group allied with the AFDL. Often naked, painted, and frightening in appearance, they have been used to terrorise FAZ soldiers.
Muléliste	The Zairean rebel group also known as 'Simba' was defeated by Mobutu in 1964 but remains a viable force and has assisted the Banyamulenge.
SPLA: Sudan People's Liberation Army	The SPLA operates from bases in Northern Zaire and Uganda in its efforts to overthrow Khartoum. It is assisted by Uganda, Ethiopia, and the United States while Zaire assists Khartoum.

PRO-HUTU	DESCRIPTION
FDD: Forces for the Defense of Democracy	The armed wing of the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD), the Burundian-based political party.
ex-FAR: Forces Armées Rwandaise	This is the former Hutu-dominated Rwandan Army
Interahamwé	This is the militia credited with organising the 1994 genocide of the Rwandan Tutsis.
FAZ: Forces Armées Zairoises	Zaire's main army (30,000 soldiers)
ADF: Allied Democratic Forces	The ADF, also known as the Ugandan Allied Democratic Army, includes anti-Museveni forces fighting from bases inside Zaire. Museveni's support for a pro-Tutsi buffer zone along Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda is partially aimed at controlling these rebels.
Palipehutu: Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu	The Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People operates mainly from the Tanzanian border area from which it launches raids into Burundi.
FNL: Forces Nationales de Libération	Two years ago the FNL split from Palipehutu to form an independent militia.
Frolina: Front de Libération Nationale	A Hutu militia led by Joseph Karumba who operates from Tanzania.