

Conflict in the Cordillera del Cóndor: The Ecuador-Peru Dispute

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Introduction

In January 1995, armed conflict once again broke out between Ecuador and Peru in the Cordillera del Cóndor sector of their Amazonian boundary. The clash in this remote and unmarked zone of the frontier was the most intense, in terms of armaments and troops deployed, in the entire history of the dispute. It was a sad reminder of the volatility of a boundary dispute which originated in the early nineteenth century. As the search for a definitive solution to the issue continued, both sides reiterated familiar legal and political arguments as they struggled to develop new and more effective strategies.

1942 Rio Protocol

The Ecuador-Peru dispute was thought to have been resolved over fifty years ago with the conclusion in Rio de Janeiro in early 1942 of a *Protocol of Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries*, known subsequently as the Rio Protocol (Figure 1). In the extended history of Latin American boundary settlements, this agreement was unique in several crucial aspects. In the role of mediators, four so-called “friendly powers,” Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States, first brought the governments of Ecuador

and Peru together and persuaded them to sign the agreement. The same four friendly powers then signed the protocol themselves as guarantors and agreed to collaborate, as required, to resolve disagreements during demarcation of the boundary. This multilateral commitment to a bilateral settlement separated the Rio Protocol from other boundary agreements in or out of Latin America.¹


The protocol also differed from other boundary treaties in that it provided both a means of settling the controversy and a new boundary line. In the area of the Cordillera del Cóndor, for example, the agreement provided for a boundary line from the Quebrada de San Francisco, the *divortium aquarum* between the Zamora and Santiago Rivers, to the confluence of the Santiago with the Yaupi River. Finally, in recognition of the fact that the frontier between Ecuador and Peru was unknown or poorly known in many areas, the protocol included a provision for reciprocal concessions where convenient to adjust to geographic conditions. Such rectifications were to be enacted with the collaboration of the four guarantor states.²

The governments of Ecuador and Peru soon resorted to the intervention of the guarantors to resolve differences of interpretation which invariably arose as the Ecuador-Peru Mixed Border Commission

worked to delimit the boundary. The guarantors, acting under the leadership of Brazilian Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha, responded by appointing a Brazilian Naval Captain, Braz Dias de Aguiar, as a technical expert empowered to study and resolve disputes. With only minor exceptions, the subsequent decisions of Captain Dias de Aguiar met the full approval of the governments of both Ecuador and Peru.³

The connecting link between the eastern and western sectors of the new boundary was the Cordillera del Cóndor, and within it, the *divortium aquarum*. The provision in the Rio Protocol that the boundary should follow the watershed between the

Figure 1



Zamora and Santiago Rivers from the Quebrada de San Francisco to the confluence of the Santiago and Yaupi Rivers seemed plain; but when applied on the ground, it raised several related issues.

The low ridge known as the Cordillera del Cóndor, thought to run in a northeasterly direction, was found to run in a due northerly direction, ending near where the Zamora River joins the Paute to form the Santiago River. In consequence, the Santiago lacked some 40km of reaching as far south as the head of the San Francisco Quebrada, and the divide that extended from the head of the San Francisco Quebrada was properly the watershed between the headwaters of the Zamora and Marañón Rivers above where the Santiago enters the latter. When these geographic realities were known, the Peruvian representative to the boundary commission proposed the boundary run north to the juncture of the Zamora and the Paute Rivers and then down the Santiago to the confluence of the Yaupi River. Ecuador, objecting that this would be contrary to the terms of the protocol, demanded a straight line between the two points.

The issue in the Cordillera del Cóndor was eventually referred to the guarantors – in effect the Brazilian Foreign Office and Captain Días de Aguiar. In this sector, Días de Aguiar focused on the boundary between the northern end of the Cordillera del Cóndor and the confluence of the Santiago and the Yaupi Rivers because he assumed, like everyone else at the time, that the Cordillera del Cóndor was in fact the watershed between the Zamora and the Santiago Rivers. Because of the later importance of this point, it is worth emphasising that *no one* at this stage questioned that the Cordillera del Cóndor was the watershed between the Zamora and the Santiago Rivers. Días de Aguiar ruled that the boundary should follow the Cordillera del Cóndor to the point where, it appeared on the map, a spur branched off in the direction of the mouth of the Yaupi River. This spur should be followed as far as it went, and if the end of the drainage divide did not extend to the confluence of the Yaupi and Santiago Rivers, the divide should be a straight line between its end and said confluence. Both Ecuador and Peru accepted this decision in July 1945, and the boundary along the spur was subsequently demarcated by the mixed boundary commission.⁴


Nullity Thesis

The United States Army Air Force, in the fall of 1946, completed an aerial survey of the Cordillera del Cóndor sector. In February 1947, a map based on the aerial survey were completed and delivered to the governments of Ecuador and Peru. To the surprise of all concerned, the Cenepa River, previously assumed to be short and of little consequence, was revealed to be a 190km independent fluvial system, lying between the Zamora and the Santiago Rivers. In consequence, there was not one but two *divortium aquarum* between the Zamora and Santiago Rivers, and Article VIII of the Rio Protocol, which spoke of a single *divortium aquarum*, thus appeared to contain a geographic flaw.⁵

The Ecuadorian government was slow to respond officially to the map of the Cordillera del Cóndor resulting from the aerial survey. But on 22 September 1948, Ecuadorian Foreign Minister Neftalí Ponce Miranda ordered the Ecuadorian representatives on the Mixed Border Commission to stop work north of the Cunhuime Sur marker (Figure 2) on the grounds the new map showed there was no single watershed between the Zamora and the Santiago Rivers. Since the Cordillera del Cóndor ran between the Zamora and the Cenepa Rivers, it could not, Ecuadorians reasoned, be the watershed between the Zamora and the Santiago Rivers. This meant that the terms of the Rio Protocol could not be applied literally, a circumstance which Ecuadorians began to suggest threatened the permanency of the entire settlement.⁶

For the Ecuadorian government, the unforeseen Cenepa question left the frontier open in a zone reaching to the Marañón River and thus reinvigorated its perennial dream of a sovereign outlet to the Amazon. At the 1942 Rio Conference, in keeping with traditional Ecuadorian policy, Foreign Minister Julio Tobar Donoso had desperately sought this particular region which Ecuadorians had always considered beyond the scope of Peruvian legal titles. The Peruvian government, in turn, was adamantly opposed to giving Ecuador a sovereign outlet on the Marañón because Ecuadorian control of the Upper Amazon posed a strategic threat to Peruvian territory downstream. That here, of all places, the protocol line would be imperfect was at the very least an odd quirk of fate. When the magnitude of the Cenepa River was discovered, Ecuador concluded that execution of the protocol in this sector was impossible and resumed its former policy of protesting Peruvian activities in the area.⁷

Figure 2



In his annual message to congress on 10 August 1951, Ecuadorian President Galo Plaza Lasso stated that the non-existence of the frontier line in the Santiago-Zamora zone made it necessary for Ecuador and Peru to negotiate a new frontier line. He added that his government could not accept, in this sector, a boundary which did not recognise Ecuador's inalienable right to a sovereign outlet to the Amazon through the Marañón River. At the same time, he appealed to the guarantors to settle what he termed the Cenepa matter. Building on these themes, Ecuadorian Foreign Minister Neftalí Ponce later asserted that it was time for Ecuador to adopt a posture of protest before the Americas in the interest of justice, protesting the 1941 aggression and demanding that a peaceful solution be found for pending differences.⁸

The Peruvian government of General Manuel Odría, a hero of the 1941 war, responded almost

immediately to the change in Ecuadorian policy with a statement that Ecuador must understand that Peru would never consent to an Ecuadorian outlet on the Marañón River. President Odría again took up the issue in his 1953 *mensaje*, reiterating the Peruvian viewpoint that it had no pending boundary problem with Ecuador. The Rio Protocol had precisely fixed the frontier, and that agreement had been subsequently clarified where necessary by Captain Díaz de Aguiar. Even if what Ecuador claimed was certain, which Odría argued was by no means established, all that remained was to draw a line connecting the border markers already in place.⁹

The four guarantors in mid-1956 suggested a new aerial study of the Santiago-Zamora region in the hopes this might contribute to a definitive solution of the boundary question. The Peruvian response expressed surprise at a statement in the proposal

which suggested the existence of a border issue since Peru felt that its dispute with Ecuador had been definitively resolved in Rio de Janeiro. All that remained to be accomplished, according to the Peruvian government, was the placement of a few boundary markers. Ecuador should be invited to continue demarcation of the remaining 78km in strict conformity with the Días de Aguiar plan. The Peruvian government felt the approach proposed by the guarantors amounted to a new procedure distinct from the Rio Protocol; and it rejected this approach as serving to encourage what it labelled an “*absurd revisionist thesis.*”¹⁰

José María Velasco Ibarra, a three-time president of Ecuador, initiated in 1960 a critical and destructive campaign for reelection in which he asserted that the Rio Protocol could not be executed. His argument centered on the alleged geographic flaw in the 1942 agreement in the Cordillera del Cóndor region. Emerging victorious in the June presidential elections, President Velasco in August 1960 declared the Rio Protocol null and void. The Ecuadorian Senate supported and applauded his stand in a resolution a few days later, and the lower house also concurred. The Ecuadorian Supreme Court sustained this nullity thesis in mid-November 1960 with Julio Tobar Donoso, ex-Foreign Minister and now a member of the Supreme Court, signing the opinion. Ecuadorian Foreign Minister José Ricardo Chiriboga Villagómez released a carefully worded document in late September 1960 setting forth his government’s position. The burden of his argument was that, due to Peruvian military actions, free Ecuadorian consent was lacking in 1942; and Interamerican international law did not recognise the acquisition of territory by force. Other factors cited by Chiriboga in support of the nullity thesis were the deficiency of delimitation in the Zamora-Santiago region, and the alleged failure of the Peruvian government to comply with the treaty through its denial to Ecuador of free navigation. The Ecuadorian foreign minister concluded that, since the Rio Protocol was stillborn, the Ecuador-Peru dispute had not varied from the *status quo ante bellum*.¹¹

Under pressure from Ecuador, the four guarantors issued separate but identical statements to Ecuador and Peru in December 1960 supporting the sanctity of treaties. These telegrams expressed the mutual agreement of the guarantors that a basic principle of international law was that a unilateral determination on the part of one of the parties to a treaty of limits was not enough to invalidate the treaty nor would it free the state from the obligations of the treaty. Any doubts which might arise concerning as yet

undemarcated parts of the frontier, the statement added, should be amicably resolved in accordance with Article VII of the Rio Protocol. In seeking to unilaterally void a treaty of limits, the Ecuadorian Government challenged a rule of international law whose overthrow threatened chaos for the entire region given the large number of boundary treaties signed in Latin America since independence.¹²

Over the last three decades, there has been little change in the public policy of the parties to the Ecuador-Peru boundary dispute. The Ecuadorian tactic has been to delay a settlement of the issue until, by some stroke of fortune, Peru could be induced to alter the provisions of the protocol to permit Ecuador an outlet on the Marañón River. The Peruvian government, on the other hand, has continued to maintain that no problem exists as the protocol and subsequent awards answered all pertinent questions. The boundary markers in place are final, in the eyes of Peruvians, and nothing remains but to complete work in the unmarked Cordillera del Cóndor sector. The Peruvian position in this regard remains relatively defensible, especially when contrasted with Ecuadorian attempts to parlay a geographic anomaly into sovereign access to the Marañón River, access clearly not included in the Rio Protocol and repeatedly and specifically denied by Peru.

Recent Tensions

The United States government raised the boundary question in 1977 in separate talks between President Jimmy Carter and the presidents of Peru and Ecuador. President Carter expressed the hope that the dispute might be resolved in such a way as to give Ecuador access to the Marañón River.¹³ The Ecuadorian strategy at the time was designed to obtain a corridor leading from the last approved boundary markers in the Cordillera del Cóndor sector to the Marañón River. In fact, access to the Marañón at the confluence of the Santiago River offered little practical advantage to Ecuador since the Manseriche Rapids bar navigation downstream; however, the psychological gains were considered by Ecuador to outweigh the practical disadvantages. The unsuccessful Carter initiative was widely criticised in Peru on the grounds that its exaggerated declarations raised Ecuadorian hopes to a completely unrealistic level. Peruvian observers also expressed concern that the dispute threatened to become multilateral in nature if outside states, in addition to the guarantors, became involved in the guise of preserving hemispheric peace. In the end, the Peruvian government continued to insist that

Ecuadorian access to the Marañón remain limited to free navigation of the northern tributaries of the river as set forth in Article VI of the Rio Protocol.¹⁴

In February 1982, US Secretary of State Alexander Haig reportedly offered Ecuador the good offices of the United States in resolving the dispute. In response to a Peruvian request for clarification, the United States government replied that it was not contemplating any initiative outside the framework of the Rio Protocol. This statement reportedly satisfied Peruvian Foreign Minister Javier Arias Stella and a wide segment of the Peruvian political spectrum since it made perfectly clear that the United States government continued to regard the Rio Protocol as a valid international instrument. The response from Washington also ratified the intention of the United States to work within the terms of the protocol.¹⁵

The ongoing tension between Ecuadorian and Peruvian forces in the disputed zone led to skirmishes in and around Paquisha in January 1981. After Ecuador established three outposts on the east side of the Cordillera del Cóndor, the Peruvian government of Fernando Belaúnde Terry took decisive action to defend the national patrimony. While Peruvian armed forces once again emerged militarily triumphant, the terms of the subsequent cease-fire were roundly criticised in Peru on the grounds they did not demarcate the boundary, refer to the legal principle of respect for international agreements, or involve the guarantors of the Rio Protocol.¹⁶ Peruvian critics also expressed concern that the essential nature of the dispute appeared to be shifting from the long-term Peruvian focus on the sanctity of international treaties towards a


negotiated, compromise solution to the dispute. Concern in this regard heightened after October 1983 when the Ecuadorian Congress, once more declaring the 1942 protocol null and void, reaffirmed Ecuadorian rights in the Amazon Basin.¹⁷

A decade later, Ecuadorean forces infiltrated the border at Pachacútec in the neighborhood of the Cusumaza-Bumbuiza marker which is located near where the Yaupi River meets the Santiago River. In this zone, Peru advocates a sinuous line from the Cusumaza-Bumbuiza marker to the junction of the Yaupi and Santiago Rivers while Ecuador advocates a straight line (Figure 3). The Peruvian position appears to be the more accurate projection of the 1945 ruling by *Días de Aguiar*, but Ecuador refuses to close the frontier. A serious armed conflict was only avoided in 1991 after representatives of Ecuador and Peru established a common security zone in the disputed region. The agreement called for the armed forces of both states to withdraw some two kilometers from existing positions.

The Peruvian government took advantage of this incident to reiterate its long-standing commitment to the terms of the 1942 protocol. Ecuador, in turn, sought to use the incident to challenge the very essence of the Rio Protocol both as a definitive settlement and a means to demarcate the boundary. The Quito government first proposed Papal arbitration in what it described as its old territorial dispute with Peru and later explored mediation of the dispute by either Brazil or Chile. Both proposals represented a serious challenge to the Peruvian position that a strict application of the provisions of the Rio Protocol was the only path to resolve the

controversy. The Peruvian government responded to the Ecuadorian proposal by reaffirming its respect for the legal framework embodied in the Rio Protocol and guaranteed by the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States. Peru later proposed to Ecuador a treaty of commerce and free navigation in the Amazon region, an offer intended to promote regional unity. This creative Peruvian initiative held out the possibility of an agreement which granted Ecuador the benefits of port facilities on the Amazon and its tributaries in return for demarcation of the 78km unmarked section of the border. The Peruvian government repeated the proposal in various forms in 1992-1993, but the Ecuadorian

Figure 3



government proved unwilling or unable to retreat from its defiant policy towards the Rio Protocol.¹⁸

In January 1995, The armed forces of Ecuador and Peru again clashed in the Cordillera del Cóndor sector. After almost a month of serious fighting, diplomatic initiatives finally produced a cease-fire in mid-February. The six-point framework of the Declaración de Paz de Itamaraty, in addition to cease-fire and demobilisation provisions, provided for bilateral talks between Ecuador and Peru with the guarantors of the Rio Protocol, who also signed the declaration, acting as observers. Following conclusion of the Itamaraty Declaration, Ecuadorian President Sixto Durán Ballén, whose skillful manipulation of the dispute improved his domestic political situation but thwarted an emerging national consensus that the time had come to resolve the border dispute, proclaimed publicly that the terms of the Rio Protocol must be changed. Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, in turn, argued that the terms of the protocol were clear and unchangeable since bilateral treaties cannot be revised on a unilateral basis. President Fujimori later rejected categorically the possibility of giving Ecuador a sovereign outlet through Peruvian territory to the Amazon River. In the meantime, the direct talks provided for in paragraph 6 of the Itamaraty Declaration, and initiated in Lima in January 1996, continued in an effort to find a lasting solution to this vexing boundary question.¹⁹

Conclusions

From the outset, the Ecuador-Peru boundary dispute in the Cordillera del Cóndor has involved much larger issues than the simple placement of the final concrete markers necessary to delimit the boundary. With the completion of the aerial survey in 1946 and the subsequent issuance of a new map of the disputed region in early 1947, the Ecuadorian government began to view the dispute in the unmarked zone as a possible vehicle to force renegotiation of the 1942 Rio Protocol. And if this proved impossible, the government in Quito hoped to gain, at a minimum, direct and sovereign access to the Amazon River via the Marañón. In pursuit of these goals, successive Ecuadorian governments regularly exploited the conflict to gain popularity at home and to divert attention from domestic problems. President Sixto Durán Ballén's deft handling of the spring 1995 war with Peru was only the most recent example of an Ecuadorian chief executive using the controversy to buttress his domestic political standing.

The Peruvian government, which reacted immediately to the 1948 shift in Ecuadorian policy, maintained thereafter that there really was no issue in the Cordillera del Cóndor beyond the placement of the outstanding boundary markers. Peruvian policy has remained a model of consistency; however, in concentrating on the issue of the sanctity of international treaties, Peru has often neglected to remind itself and others of the strength of its *de jure* and *de facto* cases to the disputed territory. Concerned with any action which might challenge the terms of the Rio Protocol, the Peruvian government has also been reluctant to accept the additional survey work in the disputed zone which the guarantors have felt necessary to clarify the exact position of key geographic points.

The United States government has periodically involved itself in the dispute, but its policies have contributed very little towards permanent resolution. Sensitivity in the Department of State to Ecuadorian demands for a sovereign outlet on the Amazon River, in evidence before the conclusion of the Rio Protocol, rekindled long-standing Peruvian concerns about the potential detrimental impact of United States involvement in such issues. United States intervention in the dispute in the 1970s and 1980s encouraged Ecuador in its pursuit of a solution outside the Rio Protocol but also strengthened Peruvian resolve to prevent this from happening. Issuance of the 1979 Krieg report, a study prepared for the Department of State under its External Research Program, also reinforced Peruvian concerns as to United States involvement outside the confines of the Rio Protocol. When compared to the earlier report by George M. McBride, the Krieg report, which was heavily dependent on Ecuadorian source materials, took a much more sympathetic stance towards the Ecuadorian position. More than once, Krieg implied in the report that Peru should compromise with Ecuador even though the latter lacked *de jure* and *de facto* rights to the disputed territory.

Where does the dispute go from here? Fulfillment of the Rio Protocol, both in terms of a full demarcation of the boundary and the provision to Ecuador of free navigation on the northern tributaries of the Amazon River, remains the most realistic, long-term solution. The Ecuadorian government, based on events over the last half century, seems unlikely to win more, and the Peruvian government certainly remains unlikely to be satisfied with less. While the ongoing state of belligerence serves neither state, a peaceful resolution of the dispute would open new opportunities for Ecuador, through enhanced

regional cooperation, to increase its role as an Amazonian state.

Notes

- ¹ For an introduction to the boundary dispute between Ecuador and Peru, including a discussion of the legal and extra-legal cases of both parties, see Bruce St John, R. (1994) 'The Boundary between Ecuador and Peru', *Boundary and Territory Briefing*, International Boundaries Research Unit: Durham, 1, 4.
- ² Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores del Perú (1967) *Protocolo Peruano-Ecuatoriano de Paz, Amistad y Límites*, Lima: Tipografía Peruana: 27-32; Pérez Concha, J. (1965) *Ensayo Histórico-Crítico de la Relaciones Diplomáticas del Ecuador con los Estados Limitrofes*, 2nd ed., Volume III, Quito: Universidad de Guayaquil, 374-378.
- ³ McCutchen McBride, G. (1949) *Ecuador-Peru Boundary Settlement: Report to the Secretary of State*, Washington, DC: n.p. Chapter IV: 55.
- ⁴ Krieg, W. L. (1981) *Ecuadorean-Peruvian Rivalry in the Upper Amazon*; 2nd Ed. Enlarged to Include the Paquisha Incident, Study prepared for the Department of State under its External Research Program, 1986: 130.
- ⁵ According to the United States Technical Advisor to the Mixed Border Commission, the map which resulted from the aerial survey showed the watershed, the pattern of stream drainage and the topographic contours with a fair degree of accuracy. McBride, *Ecuador-Peru*, Chapter IV, 29.
- ⁶ Reyes, O. E. (1967) *Breve Historia General del Ecuador*, Volumes II and III, Quito: Editorial 'Fray Jodoco Ricke,': 301-316.
- ⁷ Donoso, J. T., Ecuadorian Foreign Minister in 1942, later published a full account of the Rio Conference which was also a defence of his policies. Therein, he admitted that most of the territory lost by Ecuador in 1942 had actually been surrendered six years before with the acceptance of the 1936 Status Quo line, and as a matter of fact, had never been occupied by Ecuador. He also acknowledged that Ecuador, at no time, had possessions on the shore of the Marañón River and not even on the Santiago River. Donoso, J. T. (1945) *La invasión peruana y el Protocolo de Rio*, Quito: 'Editorial Ecuatoriana,': 461-462.
- ⁸ Martz, J. D. (1972) *Ecuador: Conflicting Political Culture and the Quest for Progress*, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc.: 182. Bryce Wood, an internationally recognised expert on Latin American border disputes, completed an exhaustive study of the Ecuador-Peru dispute in 1978 in which he concluded that Peru committed a number of aggressive acts in 1941-42 but did not consummate the act of aggression. More to the point, he cited several instances in which Ecuador as well as Peru committed aggressive acts. Wood, B. (1978) *Aggression and History: The Case of Ecuador and Peru*, Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, especially pp. 210-214. George McBride earlier concluded that both parties were guilty of aggressive acts in 1941. McBride, *Ecuador-Peru*, Chapter VII: 4-5. Krieg clouded this issue when he later implied, without providing new information, that Peru was the aggressor in 1941. Krieg, *Ecuadorean-Peruvian*: 4-5 and 80.
- ⁹ Perú, Presidente (1953) *Mensaje del Presidente de la República*, Lima: n.p: 11-13. Francisco Tudela, a widely respected Peruvian scholar and diplomat, published a study in 1952 intended to show Peruvians their legal rights were supported by an irrevocable international act. Tudela, F. (1952) *La posición jurídica internacional del Perú en el proceso de la determinación de su frontera con el Ecuador*, Lima: Imprenta Torres Aguirre.
- ¹⁰ Quoted in Zook Jr., D. H. (1964) *Zarumilla-Marañón: The Ecuador-Peru Dispute*, New York: Bookman Associates, Inc.: 222; Gustavo Pons Muzzo (1994) *Estudio Histórico sobre el Protocolo de Rio de Janeiro*, Lima: n.p: 256-270.
- ¹¹ Maier, G. (1966) 'The Impact of Velasquismo on the Ecuadorean Political System', Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Illinois University: 225.
- ¹² Bruce St John, R. (1977) 'The Boundary Dispute Between Peru and Ecuador,' *American Journal of International Law*, 71, 2, (April): 329-330.
- ¹³ In preparation for the 1942 Rio Conference, a strong current reportedly existed at the United States Department of State in support of a sovereign Ecuadorian outlet on the Marañón River; and in December 1941, Deputy Secretary Sumner Welles proposed to the co-mediators providing Ecuador direct access to the Marañón at the mouth of the Santiago River. Wood, *Aggression and History*: 156-160.
- ¹⁴ Jarrín, E. M. (1981) *El conflicto con Ecuador*, Lima: Ediciones Rikchay Peru: 51-52; Juan Ruiz (1981) 'Las relaciones con el Ecuador: Historia y Perspectivas,' *Debate*, 9: 32.
- ¹⁵ Krieg, *Ecuadorean-Peruvian*: 326.
- ¹⁶ Bruce St John, R. (1984) 'Peru: democracy under siege,' *The World Today*, 40, 7, (July): 302.
- ¹⁷ Ferrero Costa, E. (1987) 'Peruvian Foreign Policy: Current Trends, Constraints and Opportunities,' *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 29, 2, (Summer): 64-65.
- ¹⁸ 'El Pito del Hito,' (1991) *Caretas* (Lima), 1177, (16 September): 24; 'Causa del incidente en la frontera sur,' (1991) *Hoy* (Quito), (19 September); Bustamante, F. (1993) 'Ecuador: Putting an End to the Ghosts of the Past?' *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 34, 4, (Winter 1992-93): 205-213.
- ¹⁹ 'Direct Talks Agreed,' (1996) *Boundary and Security Bulletin*, International Boundaries Research Unit: Durham: 3, 4, (Winter 1995-1996): 51; *El Comercio* (Lima), 10 October 1995; Hey, J. A. K. (1995) 'Ecuadoran Foreign Policy Since 1979: Ideological

Cycles or a Trend towards Neoliberalism?' *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 37, 4, (Winter): 75-77.

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