



DURHAM MIDDLE EAST PAPERS

THE LAST KHEDIVE BUT THE FIRST TO DECOLONISE?
ABBAS HILMI II'S ODYSSEY FOR SOVEREIGNTY

Karim Malak

Fellow, The Mohamed Ali Foundation

Durham Middle East Paper No. 109

DURHAM MIDDLE EAST PAPERS

INSTITUTE FOR MIDDLE EASTERN AND ISLAMIC STUDIES

THE LAST KHEDIVE BUT THE FIRST TO DECOLONISE?
ABBAS HILMI II'S ODYSSEY FOR SOVEREIGNTY

Karim Malak

Fellow, The Mohamed Ali Foundation

**Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies
Durham University
Al-Qasimi Building
Elvet Hill Road
Durham
DH1 3TU
Tel: +44 (0)191 3345680**

MAF Papers No. 03
Durham Middle East Papers No. 109
ISSN 1476-4830
April 2024

The Durham Middle East Papers series covers all aspects of the economy, politics, social science, history, literature and languages of the Middle East. Authors are invited to submit papers to the Editorial Board for consideration for publication.

The views expressed in this paper are the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher or IMEIS. All Rights Reserved. This paper cannot be photocopied or reproduced without prior permission.

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (IMEIS), within the School of Government & International Affairs, is a Social Science-focused academic institute of excellence, research-led in ethos, with a track-record of internationally acclaimed research outputs across all sub-areas of its activity. Success in this respect obtains largely from the interdisciplinary nature of the Institute's activities and the fruitful interaction of political economists, political scientists, historians and Islamicists, as well as with colleagues from Anthropology, Arabic, Archaeology, Geography, Business – all linked together by their collective focus on the study of the Middle East and the Muslim world in the widest sense.

ABOUT THE PAPERS

Established in the early 1970s the multidisciplinary series includes topics on all aspects of the social sciences and arts in the Middle East, written by leading and emerging scholars in their respective fields.

EDITORIAL BOARD

Professor Anoush Ehteshami

Exofficio member

Professor of International Relations
in the School of Government and
International Affairs

Dr May Darwich

Assistant Professor in the
International Relations of the Middle
East in the School of Government and
International Affairs

Professor Clive Jones

Professor of Regional Security in
the School of Government and
International Affairs, Durham
University

Dr Carly Beckerman

Art editor

Assistant Professor in the
International Relations of the Middle
East in the School of Government and
International Affairs

ADVISORY BOARD

Professor Rory Miller

Georgetown University, Doha

Professor James Piscatori

Australian National University

Professor Beverly Milton-Edwards

Queen's University, Belfast

Sir Harold Walker, KCMG

Member, Luce Foundation

In 2018 Durham University and the Mohamed Ali Foundation¹ launched a fellowship programme to encourage academic research in the archive of the last khedive of Egypt, Abbas Hilmi II (1874–1944), and to make the collection’s strengths more widely known to international researchers.

The collection, which is deposited in Durham University Library’s Archives and Special Collections, provides a rich resource of material on political, social, economic and cultural affairs in Egypt in the late 19th and first half of the 20th centuries. It is hoped that this endowment by the Mohamed Ali Foundation will foster deeper understanding of an important period of Egyptian history and of a transformative era in East-West relations.

Dr Pascale Ghazaleh is Chair and Associate Professor of History at The American University in Cairo. Dr Ghazaleh has taught in AUC’s History Department since 2005. She is an expert on Ottoman history and 19th century Egypt, on which she has published widely. She holds a PhD in History from Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, writing on “Généalogies patrimoniales. La constitution des fortunes urbaines: Le Caire, 1780-1830” (“Patrimonial Genealogies. The Constitution of Urban Wealth: Cairo, 1780-1830”).

Contact email : ghazaleh@aucegypt.edu

This paper explores the nature of Egyptian Sovereignty at the turn of the 19th century. Challenging the narrative that sees the Egyptian state emerge after 1919, it traces its birth to increasingly assertive policies and reforms that began under Mehmet Ali and Ibrahim Pasha, which were stunted by the British but later picked up by Khedive Abbas Hilmi II. Asking what the limits and opportunities for governance were afforded within competing visions of Ottoman and British sovereignty, the author concentrates particularly on accounting and financial reform, military bureaucracy, and that of the *awqāf*; the key battlegrounds for Egyptian sovereignty between the 1870s and 1914 when an earlier undertheorized epoch of decolonization began.

The fates of Khedive Abbas Hilmi II (1892-1914 r.) and the High Commissioner in Egypt Evelyn Baring (1883-1907 r.), known as Lord Cromer, were intricately intertwined at the turn of the twentieth century. Even though one was a sovereign monarch and the other a British bureaucrat, Lord Cromer was no less sovereign than the Khedive as Consul-General.

Cromer, however, did not recognize the Khedive's sovereignty. He made sure never to address the Khedive privately as 'Son Altesse' but instead as "[m]onseigneur" despite Edmund Allenby—the Sirdar—addressing him as "[y]our Highness." Herbert Kitchener, the Sirdar of Sudan, too switched at the height of the Fashoda crisis in 1898 to 'Regent' instead of recognizing him as a sovereign with the proper title "Son Altesse."¹ For the British "[o]ther analogies could be easily found," where sovereigns did not style themselves as kings, "as that of England and Ireland before the Union" where the King called himself "Lord of Ireland." In the grander scheme of things, whatever title was used, for the British "it was quite unimportant that" the British monarch called "himself not King, but lord of Ireland, just as the Khedive of Egypt appears to have called himself "souverain" or "lord" of the Soudan."²

Like two archnemeses, Cromer saw the danger in how the Khedive himself was holding frequent banquets and, "unlike his father, Abbas Pasha" styled himself with "royal titles – such as "Sovereign, auguste Maître" when it didn't involve Istanbul.³ But why the focus on this rivalry between these two figures? Untangling this fateful encounter, for one, promises to change not just our understanding of Egyptian history, but the different circuits that sovereignty flowed through; allowing us to approach decolonization differently as a process that started with the Khedive, Khedive Abbas Hilmi II that is.

So precarious and pervasive was their relationship and power struggle between them that even after retirement each haunted the other and continued to slander one another. Back in London and in retirement by 1907, Cromer felt the need to publish a statement in the *Times* when the Khedive was dethroned

in 1914. He claimed that “if, as it appears to be the case, the Khedive has unwisely thrown in his lot with the Germans, his defection is probably of no great political importance.”⁴

When it came to the Khedive, however, this was no veiled insult. His coterie saw that “the tactics of Lord Cromer assured that the new Khedive had no chances of success.”⁵ Rather surprisingly, this was the same picture Cromer painted of the Khedive. He claimed that “[t]he personal influence of his Highness in Egypt is at present slight.” Yet when Cromer postponed the reading of the Khedive’s investiture *firman*, the Ottoman envoy Gazi Mukhtar Pasha rebuked Abbas and urged him to curb British power.⁶ For that, and several other challenges between the two, Cromer thought that “Abbas Hilmi can no longer be its ruler.” Egyptian policy had to be sanctioned by Britain.

Cromer’s next few words belied his thinking, “Egypt, as a result of the war, must be wholly and irrevocably be relieved of the pernicious mortmain of Turkish sovereignty.”⁷ While the Foreign Office communicated to Egypt that a protectorate was declared, and that the Khedive was no longer the ruler,⁸ Cromer’s announcement on the same day on the eighth page of the *Times* carried the explanation: Ottoman sovereignty over Egypt was to be no more. With the declaration of a protectorate, and an end to Ottoman suzerainty, Abbas Hilmi II became Egypt’s last Khedive II on December 14th, 1914. Given that the Khedive was in secret negotiations over his looming dethronement, it is not unlikely that Cromer was looped in.⁹

Nearly a month before, the Khedive was in Istanbul on official business. We know this from a *vakf* document that confirmed the *evkaf* he bequeathed to his family—from his palace, mausoleum and mosque at al-Muntaza in Alexandria, to his estates in Sharqiyya, Qalyūbiyya and Ismailia.

The timing of this document, a month before his dethronement, is not the only peculiar thing. More curious still is the fact that it required an adjudicatory council be convened in order to issue it. It was almost as if the Khedive knew something was coming. Indeed, secret negotiations between the Khedive and Whitehall regarding his deposal centered round protection of his assets and property.¹⁰ As we shall see, endowments, and their regime of notarization, mediated different layers of sovereignty, especially when it came to Cromer’s attempt to control Khedival property.¹¹

On other occasions Cromer pursued his policy of curbing Khedival sovereignty to new heights. The anniversary of the Queen’s ascension turned into a regal

event overseen by Cromer. As he stood in full army dress, Cromer looked as though *he* were the sovereign and resident of *Qasr ‘Abdīn*. Flanked by British guards and with several units of British soldiers, he hoisted the Union Jack on the anniversary of the Queen’s ascension to *God Save the Queen* as the troops played the anthem.¹² They then marched on and paraded the capital, making sure to pass along major thoroughfares and roads leading to the Citadel on their way back to their barracks in ‘Abbasiyya.¹³

In contrast, when the Khedive *was* present at certain fortuitous events, such as Opera screenings, it was no surprise that he and Cromer clashed in subtle ways, mirroring the fight between Ottoman, Egyptian and British sovereignty in the Nile Valley.

The Khedive’s memoirs confirm this. They point to how Cromer tried to one up him publicly. Cromer made sure that he toured his fiefdom while being received as if he were a ruler, attending Operas, going to the Sudan and attending army inspections while opening infrastructure projects to project British sovereignty.¹⁴

In 1901, and during his visit to the Sudan, the Khedive was received with much fanfare. He attended inspections, received the Ulema, merchants and traders of Sudan, much to Cromer’s objection.¹⁵ If the Khedive courted Azhar clerics and gave speeches in the presence of the Ulema, then Cromer would go and do the same at British institutions. Taking the opportunity to lay the foundation of Victoria College in 1906, Cromer spoke of British values of education which, he said, did not distinguish when it came to “race and creed”—so long, of course, that it was provided only to boys!¹⁶

When the Khedive replaced the British soldiers at the Alexandria fort with Egyptian soldiers in 1892, Cromer protested.¹⁷ As a counter-measure to the change of garrison in Alexandria, Cromer dispatched imperial troops to Egypt and lobbied successfully for the removal of pro-Ottoman Ministers, such as the Egyptian-Armenian Foreign Minister Tigrane Pasha.¹⁸ To spite Cromer, the Khedive permitted Colonel ‘Urabi, who was in exile since the British Occupation in 1882,¹⁹ to return to Egypt. Both the Khedive and Cromer were thus antinomies to two competing visions of sovereignty: One tried to decolonize—the other tried to maintain British sovereignty over Egypt and usurp Ottoman suzerainty. It is this lens and political conceptualization of competing sovereignty that I am concerned with.

Sovereignty & Decolonization

Beyond this petty rivalry and bickering, lies a new history of sovereignty that is informed by a study of governmental technologies. By looking at the two quintessential institutions of sovereignty, the army and *awqāf*, through a different lens—that of governmental accounting—a different narrative of sovereignty emerges.²⁰ This is where Cromer comes in. An imperial bureaucrat who first came to Egypt as a Commissioner of an International Debt Commission, Cromer's many moves against the Khedive belied his financial thinking. As a bureaucrat who rose through the ranks from Comptroller-General to Consul-General, most of his techniques ruling Egypt had a financial aspect to them as a disciplinary technology of rule.²¹ Indeed, the occupation's own claim to rule was its ability to alleviate material conditions for the peasants of Egypt through sound financial reform and agricultural innovation.²² The Khedive's attempt to wrestle these institutions of government, and claim them as his own, thus offers us a window into this bedeviled fight for sovereignty and against these financial disciplinary techniques of rule.

Initially, Abbas Hilmi II's activism set a curious precedent and example for others to follow in the Royal Family. As late as 1932, he was actively maintaining his reputation in London by suing those who slandered him in the press. In 1932 he sued the famed

publisher Macmillan. Macmillan was, coincidentally, also the publisher of Cromer's books. He sued them for the inclusion of the 'Egyptian problem', rather than presumably the Egyptian question, in one of its publications.²³ Other members of the royal family led similar protests at key moments—such as during 1922 when several princes objected over Egypt's conditional independence. Meanwhile some, such as Prince Muhammad Ali Tawfiq, refused to take the throne after the Khedive was removed. Indeed, even Husayn Kamil initially refused the throne, and only accepted it begrudgingly when it was rumored that the British would offer the throne to the Agha Khan.²⁴

But as the British presence in Egypt dragged on, and the Khedive's legacy was undone, the pendulum swung in the other way. Later monarchs learned an important lesson and toed the British line, respecting British sovereignty and lending credence to the picture that Marxist and nationalist republican historians drew of an impressionable Egyptian monarch that was subservient to British suzerainty.²⁵ For this reason, Khedive Abbas Hilmi II's rule becomes a fault line, one that set Egypt's turbulent and troublesome path towards decolonization for the next half century to come until his dethronement in 1914.

As for the nature of the Khedive's reforms—be they Ottoman, secular or Western—these set of questions

“ABBAS HILMI II WAS THUS UNDOING THE ACCUMULATION OF LAND BY FOREIGNERS...”

require a similar inquiry but into the machinery of his favorite bureau: the *awqāf*.²⁶

As an eternal pious endowment, the *waqf* is a fascinating technology that allows us to see the nature of Ottoman sovereignty and its adherence to pre-modern ethos of rule. Little vestiges of these endowments remained as Egypt racked on debt after debt in the 1860s. When Khedive Ismail transferred his household land as a security to secure a loan from the Rothschilds—creating the State Domianial Authority in 1876—Abbas Hilmi II sought to undo this by buying back the land and endowing it anew

through *Diwān 'Umūm al-Awqāf*.²⁷ With extant reports from this bureau, a different picture emerges rather than the Ministerial reports used to write a history of endowments as a form of patronage or policy.²⁸

Abbas Hilmi II was thus undoing the accumulation of land by foreigners, and helping repay Egypt's debt by buying back the property that was seized as credit, the opposite of what is assumed in Egyptian historiography.²⁹ In this way, the seizure—and return—of *waqf* property marks important, in fact essential, fault-lines in the understanding of Egyptian sovereignty and its history. Taken further, it is also an important facet of the Khedive's ability to maintain his monarchical household's power and tool to rule in the name of the people.

So important was this technology, that the office of Director of the Endowments, *Nasir Diwān 'Umūm Al-Awqāf*, became a coveted position that displayed the Khedive's direct involvement in the government of Egyptians' daily lives. The Khedive put in its place his personal secretary as director, trusting no one else other than Ahmed Shafiq Bāshā.

As Ahmed Shafiq Bāshā wrote to the Khedive, the latter received daily day dispatches about his estates and endowments, including the Aegean Island of Thasos/Taşos that was gifted to his grandfather by the Sultan in 1813. He took care to enquire about minute details, such as the performance of the local judge, the year's harvest, prevalence of the cotton worm and allegations of

“WHAT DID THESE BUREAUCRATIC REFORMS DO AND WHAT WAS THEIR IMPACT ON DECOLONIZATION OVERALL?”

corruption against judges in 1902 on Taşoş, treating it as part of his estate and its subjects as his.³⁰ Indeed, well after his exile, the Khedive continued to take care of his grandfather’s endowed property in the Aegean, sending requests for it to be repaired, reporting on its state, its lack of funds and asking the Sultan to maintain his *imare hayriye*—the soup kitchen.³¹

Continuing my focus on accounting and finance, I also look at how the Khedive tried to decolonize the army’s finances. However, this link between the army and endowments is not as far-apart as may appear. For as we shall see, it was through the same accountants and financial experts that the British were able to control the army and endowments through peculiar and incisive audits.

By looking at these two apparatuses, the accounting of the army and of the *awqāf*, I ask important and new questions in the field of Middle East History: What did these bureaucratic reforms do and what was their impact on decolonization overall? Did Abbas Hilmi II challenge British might in these reforms, as he did in instances such as Fashoda in 1898, or did he—unwittingly—invite more intervention after these uncalculated gambits as Cromer and other Egyptian nationalists insinuated?³²

Phrased otherwise, how can we evaluate the efficacy of these different reforms and resistance to the British? If indeed parts of the machinery of government were in his hands, then he could resist British justification for the occupation by offering a *Shari’a*-informed reforms as opposed to British and Western systems of governance—“the steady jog-trot” towards civilization that Cromer referred to and which was shared by Egyptian nationalists.³³

While largely beyond the scope of this paper, these questions all point towards one centrifugal question in the literature which I explore through the accounting of army finance and *waqf* endowments: decolonization against British sovereignty.

Fashoda

According to a secret pamphlet by the Khedive’s former private secretary Youssef Siddiq,³⁴ the Khedive organized the mission of Jean-Baptiste Marchand in Fashoda, the South of Sudan, where the British and French armies would confront one another. Siddiq claimed that the idea originated with French statesmen and orientalist M. Gabriel Hanotaux who passed it on to the Khedive.³⁵ Reading this pamphlet, one sees the merits of Roger Owen’s claim that, “what now came to be called the ‘Frontier Incident’ marked the end of the Khedive’s role as the public leader of the opposition to the British.”³⁶ But Cromer was equally affected by Fashoda as was the Khedive. For such a prolific writer, Cromer’s voluminous study *Modern Egypt* has one glaring omission: that of the Fashoda Incident in 1898. Not only is it omitted, but along with it comes the following statement:

I have purposely omitted any account of what is known as the “Fashoda incident” from this work. I should be most unwilling to do anything which might contribute to revive public interest in an affair which is now, happily for all concerned, well-nigh forgotten. The word “Fashoda” has been erased from the map. The place is now called by its Shillouk name of Kodok.³⁷

Cromer wanted to erase all aspects of that incident for good reason. Most Egyptians were captivated by the events and news of Fashoda. Some northern governorates even rebelled.³⁸ The local press—and the Khedive’s men were following the Sirdar Herbert Kitchener’s campaign in Sudan closely.³⁹ As Wilson Jacob has shown, children’s books were printed about the campaign and the reconquest of the Sudan became a household topic for discussion in the British Empire.⁴⁰

The Egyptian press too published short telegrams and long articles detailing the movements of Kitchener and that of his French nemesis: Jean-Baptiste

Marchand who was already at Fashoda as the latter followed his trail and encamped opposite his garrison.⁴¹ These articles immediately connected this confrontation not only to the precarious status of Sudan since the Mahdi revolt, but the removal of Egyptian officers serving in the Sudan. Novels written in 1898 also spoke of how conscription summons were issued for Egyptian soldiers for the Sudan campaign.⁴² The country was gripped by the Fashoda incident as both the British and French army enclosed and encamped around one another.

The press further pointed that, if it were true that Kitchener avoided taking British officers with him, then it would have been a sly move on the part of the British who—now that the French were in Africa—reverted to the claim that this was Egyptian territory ruled by Egyptian officers; ignoring their attempts at employing Yemeni, Somali and Indian soldiers prior.⁴³

But this was mere window-dressing. Translations of European newspaper articles in the Egyptian press also revisited how the bitter evacuation of Egyptian bureaucrats from Sudan after the Mahdi revolt. Perhaps now the evacuation of Egyptian bureaucrats could possibly be reversed. Perhaps the most important of these claims was the argument made by *Al-Mū'ayyad*: while the French and British were engrossed over who arrived first to hoist their

flag at Fashoda—be it the French tricolor or the Khedival and British flags—what really mattered was the Egyptian flag of the Ottoman Empire—*rayyāt Misr al-ūthmāniyya*—had not been hoisted.⁴⁴ Ottoman sovereignty was therefore already being circumscribed well before the declaration of a protectorate in 1914, showing how Fashoda inaugurated a new sovereign order.

I am not arguing that Ottoman sovereignty should only be seen as a bulwark against British sovereignty. Other examples of border clashes point to a tendentious relationship between Egyptians and Ottomans. One instance, for example, of equally important significance, where Ottoman sovereignty operated as a limit to Egyptian power, concerns the Egyptian Army's reaction to the border incursions by the Ottomans on the Western border in *Sidī Barānī* in 1907.⁴⁵

Contradictions of Ottoman Sovereignty

In a long panegyric appeal written to the Khedive in 1907, Mulāzim Thānī Abdel Lattif Shukrī detailed how Ottoman soldiers crossed the Ottoman-Egyptian border and collected from Tripoli tribesmen one hundred and fifty pounds. Later, the captain discovered these were allegedly overdue taxes for Tripoli. As Shukrī commenced his duties, "*bādart bi-wajibātī*," he gathered his victuals and was hot on the chase of the Ottoman soldiers as they slipped

back into their territory. While he followed them and observed them at night, he continued to gather intelligence—ascertaining if this was a one-off incident or if there was more to it. As the tribesmen spotted him and his company, they attacked him and a firefight ensued. He lost all his soldiers while firing at some tribesmen and Ottomans who responded to the scene. Alone and alive, he rather mysteriously withdrew using his own devices. It was at that point in the letter that the story ended and his plea began.

Shukrī openly begged the Khedive for mercy, asking what his ruling was, and if he had done the right thing by writing to him so that he had the facts: "*fā mā-hukmukum yā mawlāy?*" Fearing he'd be court marshalled for losing his soldiers, or worse deserting,⁴⁶ he beseeched the Khedive: "*anā bayn nārīn nār al-qabba wa-al-nasb wa-nār 'adam al-tā'a*." He did not want to lie about what happened, unlike his superiors who wanted him to paint the Ottomans in a disparaging light. Instead, he emphasized that they were merely collecting taxes from the nomadic tribes. Yet he risked insubordination for writing to the Khedive and giving a clear outline of what happened; namely that they merely protecting their claims to sovereignty and levying taxes in an un-demarcated Western border.⁴⁷

Though border clashes are a regular facet of history, the question begs itself: were clashes between the Egyptians and the British in Sudan and the standoff in Fashoda similar to that between Ottoman forces and Egyptians in Wāhat Aqaba and Taba in 1906 and *Sidī Barānī* (al-bamba) in 1907?⁴⁸ Matthew Ellis has shown that Ottomans, and Ottoman-Egyptians, struggled to make sense of these border clashes, which occurred less than a year after the Khedive's visit to Siwa, due to the borderland nature of the Western border.

One can observe this overlapping form of sovereignty affectively from Shukrī's letter, who took great pains to explain the turn of events without blaming Ottoman troops. He could have easily used them as a scapegoat, making use of Egypt's complicated legal and sovereign position between Britain and the Ottoman Empire. Out of a particular sense of allegiance and military respectability, he opted for telling the Khedive the whole story and giving a different side—showing us the tumultuous and complicated nature of Ottoman sovereignty in 1906.

When it came to Fashoda, however, things were more black and white. The frontier incident represented a watershed moment in the memory of both the Khedive and Cromer because of the high stakes and the involvement of the great powers both in Cairo and in Sub-Saharan Africa.⁴⁹ So high were these stakes that Cromer wished to wipe the memory of the incident entirely from

the historical record. Cromer wanted to do so for good reason. The Fashoda Incident offered Egyptians another power—besides the Ottomans—to turn to. Fashoda was thus about more than French posturing to protect the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, it was an opportunity to break a common European stance. Despite the Berlin Conference of 1884, France and Britain butt heads over territory south of Sudan.⁵⁰ The French claimed to support the Sultan's and Khedive's rights over parts of the Upper Nile territories were being violated.⁵¹ France thus saw through Britain's ventriloquist act of protecting Khedival territory and offered some legibility to Egyptian aspirations for decolonization. Britain countered that it was there to do the same. Yet in the midst of these tense deliberations, as Kitchener celebrated hoisting the Egyptian standard,⁵² the Ottoman standard was nowhere to be seen.

Like Cromer, the Khedive wanted to have the last word as well. After writing a short declaration to the Manchester Guardian in 1929, he published a small booklet the following year with his opinion on the proposed articles of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of friendship.⁵³

Not surprisingly, he started with Sudan and the failed compromise of the 1899 Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement. He did so to counter Cromer's earlier remarks in the *Times* that the Egyptian Government had allowed for Sudanese soldiers to be recruited by the Germans, one of the alibis used to remove the Khedive.⁵⁴ Instead, he showed that the 1899 condominium agreement involved the conquest of Sudan by Britain and that Egypt was dragged along forcibly.

According to the Khedive, Fashoda was the last chance to get France involved and for it to rally to Egypt's cause for independence. “[S]eeing them walk away,” remarked the Khedive in his diary, “I felt that last international chance escaped Egypt. Triumphant, England had won the game.”⁵⁵ The little games that Cromer played belied what the Khedive spoke of. The harassment of British Officers, calling on those who did not salute him, those who were not properly dressed in military attire compared to the Khedive who always wore his at official functions, may have seemed petty. But it was about attacking and curtailing British limits to largely symbolic and decorative forms of Egyptian sovereignty.⁵⁶

Army Politics: The Nineteenth-Century 'Free Officers'

Such a troubled relationship over the army and attempts to decolonize it, meaning rid it of British officers, stuck well after Fashoda through a series of verbal insults, “*mu'ākasāt*”—as contemporary Egyptian chroniclers called them.⁵⁷ They seemed to have the desired effect. After a series of disparaging

“IT APPEARS TO
HAVE BECOME
A DELIBERATE
PRACTICE WITH
HIS HIGHNESS TO
INSULT BRITISH
OFFICERS...”

remarks by the Khedive, Kitchener submitted his resignation along with the battalion of British officers due to the alleged sustained insult to their honor.⁵⁸

Why would “disparaging” remarks by the Khedive at Wādī Hilfa in 1894, or those pertaining to disorderly column formation in drills, at *midān al-rasd* in al-‘Abāssiya, elicit the following instructions from the Foreign Secretary to Cromer:

You will tell the Khedive that I regard this as very serious. It appears to have become a deliberate practice with His Highness to insult British Officers. Her Majesty's Government cannot allow this. Even if they were to do so, the British nation would not...In the event of his refusing to give just satisfaction, stringent measures must be considered, which will have the effect of placing the Egyptian army more directly under the control of the British Government, and will afford protection to British officers from injurious treatment.⁵⁹

With the Khedive letting subsequent inspections mostly be attended by his Sirdar, one could see that there was a limit being drawn to his sovereign powers.⁶⁰ These limits and sensitivities resonate today with the Egyptian Army.⁶¹ Decoding these incidents, their peculiar timing and rules

allows to create a broad sketch of the Khedivate's attempts to decolonize in the twentieth century and, more broadly today vis-a-vis the Egyptian Army's position in politics. Perhaps because the Khedive kept in touch with army officers deployed in the Sudan, the British wanted to make sure that the army could not be controlled by him—lest it revolt against the British.

Indeed, there was valid reason to believe the Khedive was attempting to rile up officers against the British. He regularly received letters from officers who complained of the way they were treated.⁶² An anonymous eighteen-page nineteenth-century memorandum sent on behalf “*ahrār dhubāt wa-saf dhubāt al-jaysh al-Misrī*” complained of “*masā'ib al-ihtilāl*” starting in 1882. It highlighted that promotion of rank became impossible for Egyptian officers and that their future was dark. While British officers accelerated in their promotion their Egyptian counterparts lagged behind, were court-martialed or sent into retirement and whipped for alleged insubordination—making Egyptian soldiers into cooks, workers and monkeys.⁶³ These methods of control were engineered by none other than Cromer, and he made sure that his caste system preferring British officers was supported by a financial arsenal. Documents uncovered at the Abbas Hilmi II archive point to a battle waged at the level of numbers and budget of the army.

Extant accounting records document a curious relationship between the British financial advisor, the Ministry of Finance and—what has been hitherto been ignored—the Ministry of Finance's accounting organization in charge of balancing the budget: *Diwān 'umūm al-Muhāsaba*.⁶⁴ With letters asking for increased spending for the Khedival yacht, Mahrūsā, and the Khedival list, these documents become far more than accounting records, but instead records of sovereignty. Requests from the Khedival Court, *Diwān al-Ma'iyya al-saniyya*, for unapproved spending beyond the budget had to be forwarded to the accountant general *Rā'is Idārat 'Umūm al-Muhāsaba*, showing us a third dimension to what has ordinarily been a double-engine narrative of Egyptian history between the Caisse de la Dette Publique and Egypt's rulers.⁶⁵

To be sure, the Khedive could still use his allotted 100,000 L.E to swallow up any unscrupulous expenditure. When the Khedive wished to bestow gifts upon certain mosque imāms and *adhān* reciters, the accountant-general, George Talamas, decided to 'hire' them as part of the Khedival Court for their qualifications '*darajāt 'ilmiyya*'.⁶⁶ For more pressing matters such as maintenance for the Royal Yacht, the *Caisse de la Dette Publique*, along with the financial advisor Elden Gorst, required a breakdown of the number of second engineers to be engaged in order to approve it along with their annotation of the letter.⁶⁷

In other words, these records are important not merely for their numbers, balanced ledgers, and the claims they prove over property and the accounts—but their correspondence they generated.

The accountant-general often initiated the correspondence to the budgetary department at the Ministry of Finance. At the Ministry, British officials sought the relevant approvals and different signatures approbating the request until it found it in the budget. Only with Elden Gorst, the British Financial Advisor, did the accountant-general approve over-spending for Khedival Court. He could not, however, approve moving the remaining funds in the Khedive's list to the next year because these items, *tashrifāt wa-mahiyyat khidwīyya* had their own budgets next year. In effect, he was stopping the Khedive from having his own reserve fund, clawing back his resources.⁶⁸

Though this request for moving funds spurred an explanatory memorandum showing that the overage was due to the board of these officers on board the yacht while in Europe and London, the paper trail created is far more informative. With miscellaneous receipts for newspaper subscriptions in 1901 (81 L.E!); telegraphs (156 L.E.!) and more, one gets a view of the Khedival court. For example, in a year when the budget had a surplus of 64,000 L.E,⁶⁹ despite the low inundation of the Nile and lower taxes, the Khedive's requests were still being challenged and all surplus went to the reserve fund.⁷⁰ While the government budget could be used to create a fund, the Khedive's own list could not, pointing to a battle over every un-expensed penny.

Claims to economism—the occupation's ability to bring material prosperity, fiscal reform and balanced budgets to Egypt—thus need to be evaluated afresh. Though Cromer claimed that “[s]tate expenditure has been carefully controlled and has been adapted to the financial resources of the two countries [Sudan and Egypt],”⁷¹ one sees a different picture through the documents. Using these documents, and draft budgets proposing different levels of budgetary surplus,⁷² allows us to see how Egypt's surplus was being withheld in a reserve fund, and used to amortize debt, versus being used to alleviate Egypt's material prosperity.⁷³ In other words, these accounts show us how Cromer maintained control through these governmental and financial techniques that were designed to limit Egyptian sovereignty, strangulating the Egyptian army in Fashoda.⁷⁴

Funding the Sudan Campaign

When it came to the Frontier Question and the Sudan question, it would matter greatly if Egypt had to cut expenditure to meet its obligations, or if it was being forced to do so as a British precaution. The former meant that

“...THE MORE
ONE LOOKED,
THE STRANGER
THINGS GOT...”

Egypt did not have enough to meet its obligations within reason, meaning it could not take out yet another loan to meet them and be expected to repay it. But if it were experiencing a deficit artificially, owing to accounting or legal obligations, forced requisitions or new expenditure, then British claims to occupy Egypt would seem to fizzle out like hot air.

For the year 1901 for example, where the total budget had a surplus of 64,000 L.E. deposited to the reserve fund, the Sudan budget experienced a deficit. This was due to increased military expenditure amounting to 222,634 L.E. which far exceeded civilian expenditure of 194,545 L.E. and resulted in a recurring deficit in Sudan.⁷⁵

But the more one looked, the stranger things got. In 1890, at the height of the campaign to regain the Sudan from the Mahdi, the budget was increased owing to the recommissioning of an extra 199 officers, bringing the sum total of deployed soldiers to 587 officers, 13300 soldiers, 10 civil servants and 1,250 females. Such an observation would match the increased arrears in the 1901 budget. Yet in 1890, the War Ministry's budget had a surplus of 3,019 L.E. To make matters more complicated, the War Ministry's own budget of 1889 was more than that of 1890 by approximately 3,706 L.E. Through myriad austerity measures, such

as decreasing rations but increasing overall expenditure on the soldiers, War Minister Moustafa Fahmy somehow managed to remain fiscally disciplined as his soldiers fought in Sudan.⁷⁶ Where did this money come from and why was the War Ministry's budget shrinking at the height of a campaign?⁷⁷

The War Ministry's Budget

Ever since the Sudan campaign, the British ensured that the budget of the campaign and all of Sudan beyond the purview of Egyptian scrutiny. It was only subject to the approval of the Financial Advisor. To be sure funds were available for expenditure but there were additional considerations for their expenditure. One telegram sent from Khartoum outlines this technique of using finance as a way to discipline Egyptian-Sudanese subjects:

governmental assistance...[was] justifiable... but...the political considerations in this instance would be too dearly bought at the sacrifice of the economical ones more especially in view of this present financial situation and tightness of money.⁷⁸

The question wasn't if there was money and if it made sense to spend it, rather than save it. It had to do with the prospects and expectations that available funds would create: If “merchants or banks tasted the sweets of government loans on guarantee they would in future be perpetually expecting them.”⁷⁹ In this way, surplus funds were transferred over to the reserve fund to discipline Egyptian-Sudanese subjects. More egregious still was the fact that “the General Reserve Fund”—charged with repaying European bondholders' of Egyptian debt—“[was] being employed to defray the expenses of the Soudan campaign.”⁸⁰

Initially, the reinforcements sent to Fashoda were funded by a sinking fund that was designed to repay Egypt's colonial debt. Though these funds were supposed to repay Egypt's debt out of the surplus it was generating, many objected that this was an additional levy on Egypt's *fellahin*—resulting in a lawsuit.

But there was more to this lawsuit. According to the British, the lawsuit was “practically instituted by the French Government, for the purpose of preventing payment.”⁸¹ Not only did the Commissioners from the State Domanial Authority sue, M. Bouteron, but so too did the French and Russian Commissioners of the *Caisse de la Dette Publique*—members of the International Debt Commission governing Egypt since 1876.⁸² The lawsuit, which was won in the first instance and confirmed upon appeal, directed the government to repay half a million pounds—the levy for the Sudan campaign—to the special reserve fund.⁸³

Only after the lawsuit, did the British then offer up 500,000 Egyptian pounds for the expedition while the Egyptians financed it in kind.⁸⁴ What the British hoped to do was not only saddle Egypt with debt, but use its surplus to fund the reconquest of the Sudan—in effect prolonging the repayment of their debt. Their argument that the *Caisse de la Dette Publique* “acted together as the Sovereign Power,”⁸⁵ and was thus beyond judicial review, may have been rejected by the court *de jure* but it was the *de facto* law of the land.

As a response, the Egyptian government issued a decree one year after Fashoda immunizing its decisions in Sudan from judicial scrutiny in 1889.⁸⁶ Yet this decree itself was the subject of a long-drawn out lawsuit that involved the War and Finance Ministries. These ministries were challenging Egyptian army officers in Egypt who were suing for not being promoted and having their pay withheld.

For some reason, the courts saw their claims as valid and ignored the decree immunizing governmental decisions from review. As the court made clear in subsequent judgments, the interpretation of the *Caisse de la Dette Publique* of what counts as payment to retirees was self-interested. It was designed to withhold pay to those entitled to payment by making the application time for a pension limited—especially for those who were prisoners in Sudan during the

Mahdi Revolt. After Fashoda, these officers were effectively challenging the authority of Charles Gordon Pasha as Governor-General of Sudan, who was promoting British officers while demoting and withholding pay from Egyptian officers.⁸⁷

The Appellate Court of *Al-Mahākim al-Ahliyya*, much to the Finance and War Ministries’ surprise, sided with the disgruntled Egyptian Army Officer on May 28, 1901. It ruled in the name of the Khedive Abbas Hilmi II and granted the officer his rank of Binbāshī and the withheld pay difference. Though a formality, the ruling in the name of the Khedive was more pronounced in this decision. The British-backed and controlled Finance and War Ministries were defeated by the army officer whom, behind the scenes, one could see the Khedive supporting in the shadow of the 1898 Fashoda incident.

These accounting and legal details thus point to how Egypt could have otherwise finished repaying its debt. After the lawsuit was won, “the money was immediately paid by the Egyptian Government, and subsequently repaid by Her Majesty’s Government,” though nationalist Egyptian Member of Parliament Abdel Rahman al-Raf‘ī Bey later claimed in 1924 that no repayment was ever made.⁸⁸ All in all, Cromer remarked, “[t]his gave a heavy blow to French influence.”⁸⁹

Through these accounting tricks the British funded their campaign in Sudan and—more curiously—the station at Fashoda where Kitchener had encamped against French forces led by Marchand.⁹⁰ A contorted and roundabout scheme was hatched, one that showed how different wheels of sovereignty in Egypt and Sudan turned: Egyptians financed British officers to recruit Egyptian and Sudanese soldiers. These soldiers, in turn, were stationed at Sudan and Fashoda and were fighting the Mahdist rebels they had once ruled over. To the Egyptians, the British claimed it was part-British. But during Fashoda, the British claimed to the French that the Sudan was entirely Egyptian.

By looking at this incident as an episode in a long-drawn out battle for sovereignty, we understand that this ventriloquizing of rule was a consorted technique of colonialism: Title to territory could be native, in this case Egyptian, but financial sovereign control was British—just as the British claimed the decisions of the *Caisse de la Dette Publique* were sovereign.

If, however, finances were how the British tightened their noose around Egyptians since 1876, and certainly after 1882, then were they able to make those same inroads elsewhere? Could they influence certain apparatuses where Ottomans had a robust tradition of rule, such as *awqāf* and its legal system? As symbols of Ottoman sovereignty, *awqāf* provide an excellent way for us to understand post-occupation Egyptian sovereignty.

Waqf

Though the Sublime Porte refused to grant Egypt *eyalet-i mümtaze* status in 1810,⁹¹ the 1841 settlement of the Levant Question granted it some measure of autonomy. After Egypt’s ties to the Ottoman Empire were forcibly severed what mode of rule would it adopt? Was Egypt better off—for example—without a head Qadī appointed from Istanbul now that it was not part of the Sublime Porte,⁹² or was its use of *waqf*-based rule another way to maintain a form of Shar‘ī rule in the face of British-led reform?⁹³

If we adopt a binary opposition that sees the Monarchy in Egypt, as either pro or against independence, then we see this as part of a natural step towards the autonomy of the judiciary system whose head now was appointed by the Egyptian Sultan; albeit at the behest of the British. But if we break this binary and use the lens of decolonization, we see that it mattered little if the head judge was Ottoman or Egyptian, what mattered was the substance of the law—which after 1914 meant that the British Judicial Advisor’s decrees were passed by the Prime Minister instead of the Khedive.

Before 1914, however, things were not yet fully in the control of the British. Ruling through these Ottoman motifs and Muslim institutions certainly gave the Khedive a semblance of native rule and allowed him to shore up resistance to British-led rule. Indeed, his detractors were quick to point out that the Khedive went to Istanbul after he ascended the throne, something that Tewfiq had not done—at all.⁹⁴ Drawing on some form of Ottoman sovereignty, one could say, was a concerted tactic of the Khedive.

After the occupation by two years, the British made sure to distance themselves from the Waqf Ministry and converted it into a *dīwān*; a bureau. But even though the bureau was beyond their reach, the British tried to control it by attaching to it their own auditor. They hoped that they could use it as a line of credit and dip their hands into the cookie jar if so to speak.⁹⁵

Under the Khedive, one last attempt would be made to turning it back into a Ministry. As late as 1912, attempts by Shaykh Muhammad ‘Uthmān to convert it into a Ministry again were underway but were forestalled by the British.⁹⁶ It would only become successful in 1913. British sovereign might thus placed a firm limit on Egypt’s ability to draw on Ottoman leitmotifs of rule that signaled a countervailing form of sovereignty.

Indeed, the document I referred to at the beginning allows us to trace these different vicissitudes of sovereignty. Why would the Khedive decide to convene a council when he was in Beykoz in Istanbul to address questions of property back in Egypt? More importantly, why would he seek out the Ottoman *kadi* of Beykoz to notarize it? It is my contention that the problems regarding who usurped the Khedive’s endowments, and his decision to confirm these endowments anew in Ottoman, while convoking a *meclis şeriet* in Istanbul, points to a different layer of sovereignty and power at play.

Sensing that there was trouble back home around November of 1914, especially over the recalcitrant intendant of these *evkaf* Muhammad al-Buraynī, he proceeded to list all his endowments and confirm them for his kin anew. In effect, he was seizing the opportunity to confirm them jurisprudentially as *vakf-i sahih* according to the jurisprudence of Shaybanī and Abu Yusīf lest his property be seized in future.⁹⁷ Looking back retrospectively, one gets a sense that the Khedive knew about British plans to remove him. With only one month left until he was removed, the Khedive was racing to get the papers for his family’s property.

But this begs the question: what kind of protection would a calligraphic *vakf* deed written in *divan-i script*, bearing the signatures of the Khedive’s Court

and a mysterious one ‘Uthmān Nuri, provide? Who was this individual and how could a Khedive abroad convoke a *meclis-i şeriet* absent of the major jurists? These questions and details point to a different phenomenon wherein a paper trail of different stamps, signatures and ink doubles as a mirror into the different wheels of power and sovereignty that the document turned through.

The legal battle to sequester property

As one document, this endowment deed was part of a long palimpsest of correspondence that had Ottoman, Dutch and Egyptian traces of sovereignty after hostilities broke out. The Dutch transmitted it to the Sublime Porte seeing as hostilities had broken out between the British and the Ottomans. The Egyptians, in turn, forwarded the British request to the Dutch for proof of this property in comply with British wartime arrangements against enemy sequestered property whose annual profit amounted to 2,086,149 L.E. in 1919.⁹⁸

The Ottomans, on the other hand, sought to show that it was part of Ottoman law and sovereignty to avoid its sequestration. That is why the Khedive sought to get the opinion of *şeyhülislam* and to issue a document from the *fetvahane* as an *i‘lān shar‘ī* along with the signatures of *bab-ı fetvahane âli ilamat-i şeriye* intendant Muhammad Fethüllah.⁹⁹

When the British moved to seize all the goods of the Khedive, they knew they would encounter opposition. Indeed, telegrams exchanged by the Khedive, the Sublime Porte and the British after the Treaty of Lausanne argued that the treaty released the Allied Powers and the Axis from any claims of sequestered property according to article 58.

But the Khedive retorted that, strictly speaking when his estate was seized, it did not belong to him; rather he was a benefactor. Such details were confirmed as an endowment in 1914—before the treaty of Lausanne. They were cabled to the negotiating parties fifteen days before the treaty was signed and embedded in the discussion—as the minutes of the treaty sessions show.¹⁰⁰ This, however, didn’t stop the British who proceeded to liquidate his property.

Knowing the Khedive would likely sue, the British found a way to strangulate attempts at litigation. They enshrined the sequestration of the Khedive’s property in article 168 of the 1923 Egyptian constitution.¹⁰¹ According to the British, the properties of the Khedive would be determined by a British-backed constitution that allegedly was the product of the 1919 revolution. Ruled by exception rather than the letter of the law, the constitutional provision was forced on the Egyptian committee drafting the constitution and after offering a paltry indemnity.¹⁰²

The Khedive, on the other hand, argued that his plea filed on May 13th 1926 with the Turco-Anglais Tribunal should not have been rejected. As an Ottoman subject he had standing to sue. The British argued that Egypt's nationality law defined him as such and this was an Egyptian matter that they had jurisdiction. Will Hanley's argument, that the nascent category and technology of nationality Ottoman forms of sovereignty, would seem to apply here.

Yet there was more to the question of nationality than what the British represented based on the 1926 nationality law. British arguments centered on the Khedive as an indigenous Egyptian ignored that hitherto Egypt's nationality law of 1926¹⁰³—which retroactively applied its definition back to 1914—all Egyptians were Ottomans and that they would not lose out on their Ottoman nationality. What is more, it ignored the non-applicability of law retroactively in general and in cases of international law. The Khedive's lawyers retorted that the Sultan's *firman* of Abbas in 1892 defined him as his vizier—meaning he was an Ottoman subject. To borrow from the Khedive's lawyers, “it is necessary to come to an agreement as to what is meant by the word:

indigénat...we absolutely contest the analogy between Federal States, or dominions of the British Empire, on the one hand, and Egypt, simply a privileged province

of the old Ottoman Empire, on the other...the King of Bavaria did not administer the country in the name of the Emperor of Germany, whereas the Khedive administered Egypt in the name of the Sultan.¹⁰⁴

Citing a December 23rd 1923 case between the Romano-Hungarian mixed tribunal, the lawyers argued that there was international precedent through case-law for the regaining of sequestered property based on violations of the Treaty of Trianon (1921). Objecting to the British memorandum submitted to the Mixed Turco-Anglais Arbitral Tribunal, the Khedive showed that as a question of international law, subjects of different nations party to international treaties had a right to sue regarding sequestered property. The tribunal rejected the claim arguing that it was not competent to rule on matters that concerned Egyptian subjects—the Khedive, for the tribunal, was Egyptian not Ottoman.¹⁰⁵

Rather than focus on nationality, this episode shows us that British lawfare functioned more via exception rather than adhering to law. Ignoring Ottoman *vakf* jurisprudence, and the fact that the Khedive's endowments were not his property rather he was its benefactor, served to enshrine British juridical norms in a fiat way. Thus, Hanley's incisive legal history of nationality offers many cases of how protection to certain nationals in colonial nineteenth-century

Alexandria could be used. The Khedive's example, however, requires us to pause and think differently, it involves the forcible application of a nationality on a subject who had another. In this way, it requires that we take into account that even when the Khedive's lawyers could furnish precedents, and examples to laws that were put in place before nationality, these were ignored.

Instead, the British relied on the fiat nature of the law to have their way. These included a number of important precedents in this case Ottoman *tabiyet* law of 1869,¹⁰⁶ vizierial correspondence showing the Khedive was Ottoman, imperial *firman*s confirming said correspondence, the minutes to the treaty of Lausanne and articles from the treaty confirming that claims to sequestered property would be released.¹⁰⁷ Taking British law too seriously—and relying on state archives of law and diplomatic correspondence in general—forces one to ignore the fiat nature of colonial law and exceptional nature of colonialism. As a corollary, it means that one takes law seriously when the British themselves didn't and only applied it when it suited them. Private archives and confidential legal memorandums on the other hand—especially in the face of the inexistence of documents of the Mixed British-Turkish Tribunal—underscore the fiat nature of British lawfare.

The lawyers of the Khedive knew that the British had little legal grounds to stand on and put in their memorandum. In their memorandum, they left an important lesson to future politicians and historians regarding the so-called 'first' constitution of Egypt written as a fruit of 1919:

will only say that the Egyptian Constitution was framed by the executive power alone, that the Parliament was not consulted by the executive power alone, that the Parliament was not consulted when it was drawn up, and that the signatories of this constitution were, amongst others, King Fuad who profited by the liquidation, and the Minister of Wakfs, whose Administration is a beneficiary thereby.¹⁰⁸

Viewed through the lens of decolonization, the 1922 constitution, and the convocation of a parliament that rubber-stamped prior jurisprudence of the British, would thus seem to present a paradox. Egyptians could now legislate their own law in 1923—even though it was lobbied by the British Judicial Advisor. But the provisions and substance of said law violated the major principles of jurisprudence. These included the non-retroactive application of a law, the creation of supra-constitutional principles that targeted individuals, flagrant disregard for international treaties, non-recognition of foreign nationals' property or judicial standing, non-indemnification of individuals in the case of seizure of property and of *vakf Shari'a* jurisprudence.

Lawfire in Action

As different property began to be sequestered in Egypt, a voluminous multi-lingual correspondence was generated. It was within this context that the Khedive's endowments were sequestered and that this document was forwarded.¹⁰⁹

It passed through Egyptian lawyers, Ottoman secretaries, jurist, judges and Dutch, British, Ottoman and Egyptian diplomats from Cairo to Istanbul. Each signature, annotation, stamp and marking in a different color shows a palimpsest of sovereignty. But why had the Khedive not had this in his possession in the first place to avoid all of this hassle of its reproduction and dispatch across enemy lines?

When it came time to retrieve this document and duplicate it a problem appeared: The original was apparently burned in a fire a year prior. As a remedy, the police searched for the *kazı*, 'Uthmān Nūrī, and scribe of the Beykoz *Mehkeme Şeriye* who issued it in order to testify that he indeed issued such a document and to issue it anew.¹¹⁰

As it turned out, 'Uthmān Nūrī was the key to solving the Khedive's troubles and reconstructing the destroyed document to maintain his claims over his property. Later in 1920, unidentified Egyptian officials from the Finance or Waqf Ministry went to Istanbul to get authenticated copies attesting to the void nature,

batıl, of the Khedive's endowments. According to the Khedive, they offered officials at the Beykoz court forty-thousand pounds sterling to make sure the papers were 'lost', a sizeable sum today that would have amounted to more than £2.5 million sterling.¹¹¹ We are told from a confidential dispatch that their efforts failed but it would appear that, acting a year after the fire and a month before his dethronement, the Khedive knew what was coming. Ottoman sovereignty, backed by centuries of *Shari'a* jurisprudence, in this case, was the bulwark against British wartime-sequestration that saved him.¹¹² To appreciate this sovereign move that the Khedive deployed by imbuing his endowments with an Ottoman layer of power, we have to go back in time to understand how the occupation choked *evkaf* of this recourse.¹¹³

Prior to that, the *awqāf* administration had been the question of a long-drawn-out court case in which it demanded the credit that it gave the government back. In other words, as of 1880 and beyond, the Law of Liquidation—set up by the international committee to investigate Egypt's finances as Malak Labib has shown—functioned to usurp state resources after the Waqf Ministry was downgraded into a bureau.¹¹⁴

According to an undated and confidential memorandum from the *Waqf Administration's* department of litigation there was another

reason for making it a body without a cabinet.¹¹⁵ With an outstanding debt of roughly 19,040, 682 L.E. seized from the bureau, the revenue of endowment was in shortfall. Ever since the *Caisse de la Dette Publique* began to draw on *waqf* surpluses, it treated these endowments as a bank. Under the Khedive, attempts were made to prevent borrowing from the Waqf Bureau but to no avail.¹¹⁶ When the Waqf Administration sued before the Cairo Court and lost, it managed to appeal and began to negotiate with the finance minister.

With a copy of this undated and confidential memorandum containing the Finance Minister's dismissive reply, it is not hard to figure out who lay behind it. As a memorandum found in the Khedive's Family Papers, as opposed to the *waqf* files, it speaks to the personal involvement of Abbas Hilmi II.

For Cromer, this was an example of the personal corruption of the Khedive, pointing to the need to sequester these endowments, on account of them being used to fund Axis activity through German infiltrators in Egypt.¹¹⁷ No doubt such vast amounts of revenue generated by these endowments, 110,150 L.E. in 1907, caused alarm in British circles.¹¹⁸ Nevertheless, such allegations of corruption and Axis funding stuck. As Cromer put it, the *waqf* administration was taken by the Khedive "into his own hands."¹¹⁹

There was certainly some merit to Cromer's observation. When Abbas Hilmi II was removed, Sultan Husayn Kamel was initially recalcitrant in becoming ruler—and for good reason. Abbas Hilmi II had deprived Sultan Husayn from running his father's *waqf*—Khedive Ismail's *waqf*—by eliciting a court ruling from the *Mahkama Shar'iyya* mandating it be run by the Khedive. When Sultan Husayn Kamel turned to the British they said there was little they could do.¹²⁰ Other examples point to Husayn Kamel suing members of the royal family—Princess Jamila and daughter of Khedive Ismail—because he was removed as intendant.¹²¹ Now that Husayn was Sultan, he remembered how the British had neglected to help him.

These examples show that the *waqf* was a mediator of battles over sovereignty. It serves as a litmus test to see where the British intervened in ruling Egypt and what areas they left alone. Under the British, the *waqf* was a bastion of what has been called 'native rule' which Cromer seldom touched, even though it represented a thorn in the back of the British. Numerous Egyptians warned the British, especially Lord Milner in 1922, not to touch the administration.¹²² When the Khedive was removed, the British sequestered his overseas endowments and handed them over to the Greeks—specifically the island of Thasos and later Mehmet Ali's hometown of Kavala in 1914.¹²³ What better way to understand the different regimes than treat the history of these

“SUCH THREATS
WERE NOT
EMPTY,
HANDED...”

endowments as part of the history sovereignty?

The Khedive's control of endowments, however, was not out of corruption, but to shore up an institution that touched the lives of many subjects and which could be a tool to decolonize. It was a peculiar and genius way to found what would later become Cairo University through an annual cash endowment of 5,000 L.E which by 1908, the year of inauguration, reached 20,000 L.E.¹²⁴ The Khedive monitored its performance, making sure that someone from his household headed it and succeeded it after the resignation of Prince Fu'ad such as Prince Youssef Kamal.¹²⁵ He wanted to make sure that it was beyond the clutches of the British.¹²⁶

Yet this was easier said than done. The British made it conditional that all endowments—including the Egyptian University—be subject to their inspection through a *muraqqib*—an accountant—just like the one we saw earlier; George Talamas.¹²⁷ Such threats were not empty-handed, indeed, the *waqf* authority sued the Khedive's confidant and secretary of his endowments in 1915, Shafiq Bāshā. It claimed that he withdrew 8,706 L.E from the bank account of these endowments without authorization and put them in his own private account in Rome for the Khedive to withdraw.¹²⁸ It was

none other than George Talamas, the accountant-general of *Idārat 'Umūm al-Muhāsaba*, that the court summoned to audit the accounts of the Khedive's Sultanic Waqf Department *Diwān al-Awqāf al-Khusūsiyya*.¹²⁹ What the British could not control through the law, or force, they sent in their accountants to do by auditing.

Coda: 1924

By way of conclusion, I'd like to reflect on the Khedive's legacy by conveying two anecdotes that encapsulate what it is that the Khedive was up against, and how his legacy of decolonization lives on much later than he did. Endowments are curious creations, they are life-long bequeathed devices that allow for alienated property to outlive their founder. As an endowed corporation, the Egyptian University stands as one of the few legacies that outlived the Khedive himself, precisely because of its reliance on this kind of supported and autonomous structure of the *waqf*.¹³⁰ Much like the Egyptian University, Abbas Hilmi too has a legacy that lives on and animates Egyptian politics.

But it is difficult to see this legacy amid the different smokescreens and historiographical takes on the Khedive's years. Such a thing, to my mind, is by design. In retirement, Cromer still felt the need to have the final say and settle old scores.¹³¹ In addition to his magnum opus *Modern Egypt*, Cromer authored a less-known book on his archnemesis and titled it: *Abbas Hilmi II*. In it he detailed how grandiose the Khedive was and how he was led astray by some until his removal which, otherwise, had he “cast a prudent veil over his extreme Anglophobia, he would have remained Khedive of Egypt till the day of his death.”¹³²

In response, a large pro-monarchy historiographical body exists that attempts to reclaim any and all vestiges of the monarchy. Rather predictably though unintentionally, this led to the rise of a counter-current after 1952 of 'nationalist' and 'republican' historians who discarded the monarchy's years as an example of opulent pro-British decadence.¹³³

However, it is possible to untangle this binary and see the merits of a nationalist take on the Abbas Hilmi II years through the lens of decolonization, especially if one looks at his legacy in 1924. When the Sirdar of the Egyptian Army Lee Stack was assassinated by nationalists, Whitehall demanded a set of reparations. First, Egyptians paid an indemnity of half a million-pound sterling. Second, Prime Minister Saad Zaghlul offered the resignation of his cabinet along with an apology. Third, Egypt's share of its water supply was diminished. Yet one more striking demand raised the specter of Fashoda once more: Egyptian soldiers in Sudan were ordered to leave. Many officers

refused because it was a near repeat of Fashoda, when the British army purported to use Egyptian soldiers but in fact seconded them to British officers.¹³⁴

A fiery parliamentary session with Prime Minister Saad Zaghloul saw many members enumerate what Egypt had spent on the Sudan. Hanafī Nājī Bey claimed that Egypt spent a hundred million pounds since Mehmet Ali while the British spent 13 million pounds, which was mostly on agricultural projects that benefited its “colonial companies.”¹³⁵

While Parliament issued a statement calling for the independence of Egypt and the Sudan—with or without British negotiations—and renewed its support of Prime Minister Zaghloul, it saw that the way to tackle this head on was to enumerate the money that it was forced to spend since the Mahdi revolt that amounted twenty-six million in addition to annual sum of two million pounds.¹³⁶ Closing off access to these funds, and redirecting the budget, would prove an important step at decolonization. While Zaghloul may have admitted that “yes our arms were twisted to secede a part of it and to withdraw,” referencing the Sudan, “yes are weak, *na‘am innanā du‘afā’*,”¹³⁷ he implored Parliament to back his position and to press on enumerating British ills against Egypt and the Sudan—to hold them accountable.

When things died down in the 1920-30s, a new generation of army officers began to take an interest in politics. These officers who—not unlike those who wrote to the Khedive and called themselves the ‘Free Officers’—eventually seized power and formed a Revolutionary Command Council headed by Muhammad Naguib: the head of the Free Officers movement in 1952, *al-dhubāt al-Ahrār*, that we know today. In his own words the 1924 evacuation—and its attempt to cut Sudan off from Egypt—“served only to increase the attachment of Sudan to Egypt, and its relationship to Egypt’s political movement cannot be hidden, *wa-lā-yukhfā tā‘thurhum bi-haraka al-siyāsiyya fī Mīsr*.”¹³⁸ In this way, to understand 1952 we have to go back to 1898 and the Khedival years at the turn of the twentieth-century.

The second anecdote concerns a personal experience. Few would disagree that it is the historians’ job to dispel fact from fiction, separate rumor from truth, and arrive at a historical narrative supported by sources. This is easier said than done when it comes to the Khedive because of the many facets and layers of sovereignty. Be it Ottoman, British and Egyptian sovereignty—these different vestiges of sovereignty each have their historians that have written their own histories—of which Cromer can be seen as one of the initial voices. So distraught was the Khedive by Cromer that he regularly followed his annual reports, which were serialized by al-Muqattam.¹³⁹

As a counter-measure, the Khedive collected and perhaps patronized certain authors to respond to these reports, authoring newspaper articles and books, while sending the Khedive their drafts.¹⁴⁰ For a man who counted the number of birds at the Giza Zoo, the Khedive’s authors were livid that Cromer failed to say a word about the Egyptian Army and, to no surprise, Fashoda.¹⁴¹ All in all, it may seem that there was a fictional conspiracy from the get-go to combat the Khedive, with all the forms of British control—financial and otherwise legal—made available to Cromer to combat his nemesis.

At its height, this form of surveillance and fight against the Khedive resulted in family conflict, with the Khedive’s brother—Prince Muhammad Ali Tewfiq—telling his brother that while in exile his knowledge of Egypt deteriorated and he became paranoid. “[N]o one is spying on you,” he assured him. Except there was. Not only was his former privy secretary Youssef Siddiq a British agent, but the British kept tabs and followed the Khedive in Switzerland.¹⁴²

But there are times when fact and fiction intertwine. Take Somerset Maugham’s hit-novel serialized by the BBC into the hit TV show *Ashenden*. Much to my surprise, I found that *Ashenden*, the protagonist of the novel dispatched to Switzerland to spy on behalf the British, met with a certain Muhammad Ali who was related to a Khedive. Intrigued by this coincidence, I read on to see if there was anything in the novel relevant to what the Abbas Hilmi II papers contain. As the spy met the Khedive’s dying British chambermaid, he also had an opportunity to converse and talk to Prince Muhammad Ali—whose many letters from Switzerland, where *Ashenden* was dispatched, survive.

I so happened to have been at the same time reading Prince Muhammad Ali’s letters. I looked for clues in any his dispatches from France, Switzerland and Rome to the Khedive for a haughty English author he may have met. Perhaps Somerset Maugham had drawn inspiration for his novel through a curious encounter. I even perused some of the finding aids of his private papers housed at Yale and the American University in Cairo, only to find none. After a little research, I discovered that Maugham was indeed used by the British Security Service and sent to Switzerland during the War to report on German activity.

But what astounded me was a letter from the Khedive’s former secretary, Ahmed Shafiq Bāshā, that spoke of a one British doctor by the name of Sir Arthur Stanley; brother to the Earl of Derby and head of the British Red Cross. Stanley was in Geneva negotiating a prisoner swap which the Khedive was brokering between the British and the Ottomans, pointing to the presence of British doctors back-channeling with the Ottomans under the cover of the Red Cross. Could he have been the inspiration for Somerset Maugham’s dying

British chambermaid, or was he the same Stanley dispatched by the Foreign Office to Cairo in Maugham's play *Caesar's Wife*?¹⁴³

Whether any records show up that tie Maugham to the Khedive, beyond the world of fiction in *Ashenden* and his play *Caesar's Wife*, remains to be seen. But for the time being, the private papers of Abbas Hilmi II furnish much fact that, undoubtedly, will continue to inspire even the most creative of novelists. With British designs to conspire against the Khedive documented in the Abbas Hilmi II archive, historians will have no trouble writing equally riveting accounts of the ruler; one who attempted to decolonize and paid the price for it.

BIOGRAPHY

Dr Karim Malak is a historian of technologies of rule in the Global South with a focus on the nineteenth-twentieth century Middle East. His present book manuscript titled *Counting colonialism: Britain, Egypt and the Ottoman Empire from 1807 to 1954* focuses on the changes in colonial and postcolonial sovereignty through the introduction of governmental calculative technologies – such as accounting, auditing and the census – during the Anglo-Egyptian colonial encounter of the 19th and 20th centuries.

He is currently Assistant Professor of Non-Western History at the Department of History at Wagner College, NY. He was the Mohamed Ali Foundation Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Institute of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (IMEIS), Grey College, Durham University. He received his PhD in Middle East Studies from the Department of Middle Eastern, South Asian and African Studies (MESAAS), at Columbia University, New York.

Email: kmm2282@columbia.edu

END NOTES

- 1 HIL/18/13, “Cromer to Abbas Hilmi,” August 14th, 1904, Strathmore Lodge, Halkirk, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England; HIL 18/14, “Cromer to Abbas Hilmi,” July 19th, 1905 Strathmore Lodge, Halkirk, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England; HIL 18/88, “Allenby to Abbas Hilmi,” July 17th, 1905, London, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England.
- 2 FO 141,777, “J.W.Headlam-Morley to J.Murray, Eastern Department,” April 16 1923, Kew Gardens: Richmond.
- 3 FO 371/67, “Cromer to Sir Edward Grey Bart M.P.,” Confidential, June 13th, 1906, Cairo: No. 21481, TNA: Kew Gardens, Richmond. HIL/13/10, “Herbert Kitchener à Son Excellence Le Règent de l’Égypte,” Le Caire, Octobre 6, 1898. Palace Green Library and Archives: Durham University, England.
- 4 Cromer was clairvoyant, foreshadowing the removal of Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylānī in 1941 because of alleged pro-Axis sentiment and his later designs to support German infiltration in Kabul. Yet this could be explained by a trip to Jalalabad in 1895. See HIL/259, “Ismail Pacha à Rouiller Bey,” Janvier 1 1895,” Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University. On the Kabul mission, and its contact with Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1916, Ottoman War Minister Enver Pasha and the Khedive Abbas Hilmi II, see Faiz Ahmed, *Afghanistan Rising: Islamic Law and Statecraft between the Ottoman and British Empires*. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, (2017), 146. On the Afghan Mufti’s answer to the Ottoman call for Jihad during WWI, and defection of a Camel Corps battalion to the side of the Ottoman Sultan, see HIL 203/43-59, “Enver [Pasha?], *did a’dā’ al-Islām Inkaltarā wa-Faransā wa-Rusyā: Al-Nasr wa-al-sharaf wa-al-janna fī taqadum wa-al-mawt wa-al-dhul wal-hawān fī al-taqahqur*, Damascus: *Matba’at al-Fayhā*,” Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England. The only other evidence I could find of the Khedive’s purported closeness with the Axis powers was his claim that the real reason Britain entered WWI was to destroy the growing German fleet which threatened its own navy. Whether the Khedive can be considered to be pro-German after his dethronement, and because of visits by members of his household—Prince Muhammad Ali—to the German front in 1918, is a different question that is harder to solve in the absence of more evidence of pro-German sentiment in 1914 before his dethronement. See Abbas Hilmi II, *A few words on the Anglo-Egyptian Settlement*, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., (1930), 74-5; HIL/166/919, “Ahmed Shafiq Bāshā ilā al-Khidiwī,” July 27 1918, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University, England.
- 5 HIL/202/527, “La Question Égyptienne: Relations entre Abbas II Khédive d’Égypte et le Gouvernement Britannique. I Avant la Guerre 1914,” Lausanne, Septembre 20 1916, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England.
- 6 On the *firman* investing Abbas Hilmi II, and British attempts to prevent its reading despite Tigrane’s best efforts until the question of Al-‘Arish and Egypt’s border in Sinai was resolved, see Mikhāil Shārūbim, *Al-Kāfī fī tārikh Mīsr*, Vol 5: I, 78-80; Cromer, Abbas Hilmi II, London: Macmilland and Co., (1915), 11-14; Muhammad Farīd, *Mudhakkirāt Muhammad Farīd: Tārikh Mīsr min ibtidā’ sanat 1891 māsihiyya*, Raouf Abbās, Al-Qāhirah: Dār Nahdat al-Sharq, (2002), 94-7.
- 7 Lord Cromer, “German Methods in the East,” *The Times*, December 15, 1914, 9.
- 8 HIL/370/111, “Journal Officiel Extraordinaire du Vendredi 18 Décembre 1914, No. 170,” Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University, England.
- 9 See n9.
- 10 Extant confidential letters and memorandums survive indicating the Khedive was notified in September and in Bern during October of 1914 by Sir Louis du Pan Mallet—British Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire—and Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey that he would be deposed and that he entered into negotiations over his abdication provided the line of the throne would remain the same for his sum and that his assets would not be touched. Upon finding out he attempted to return to Egypt but was stopped by the British who stalled as they entered into negotiations over the status of the line of succession and his possessions. Originally, the interview between Louis Mallet and the Khedive centered round the Arab movement in Syria, which may indicate that demands by Syrian nationalists for the Khedive to be installed as monarch in Syria may not have been unrelated. See HIL/202/515-520, “La Question Égyptienne, Notice: Rupture des Relations entre Abbas II Khédive d’Égypte et la Gouvernement Britannique,” Lausanne, August 11 1916, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University, England; HIL/538-9, “Mémoire Confidentiel sur Un esai d’arrangement avec le gouvernement Anglais,” Lausanne le 21 Octobre 1916.
- 11 HIL/400/1-4, “Hadhihī surrat al-waqfiyya wa-al-wathiqa al-mar‘iyya al-muwaqa’a bi-tawqī’i qubilat ma’ aslahā al-sharīf satran bi-satr muqābala sāhiha lā taghyr fihā lā tahrif, Bekqūz [Beykoz] Qādī,” Muharram 1, 1333 [circa November 18th, 1914], Palace Green Library & Archive: Durham University, England.

- 12 Curiously, Cromer complained that unlike Khedive Tewfiq, Abbas Hilmi II was never seen in public without his guards while Cromer himself made sure to often have a proto-entourage at some events, particularly army inspections. FO 371/67, "Cromer to Sir Edward Grey Bart M.P.," Confidential, June 13th, 1906, Cairo: No. 21481, TNA: Kew Gardens, Richmond.
- 13 Mikhāil Shārūbim, *Al-Kāfī fī tārikh Misr al-qadīm wa-al-hadīth*, 5 Vols., Vol 5: II, Qāhira: Dar al-Kutub (1998), 622.
- 14 See details of Cromer's visit on the 27th of December, 1900 in *Al-Mū'ayyad*, "Al-Khartūm," January 5th, 1901
- 15 SAD 248/23/1, "Special Sudan Gazette: Visit to the Sudan of His Highness The Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha II," December 3 1901, Sir Reginald Wingate Papers, Palace Green Library & Archive: Durham, England.
- 16 FO 371/67, "Cromer to Sir Edward Grey Bart M.P.," Confidential, June 13th, 1906, Cairo: No. 21481, TNA: Kew Gardens, Richmond.
- 17 Mikhāil Shārūbim, *Al-Kāfī fī tārikh Misr*, 145. After Fashoda, this would be reversed and most Egyptian soldiers in Sudan would be removed. See Mikhāil Shārūbim, *Al-Kāfī fī tārikh Misr*, Vol 5: II, 600.
- 18 FO 407/113, "Tigrane Pasha to Sir E. Baring," Le Caire, 16 Février, 1892, TNA: Kew Gardens, Richmond.
- 19 *Al-Mū'ayyad*, "Hawādith Mahaliyya," May 20th, 1901; *Al-Mū'ayyad*, "Hawādith Mahaliyya," May 23rd, 1901; *Al-Mū'ayyad*, "Al-'Urābiyūn," May 25th, 1901
- 20 Rather than query Ottoman and Khedival sovereignty in Egypt spatially through the acquisition of territory—by probing borderlands and through a focus on frontiers as Matthew Ellis has poignantly demonstrated, I look at sovereignty internally to see where and when certain institutions and governmental bureaus were sovereign. For an example of my approach and the determination of sovereignty via government see Karim Malak, "The High Tide of Colonialism,"; Matthew H. Ellis, *Desert Borderland: The Making of Modern Egypt and Libya*. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, (2020).
- 21 Roger Owen, *Lord Cromer: Victorian Imperialist, Edwardian Proconsul*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2004), 273.
- 22 On the financial side of Cromer's career, and other British accountants in Egypt such as Gerald Fitzgerald, see See Karim Malak, "The High Tide of Colonialism: Theorizing Sovereignty at Sea," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, Vol: 40 (2), (2022).
- 23 Al-Ahrām, "Qadiyya li-sumuw al-khdiwī al-sābiq fi Landan," March 12, 1932.
- 24 According to Kīlānī Khedive Abbas Hilmi II also requested to abdicate. FO 371/7733, "Egypt 110: Transmits copies of a petition addressed to the Sultan on March 5th by certain Princes of his family. Publication of this document was prohibited by Sarwat Pasha," March 20th, 1922, Kew

- Gardens: The National Archives (TNA), 52. See also Lord Granville's letter to Cromer stating that "nor does it appear to them that the Governments of England and France called upon to interfere in the question of Musulman religious foundations, in which they do not see that their interested are affected." Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vol. 1, 241. As we shall see, this implementation of so-called 'native rule'—the split between the refusal to undertake reforms that would interfere with local customs pertaining to Muslim faith—versus technical and financial material reforms that do not interfere with local customs was far from the case. On Prince Muhammad Ali Tawfiq's refusal, Prince Kamāl al-Dīn's refusal and even that of Husayn Kamil—until the British made it known they were going to offer the throne to the Agha Khan—see Muhammad Sayyid Kīlānī, *Al-Sultān Husayn Kāmil: Fatrah muzlimah fī tārikh Misr*, 1914-1917, Al-Qāhira: Dār al-Qawmiyah al-'Arabīyah lil-Tibā'ah, (1963), 33, 57-8. On the Agha Khan's involvement in Egyptian politics, and his intercession on behalf of Youssef Siddiq who since the dethronement of the Khedive ended up in Vienna penniless and financially distraught, see SAD,153/4/10, "Aga Khan to Reginald Wingate," Sir Reginald Wingate Papers, London, September 15 1917, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England; HIL/203/344, "Al-Taqrīr al-Rābi' min Suwisrā," Geneva, October 17 1927, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England.
- 25 See for example King Farouq's acquiesce in the famed 'Lampson Ultimatum' of 1942.
- 26 Cromer, *Abbas Hilmi II*, 70.
- 27 While the picture Samera Esmeir remains important, the Abbas Hilmi II records show the shortlived attempt by Abbas Hilmi II to resist these land sales, repurchase the estate lands of Ismail and in fact to re-endow them and resist to British financial designs. In 1899 1459 feddans were purchased for 94,846 L.E followed by 1540 feddans in 1901 for 1,00,116 L.E from *al-dayra al-saniyya*—the Khedival Court—compared to 3813 feddans in 1902 from the *Daira Saniyya Company* for 243,830 L.E. HIL/166/522, "Majlis al-Awqāf al-A'lā: Mudhakira suhibat bi-amr Sa'adat al-Bāshā al-Mudīr," June 15, 1912, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England.
- 28 See for example Bayumī's reliance on Ministerial reports for his history of endowments in Egypt in Ibrahim Ghānim Bayumī, Ibrahim Ghānim. *Al-Awqāf wa-al-siyāsa fī Misr*, Cairo: Dar al-Shorouk, (1994), 405, n4; Abbās Hilmī, "Surat al-amr al-'Ālī: lā'ihat ijrā'at diwān 'umūm al-awqāf al-musaddaq 'alayha bi-al-'amr al-madhkūr," Wizārat al-Awqāf, Tab'a sabi'a, Matba'at Wizārat al-Awqāf, Dar al-Kutub, 2/594 Maktabat al-Ghūrī,1919 [1895]), Cairo: Egypt; HIL/166/522, "Majlis al-Awqāf al-A'lā: Mudhakira suhibat bi-amr Sa'adat al-Bāshā al-Mudīr," June 15, 1912, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England. *Al-Awqāf wa-al-siyāsa fī Misr*, Cairo: Dar al-Shorouk, 1994.

- 29 Robert Hunter, *Egypt Under the Khedives 1805-1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy*. Cairo Egypt: American University in Cairo Press, (1999).
- 30 The Khedive treated the Awqāf Diwān so much as an extension of his Privy Council that he had employees tested their first before prestigious posts such as Shaykh Mustafa al-Marā'ī who was first head of the Mosque Inspectorate in Diwān al-Awqāf before becoming Qādī al-Qudāh in Sudan, See “Ahmed Shafiq Bāshā ilā al-Khidiwī: Qādī Qudāh al-Sūdān,” 14 July 1908, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England.
- 31 HIL/25/49, “Mekām-i Celil Hazret Sedāret Pināhi Cenāb Aliye-i, marūz-ı Çâker-i Kemîneleridir ki: Abbas Hilmiye Sadrâzam,” Cemaziyelevvel 22, 1322, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England; HIL/25/49, “Mekām-i Celil Hazret Sedāret Pināhi Cenāb Aliye-i, marūz-ı Çâker-i Kemîneleridir ki: Abbas Hilmiye Sadrâzam,” Cemaziyelthani 14, 1322, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England. HIL/166/189, “Ahmed Shafiq Bāshā ilā al-Khidiwī,” March 21 1902, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England. See Samera Esmeir, *Juridical Humanity: A Colonial History*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, (2012), 208-212.
- 32 For nationalists and authors who held contemporaneous views regarding “absent-minded Egyptians, *fāqdi al-‘uqūl*,”—as Mikhāil Shārūbim described them—who invited more intervention because of their resistance to the British see Mikhāil Shārūbim, *Al-Kāfi fī tārikh Misr*, Vol 5: II, 1177; Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayyed, *Qissat hayātī*, Al-Qāhira: Dar al-Hilal, (2022), 43-4. For those who hold these opinions in the secondary literature see AbdelAziz EzzelArab, *European Control and Egypt’s Traditional Elites: A Case Study in Elite Economic Nationalism*. Lewiston N.Y: Edwin Mellen, (2003).
- 33 Elsewhere however, the Khedive’s reforms look more contentious. Even the Khedive saw the importance of such a civilizing role in the Sudan, helping it attain its place amongst the ‘civilized nations,’ and using it solve Egypt’s “growing population” such that “the Sudan...receive settlers coming from Egypt in preference to those coming from elsewhere.” One wonders if his contention with Cromer was merely over who was doing the civilizing rather than the idea of civilizing the Sudanese themselves. Cromer, *Abbas Hilmi II*, xi. For others who opposed the protectorate, but agreed with this general pace of reform such as the acting ruler and Prime Minister Hussein Rushdi Pasha, See Ahmed Shafiq Bāshā, *Hawliyyat Misr*, 56-7. The Khedive’s words were: “Ann yanbathiq fajr dhalik al-yawm alladhī yatamata’ fih al-Sūdān bayn amrāt al-umām al-mutmadyina.” Abbās Hilmi al-Thānī, *Al-Mu’āhda al-Inkiliziyya al-Misriyya*, 5; Abbas Hilmi II, *A few words*, 28-9.
- 34 Youssef Siddiq was for some time the head of the Khedive’s private cabinet/(Cabinet Khédive in French, *hassa* in Ottoman from 1907, though it is unclear if he held this post continuously until 1911. During the

- Italian-Ottoman War of Tripoli from 1911 to 1912 he was the Khedive’s representative in Istanbul. Prior incursions by Italy on Egyptian territory such as Kassala in the nineteenth-century seem to have been exaggerated. Reginald Wingate saw that the Italian campaign was a failure, it still had the effect of challenging the already strained Egyptian-Ottoman sovereignty in Sudan and beyond. See HIL/5/75, “Sirdariyyat al-Jaysh al-Misri, Qalam al-Mukhābarāt: Intelligence Report, Egypt No. 43 by R. Wingate,” January 1896, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University, England. See “Nafqāt i’ādat Kassalā,” *Al-Rā'id al-Misri*, October 15 1897. On Youssef Siddiq’s request to be hired in the Khedival court see HIL 166/677, “Mawlāy wa-Wallī al-Ni’ām,” September 15 1912, Palace Green Library & Archive: Durham, England; SAD/153/18, “Avant-Propos,” Vienna, November 28 1915, Sir Reginald Wingate Papers, Palace Green Library & Archive: Durham, England.
- 35 SAD/153/18, “Avant-Propos,” Vienna, November 28 1915, Sir Reginald Wingate Papers, Palace Green Library & Archive: Durham, England. According to Prince Omar Tūsūn, had it not been for Fashoda and the Marchand expedition the British might not have reconquered Sudan. ‘Umar Tūsūn, *Mudakkirāt ‘an Mas’ālat As-Sūdān Baina Misr Wa-Ingiltirā. al-Iskandariya: Matba’at al-Iskandariya*, (1929), 63.
- 36 Roger Owen, *Lord Cromer*, 273.
- 37 Earl Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vols. 2, Vol: 2, New York: Macmillan, (1909), 48 n1. On Cromer’s official decision to drop the name of Fashoda and use Kodok in 1904 after its sensationalist coverage in the press see FO 407/164, “The Earl of Cromer to the Marquess of Lansdowne,” Cairo, March 20, 1905, TNA: Kew Gardens, Richmond, 199. Compare these statements with those of Kitchener who downplayed the Fashoda Incident and showed how it was resolved by peaceful diplomacy between himself and Marchand who agreed to hoist their flags and enter into a conference of mediation and withdraw. Horatio Herbert Kitchener, James Bacon Rye and Horace G Groser. *Kitchener in His Own Words*. London: T.F. Unwin, (1917), 133-9.
- 38 On the loss of an unnamed northern governorate, likely Buhayra, and the firing of the ‘Umda and Shaykhs and their replacement with police personnel see Kulliyat al-Būlis al-Malakīyah, *Al-Kitāb al-Dhahabī: 1896m-1946m*, Al-Qāhira: Al-Matba’ah al-Amīriyah, (1950), 269.
- 39 On Prime Minister Muhammad Sa’id’s reports on Kitchener’s conversation regarding interwar armament and the building of ironclads to match those of Germany’s, and plans to increase the Egyptian army and maintain British presence in Malta see HIL 7/377, “Muhammad Sa’id ilā al-Khidiwī,” November 20, 1912, Palace Green Library and Archives, Durham: England.
- 40 Wilson Jacob, *Working Out Egypt: Effendi Masculinity and Subject Formation in Colonial Modernity, 1870-1940*, Duke: Duke University Press, (2011).

- 41 Mikhāil Shārūbim makes the case that Kitchener was insulted as his forces collapsed in Sudan. See Mikhāil Shārūbim, Vol. 1, 536.
- 42 R.G., *Riwayāt Al-Dam' al-Dar fi Masā'ib al-Midrār: Adabiyya Tarikihiyya li-sanat 1897-1898*, Al-Qahira: Jam'iyyat Muntaza al-Nufus al-Adabiyya, 25. As Wilson Jacob has shown, children's books written about the Sudan campaign, such as G.A. Henty's *With Kitchener in the Soudan*, memorialized the heroic fight. At the same time they omitted the details of Sudanese resistance and incursion into Egypt and incidents such as that of Fashoda. See Wilson Chacko Jacob, *Working Out Egypt: Effendi Masculinity and Subject Formation in Colonial Modernity 1870-1940*. Durham NC: Duke University Press, (2011), 32; G. A. Henty, *With Kitchener in the Soudan: A Story of Atbara and Omdurman*. London: (1903), Blackie & Son Limited 50 Old Bailey E.C.
- 43 Majlis al-Nuwwab. *Majmū'at Madābit Dawr al-In'iqād al-Awwāl li-Majlis al-Nuwwab*, 715. On Indian troops see Sudan Archive (SAD)/263/270, "H. Bower to Colonel Wingate," Confidential, December 15, 1896, Sir Reginald Wingate Papers, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University, England; SAD/263/1/395, "Wingate to Bower," Cairo War Office: January 4, 1897, Sir Reginald Wingate Papers, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University, England.
- 44 *Al-Mū'ayyad*, "Mas'ālat Fashūda: wa-jarā'id al-urūbiyya," September 26th, 1898.
- 45 For similar clashes that occurred over Taba in 1906 see Muhammad Sayid Kilānī, *Al-Sultān Husayn Kāmil: Fatra Muzlima fī Tārikh Misr 1914-1917*, al-Qāhira: Dar al-Qawmiyya al-'Arabiyya lil-tibā'a, (1964), 66-7.
- 46 Other soldiers who crossed over from Salloum in similar circumstances were often thought to have deserted such as Abdel Fattah Mohammed el Mahdi of the Egyptian Army's Third Battalion. See HIL/64/708, "Snow Bey to Alexandria [the Khedive?]," Telegram No. 28, June 3 1912, Palace Green Library & Archives, Durham: England.
- 47 See HIL/5/233, "Mulāzim Thānī Khafar al-Sawāhil 'Abd al-Lātif Sirri ilā al-Khidiwī Abbas," August 1, 1907, Palace Green Library and Archives, Durham: England;
- 48 Matthew H. Ellis, *Desert Borderland: The Making of Modern Egypt and Libya*. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, (2020).
- 49 On the 1906-7 border clashes as a result of raiding 'Awaqir and Shihabat tribesmen, see Matthew Ellis, *Desert Borderlands*. See HIL/5/233, "Mulāzim Thānī Khafar al-Sawāwil 'Abd al-Lātif Shukrī ilā al-Khidiwī Abbas," August 1, 1907, Palace Green Library and Archives, Durham: England. On the 1907 clashes in which army leadership pressured Captain Shukrī to lie about the Ottomans, instead of saying they crossed the Western border to collect taxes from unruly tribesmen, see HIL/5/233, "Mulāzim Thānī Khafar al-Sawāhil 'Abd al-Lātif Sirri ilā al-Khidiwī Abbas," August 1, 1907, Palace Green Library and Archives, Durham: England

- 50 On Belgian abuse of the Berlin Act, but its use to present French advances in Fashoda, see FO 407/164, "Governor-General Sir R. Wingate to the Earl of Cromer," Khartoum, April 2, 1904, TNA: Kew Gardens, Richmond, 237.
- 51 On the failure to recognize the Upper Nile as an Anglo sphere of influence, and French plans to occupy Bahr al-Ghazal, see "Sir E. Monson au marquis de Salisbury," Paris, le 18me Septembre 1898, in M. Louis Renault, *Archives Diplomatiques: Recueil de Diplomatie et d'histoire*, Deuxième Série, Tome LXVIII, Paris: Imprimerie L. Frémont, Place Du Marché-Couvert, (1898), 28-30. On older French claims to support Ottoman and Khedival rights to the Upper Nilotic regions, which the British and Belgians were argued to have violated with their treaties recognizing the colonization of Congo in 1894, see "Mémorandum communiqué par M. Decrais, le 8 août 1894," in M. Louis Renault, *Archives Diplomatiques*, 36; "M. Declassé, ministre des affaires étrangères à M Geoffroy, ministre de France à Londres," Paris, Le 20 Septembre 1898, *Archives Diplomatiques*, 55. On Belgian incursions near Anglo-Egyptian territory in Sudan by the Lemarie Expedition in 1905 see, FO 407/164, "The Earl of Cromer to the Marquess of Lansdowne," Cairo, March 20, 1905, TNA: Kew Gardens, Richmond, 56. On Belgian abuse of the Berlin Act, but its use to present French advances in Fashoda, see FO 407/164, "Governor-General Sir R. Wingate to the Earl of Cromer," Khartoum, April 2, 1904, TNA: Kew Gardens, Richmond, 237.
- 52 Kitchener specifically mentioned "son drapeau," and in his reply the Khedive mentioned "le drapeau Égyptien," see HIL/13/12, "Moustapha Fehmy à Sirdar," Octobre 9, 1898, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University, England.
- 53 Abbās Hilmi al-Thānī, *Al-Mu'āhda al-Inkiliziyya al-Misriyya wa-'ārā' sumuw al-khidiwī Abbās Hilmi al-Thānī*, n.p. (1936).
- 54 Lord Cromer, "German Methods in the East: The Future of Egypt: To the Editor of the Times," *The Times*, December 15, 1914.
- 55 Abbas Hilmi II, *Mémoires d'un Souverain par Abbas Hilmi II, Khédivé D'Égypte*, Amina Azhar (ed.), Le Caire: Centre d'Études et de Documentation Économique, Juridique et Sociale, (1996), 93.
- 56 Mikhāil Shārūbim, *Al-Kāfi fī tārikh*, Vol 5, (II), Al-Qāhira: Dar al-Kutub (1998), 51.
- 57 Mikhāil Shārūbim, *Al-Kāfi fī tārikh*, Vol 5, (II), Al-Qāhira: Dar al-Kutub (1998), 188.
- 58 For the Khedive, these officers were paid more than their Egyptian counterparts and their resignation would have aided in the decolonization of the army. See Mikhāil Shārūbim, *Al-Kāfi fī tārikh*, Vol 5, (II), Al-Qāhira: Dar al-Kutub (1998), 270-1. HIL/5/193 "
- 59 Cromer, *Abbas Hilmi II*, 58.
- 60 SAD, 153/2/19, "Wingate to the Khedive," Khartoum, March 9, 1911, Sir Reginald Wingate Papers, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham

University, England.

- 61 See for example the statement by Supreme Council of Armed Forces—the ruler of Egypt after Honsi Mubarak stepped down in 2011—surrounding the deaths of protestors in November of 2011 while also acknowledging that its apology for the forcible dispersion of camped protestors in February of 2011 was met with the strange statement: “our record to you allows [for such mistakes]”—*rasidana ladaykum yasmah*. See Yusri Fouda, “Rasidana ladaykum yasmah,” *Al-Masry al-Yawm*, February 27, 2011. “SCAF officially apologizes for recent protest causalities,” *Egypt Independent*, November 24, 2011.
- 62 See HIL/5/1, “Abd al-Baqī Sāgh ilā al-Khidwī,” August 24, 1891, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England. See also a petition submitted by ten Egyptian army officers to the Khedive complaining about British army officers’ abuse. Submitted by mid-ranking officers who were Yūzbāshīs/ Yūzbaşı (captains) and Sāgh/Sağ [Major] they detailed how the most junior British saf dābit (Non-Commissioned Officer) ridiculed senior Egyptian officers and mistreated them. They were outwardly fanatic “*jaharūna bil-ta’sub wa-hubb al-jins*.” HIL/5/83, “Walī na’matinā al-a’zām,” n.d., Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England.
- 63 Such claims were not unbacked amid the tense environment in Sudan. For example a one former Lieutenant Abdel-Hāmid was court-martialed for a brawl that ensued as a result of “*kalām fī shā’n al-siyāsa*,” and “*shā’n al-diwāl*,” which was mediated through the platoon translator, who was beaten up by Abdel-Hāmid. See anonymous letter by Captain F.S.H HIL/5/189, “*Taqrīr ruf’ min ahrār dhubāt wa-saf dubāt al-jaysh al-Misrī ilā akhwātuhum dubāt wa-saf dubāt wa-’asākīr juyush al-duwal al-awāl bal ilā al-rā’ al-’ām al-gharbī bi-wasitat al-hizb al-watanī al-Misrī...*,” Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England. On Abdel-Hamid’s brawl and court-martial see HIL/5/257, “*Mudhakira*,” n.d. [circa April 1907], Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England.
- 64 HIL/440/54, “Mahmoud Fahmy ilā Māliyya Nāzirī,” November 22, 1900, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England.
- 65 Robert Hunter, *Egypt Under the Khedives*; David S. Landes, *Bankers and Pashas: International Finance and Economic Imperialism in Egypt*. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, (1979).
- 66 HIL 440/51, “Nāzir Idārat ‘Umūm al-Muhāsaba George Talamas ilā Qalam hasr al-hisābāt al-misriyya,” June 16, 1900, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University, England.
- 67 It is curious to see that the purple stamp of George Talamas is unique to all those, including Mahmoud Fahmy the head of the Khedive’s court which is merely in black ink. This matches budgetary tables, memorandums and tables in purple, presumably from *Diwān ‘umūm al-Muhāsaba*. I am aware that purple ink is often also used as an annotation to make copies. See HIL

- 1/49, “Muhammad Tawfiq al-Bakrī ilā al-Amīr Husayn Bāsha Kāmil Rā’is Majlis Shūrā al-Qawānin wal-Jam’iyya al-‘Umūmiyya,” May 15, 1909, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University. For examples of Talamas’ purple stamp see HIL 440/51, “Nāzir idārat ‘umūm al-Muhāsaba George Talamas ilā Qalam hasr al-hisābāt al-misriyya,” June 16, 1900, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University, England; HIL 436/2/207, “Budget du Ministère de la Guerre Pour L’Exercice 1890,” 1890, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England. Other individuals and members of the legislative council sometimes also had purple stamps such as Muhammad Tawfiq al-Bakrī, “Muhammad Tawfiq al-Bakrī ilā Sa’ādātlu efendim hadratlari,” August 25, 1909. Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University, England; HIL 440/51, “Rā’is diwān al-Khidwī Mahmūd Fahmy ilā Māliyya Nāzirī,” November 22, 1900, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University, England.
- 68 HIL/440/56, “Mahmoud Fahmy ilā Māliyya Nāzirī,” November 17, 1900, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England.
- 69 This was initially 74,000 L.E but lowered to 64,000 L.E. See HIL/440/64, “Nahnū Khidiwī Misr,” n.d., Palace Green Library and Archive: Durham, England.
- 70 The reserve fund helped shoulder the burden and in most cases the Financial Advisor mandated that the surplus be transferred to the reserve fund. In 1901 for example 216,000 was taken from the reserve fund to augment weak tax revenue due to weak inundation. See HIL/440/82-4, “Tarjamat: Amr ‘ālī n.d.,” HIL 440/94, “Décret,” n.d., Palace Green Library & Archive: Durham, England; HIL 440/69, “Mudhakira marfū’a min al-lajna al-malliyya li-majlis al-nuzār,” n.d., Palace Green Library and Archive: Durham, England; HIL 440/67, “Mudhakira al-Mustashar al-Māli ‘an mizāniyat sanat 1901,” n.d., Palace Green Library and Archive: Durham, England; HIL 440/72, “Mudhakira al-Mustashar al-Māli,” n.d., Palace Green Library and Archive: Durham, England. This was also the same for 1903 see HIL/440/112, “Note by the Financial Advisor on the Budget for 1903,” Palace Green Library and Archive: Durham, England; HIL 440/81, “Tarjamat Mudkakira marfū’a min al-lajna al-māliyya ilā majlis al-nuzār: Masrūfāt,” Palace Green Library and Archive: Durham, England.
- 71 “The true reason why there has been no general discontent in Egypt or the Soudan is, I believe, that State expenditure has been carefully controlled and has been adapted to the financial resources of the two countries.” Cromer, *Abbas Hilmi II*, xxi.
- 72 HIL 436/1/140, “Projét de Budget pour l’Exercice 1888,” n.d., Palace Green Library and Archive: Durham, England.
- 73 Aaron Jakes. *Egypt’s Occupation: Colonial Economism and the crises of Capitalism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, (2020).
- 74 It was the *Caisse de la Dette Publique*, the representative of European

- bondholders, that refused to pay the carrier of the Ottoman *firman* of investiture the customary 10,000 gold coins out of ‘financial prudence’. In this case though, financial prudence was but an alibi for British control of Ottoman vestiges of sovereignty. Withholding payment was to an affront to Eyüp Paşa, and the bonds of Ottoman sovereignty to Egypt as a whole. Mikhāil Shārūbīm, *Al-Kāfī fī tārikh Mīsr*, Vol. V: I, 89.
- 75 HIL 440/76, “mizāniyat ‘an sanat 1901,” Palace Green Library and Archive: Durham, England.
- 76 To put that sum in context, one can compare it to the total expenditure for military construction in 1890—6500 L.E.—which the 3,706 L.E. of surplus forms amounts to half of. See HIL 436/2/57, “Ministère de la Guerre,” n.d., Palace Green Library and Archive: Durham, England. On item by item reductions, such as the 1,460 L.E. reduction in rations and 1,287 L.E. increase due to increased recruitment of soldiers in the 1890 War Office budget see HIL 436/215, “No.85 par Moustapha Fahmy, Le Ministère de la Guerre,” n.d., Palace Green Library and Archives: Durham, England.
- 77 HIL 436/2/7, “Minsètre de la Guerre,” n.f.d., Palace Green Library and Archive: Durham, England.
- 78 HIL/64/78, “Khartoum to Nekoud,” Cairo, Telegram No. 206, November 3rd 1908, Palace Green Library and Archives: Durham, England.
- 79 HIL/64/78, “Khartoum to Nekoud,” Cairo, Telegram No. 206, November 3rd 1908, Palace Green Library and Archives: Durham, England.
- 80 The fund was originally invested in Egyptian debt but by the 1930s and 1940s British officials suggested it be invested in British securities to accrue interest and shore up the British pound sterling. By 1936 the *Caisse* had a half a million L.E working fund in addition to 1,800,000 L.E in the reserve fund. See Bank of England Archive (BoEA), OV43/78, “V. Cavendish-Bentinck to S.D. Waley,” February 6 1939, London: England; SAD/165/1/236, “The Egyptian Public Debt by Ronald Graham, C.J.B. Hurst, Sydney Armitage-Smith,” July 20 1917,” Sir Reginald Wingate Papers, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England.
- 81 FO 407/161, “The Earl of Cromer to the Marquess of Landsome,” July 6, 1903, TNA: Kew Gardens, Richmond.
- 82 Messrs. Louis and Yonnie.
- 83 The government requested a guarantee 500,000 pounds but initial expenditure out of the special reserve fund was 200,000 pounds and then 150,000 pounds which hurt the interests of the bondholders as alleged by M. Bouteron the litigant and M. Herbault. The Cairo Mixed Court of First Instance ordered these funds be repaid in its judgment on June 8, 1896 with 5% interest. The Appeals Court affirmed this ruling but another appeal stripped it of its substance, requiring the Court of Appeals to hold a session to combine both judgments into one on December 2 1896, largely confirming the Egyptian Government’s obligation to return the funds out

- of the special reserve fund. Parliament, *Egypt. No. 1 (1897). Correspondence Respecting the Law-Suit Brought against the Egyptian Government in Regard to the Appropriation of Money from the General Reserve Fund to the Expenses of the Dongola Expedition*, Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty., London: Harrison & Sons, (January 1897). On expenditure of the half a million loan see HIL/64/64, “Khartoum to Ferasudan, Cairo,” Telegram No. 1422, Cairo, December 26 1908, Palace Green Library and Archives: Durham, England.
- 84 See HIL/64/51, “Khartoum to Ferasudan, Cairo,” Telegram No. 448, April 11 1908, Palace Green Library and Archives: Durham, England.
- 85 Parliament, *Egypt. No. 1 (1897). Correspondence Respecting the Law-Suit Brought against the Egyptian Government in Regard to the Appropriation of Money from the General Reserve Fund to the Expenses of the Dongola Expedition*, 11.
- 86 See Ministry of Finance and War versus Ibrahim Bek Fawzī in Nizārat al-Haqqāniyya, *Al-Majmū‘ah al-Rasmiyya lil-Mahākīm al-Ahliyya wa-qarārāt lajnat al-murāqaba al-qadā’iyya*, Vol. 3, (1902), Al-Qahira: Nizārat al-Haqqāniyya, 7-21. See also Ministry of Finance versus Khalil Effendi ‘Umara on prisoners of War during the Mahdi Revolt in Sudan’s right to a salary during imprisonment and retirement funds (25 qurush) based on the rank of Binbashī that he is entitled vis-à-vis his time in the Ministry of War—including as a prisoner—which the Ministry of Finance had denied in Nizārat al-Haqqāniyya, *Al-Majmū‘ah al-Rasmiyya lil-Mahākīm al-Ahliyya wa-qarārāt lajnat al-murāqaba al-qadā’iyya*, Vol. 4, (1903), 44-7. For more on the disappearance of Egyptian soldiers in Sudan during the 1898 campaign see Mikhāil Shārūbīm, *Al-Kāfī fī tārikh Mīsr*, Vol. V: I, 214. For complaints of unfair referral of Egyptian officers to retirement in 1907 by the Sirdar sent to the Khedive see for example HIL/5/257, “Muhammad ‘Uthmān: Mudhakira,” n.d., Palace Green Library and Archives: Durham, England.
- 87 These included individuals such as Elden Gorst himself, Mitchell Innis, V. Harari and others. See HIL 440/81, “Mudhakira marfu‘a min al-lajna al-malliyya li-majlis al-nuzār,” n.d.,” Palace Green Library and Archives: Durham, England.
- 88 Majlis al-Nuwwab. *Majmū‘at Madābit Dawr al-In‘iqād al-Awwāl li-Majlis al-Nuwwab*, 715-6. On the one million pound loan from the Egyptian government to the Sudan campaign as part of the guaranteed 90 million pound sterling loan—and the decision to bar litigants from challenging government collection of taxes for a year to finance the campaign whose loan was nearly depleted in November of 1888 with sixty-thousand sterling only left—see Filib Jallad, *Al-Qāmūs al-‘āmm lil-idārah wa-al-qadā: Min sanat 1876 ilā sanat 1900, Al-Iskandariyya: Matba‘at Banī Lāghūdākī*, 7 vols, Vol. 2, (1899), 470-2, 486. On the Sudanese compensation law as part of the property destroyed during the Mahdi revolt see *Majmū‘at al-qarārāt*

- wa-al-manshūrāt al-Sādirah min Majlis al-Nuzzār wa-min al-nizārāt min awal shahr yanāyir sanat 1892 ilā 31 minhu*, Al-Qahirā: Matba‘at Bulāq, (1892), 11, 195. Private correspondence confirms that there were fears that interwar armament would cost the Egyptian treasury as it helped the British rearm, despite Kitchener’s claims otherwise. See HIL 7/377, “Muhammad Sa‘īd ilā ilā al-Khidwī,” November 20, 1912, Palace Green Library and Archives, Durham: England.
- 89 FO 407/161, “The Early of Cromer to the Marquess of Landsowne,” Cairo, June 24 1903, TNA: Kew Gardens, 97; Majlis al-Nuwwab. *Majmū‘at Madābit Dawr al-In‘iqād al-Awwāl li-Majlis al-Nuwwab*, 715-6.
- 90 French forces arrived on the seventh of September while Kitchener left on the tenth. Horatio Herbert Kitchener, James Bacon Rye and Horace G Groser. *Kitchener in His Own Words*. London: T.F. Unwin, (1917), 133.
- 91 Butrus Abu-Manneh, “Mehmed Ali Paşa and Sultan Mahmud II: The genesis of a conflict.” *Turkish Historical Review*. Vol.1, No.1: 2010, 1-24.
- 92 On the removal of Muhammad Fawzy Effendi, the last Şeyhulislam, in December of 1914, see Ahmed Shafiq Bāshā, *Hawliyyat Mīsr al-Siyāsiyya*, Vol. 1, 74-5.
- 93 See Husayn Rushdi’s interview with the times speaking of the ability to now reform the judicial system, the *awqāf* and *al-mājlis al-hisbī*, institutions of Shari‘a law which were previously beyond purview. Cited in Ahmed Shafiq Bāshā, Vol. 1, 77.
- 94 See the following pamphlet by Youssef Siddiq SAD/153/18, “Avant-Propos,” Vienna, November 28 1915, Wingate Papers, Palace Green Library & Archive: Durham, England.
- 95 See Ibrahim Ghānim Bayumī. *Al-Awqāf wa-al siyāsa fī, Mīsr*, Cairo: Dar al-Shorouk, (1994), 397.
- 96 HIL 7/548, “Muhammad Sa‘īd ilā al-Khidwī,” October 20, 1912, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University, England.
- 97 HIL/400/1-4, “Hadhihī surrat al-waqfiyya wa-al-wathiqa al-mar‘iyya al-muwaqa‘a bi-tawqi‘i qubilat ma‘ aslahā al-sharīf satran bi-satr muqābala sāhiha lā taghyir fihā lā tahrif, Bekqūz [Beykoz] Qādī,” Muharram 1, 1333 [circa November 18th, 1914], Palace Green Library & Archive: Durham University, England.
- 98 The question of Khedival finances by the 1920s would be more fraught and difficult as the press started to report on the Khedive’s dire financial situation and the money he owed Istanbul. See *Ileri’s* article on the one million-Lira debt the Khedive incurred to help him settle in Istanbul after his dethronement and failure to repay. HIL/24/93, “Sabık Hidivi’nin Bir milyon lira borçı,” *Ileri*, February 22 1922, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England. Even Sultan Husayn objected to the sequestration of the Khedive’s endowments. See Murtadā Bāshā, the last secretary of the Khedive, and his interview detailing his intervention with Sultan Husayn

- over the protection of the Khedive’s property. *Al-Ahram*, “Al-Ayām al-Akhira min ‘ahd al-Khidwīyya,” February 15 1927, 1, 5. This also included the sequestration, and alleged compensation, of the Khedive’s steamer the *Doloman*. See HIL/441/8, “Rapport sur la gestion des biens sis en Egypt de S.A. Abbas Pacha Hilmi, Ancien Khedive D’Egypte, Etabli en execution de l’ordinnance de Monsier le President du Tribunal des Référés du Caire, en date du 16 Mars 1915,” Le Caire, February 18 1919, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England. In 1919, the Khedive’s property was inventoried and it was lifted by the sequester general, with some funds and previous objects deposited in the National Bank of Egypt. As for the land, which was endowed and managed by the Sultanic Waqfs Authority. Some of these lands were donated, such as the Bebek Palace and jewelry of Emine İlhami, to the Egyptian government while the palace of al-Dübāra was sold. See HIL/352/211, “Muhammad Tewfiq à Daira de S.A. le Khédivah Mère,” Kasr El Doubara, Le Caire, Novembre 5 1921, Palace Green Library and Archives: Durham, England ; HIL/352/220, “Muhammad Tawfiq à S.A. Altesse,” Le Caire, Octobre 2 1932, Palace Green Library & Archvies: Durham, England. Before that, however, many of these lands were reclaimed by foreign land speculators and companies which claimed to have sold land to the Khedive which he was buying back from the State Domanial Authority, as a way to regain the land that Khedive Ismail mortgaged to remain liquid. By 1920, the British decided to liquidate the properties. See HIL/209/12, “Note,” Constantinople, 29 Decembre 1920, Palace Green Library & Archives, Durham: England. HIL/441/97r, “Assignment en Référé,” Le Caire, 16 March 1915, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England; HIL/441/103, “Nicolas Naklé à Monsieur le Juge des Référés du Tribunal Mixte du Caire,” Le Caire, n.d., Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England. HIL/467/1, “Draft petition [from `Abbas Hilmi II to Hussein Kamel or King Fouad I], concerning the sale of khedivial lands and palaces,” n.d., Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England. See also transmission of the sequestration and liquidation order via the Grand Vizier Mehmet Talaat, HIL/467/2, “Hidivi Misir-i Fehametlu Abbas Hilmi Paşa Hazretidir Mehşis Arzdir,” Kalem Mehşus Daira Sadr Azam, Istanbul: August 12 1922, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University, England.
- 99 See other copies in HIL/352/350-6, “Mısırda mütevssit şerefmukim...,” 12 February, 1338 h.j. [circa July 1920] and Şevval, 1340 h.j. [circa June 1922], and another authenticated in on Rajab 9, 1339 h.j. [March 1921] by Eminül Fetva in in HIL/431/12, “Vu au Ministère Imperial Des Affaires Etrangères Pour Legislation Du Sceau du Fetva,” 15 Juin, 1927, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England. The latter document was likely issued on behalf of the Khedive and Princess ‘Atiyya to ascertain inheritance claims possibly after the death of Fatma Hanim. See HILM/431/12, “Muamele tehririne mehşus kısımdır,” 14 Şevval, 1340, Palace Green Library &

- Archives, Durham, England; HIL/431/43, “‘addad 2 i’lām shar’ī bi-tawkīl dawlat al-Amira Ni’matallah Hanim...,” Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University, England.
- 100 HIL/+107/1 *Tribunal Arbitral Turco-Anglais: Contre Mémoire Spécial Présenté au nom de Son Altesse Abbas Hilmi II en Réponse au Mémoire Spécial Présenté au nom du Gouvernement de sa Majesté Britannique*, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England.
- 101 For more on his claim of being an Ottoman national which the provisions of the Lausanne treaty applied to see HIL/+107/1/59-65, “Annexe I: Consultation Au Sujet de la Nationalité de Son Altesse Abbas Hilmi II Par M. P. Arminjon, Ancien Avocat au Barreau D’Alexandrie, Ancien Juge Aux Tribunaux Mixtes D’Égypte Professor Honoraire a la Faculté de Droit du Caire,” in *Tribunal Arbitral Turco-Anglais: Contre Mémoire Spécial Présenté au nom de Son Altesse Abbas Hilmi II en Réponse au Mémoire Spécial Présenté au nom du Gouvernement de sa Majesté Britannique*, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England; HIL/+107, “Annex No 13, “Official Journal of the Egyptian Government dated July 19th 1922 (Addition.): Note relating to the properties of the Ex-Khedive,” Alexandria, July 17 1922, in *Tribunal Arbitral Turco-Anglais: Contre Mémoire Spécial Présenté au nom de Son Altesse Abbas Hilmi II en Réponse au Mémoire Spécial Présenté au nom du Gouvernement de sa Majesté Britannique*, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England
- 102 HIL/72/37/ “Huzur Sami-e Fehimatlerinde,” n.d. [1923?], Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University, England; HIL/72/41, “Excellence,” n.d. [1923?], Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University, England; HIL/72/44, “À Son Excellence Ismet Pacha Commissaire aux Affaires Entrangères de Turquie, Chef de la Délégation Turque auprès de la Conférence de Lausanne,” le 25 Julliet 1923, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University, England; HIL/749, “Abbas Hilmi II à Son Excellence Ismat Pacha Président de la Délégation Turque,” le 10 Julliet 1923, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University, England; HIL/7/252, “Déclaration,” n.d. Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University, England. See also n101.
- 103 The Méemorandum Spéciale Britannique argued that Egyptian nationality could be applied retroactively as early as May 1st 1883 and June 29th 1900, when electoral laws for Egypt’s quasi-parliaments outlined what and who an indigénat was HIL/+107/3/ *Tribunal Arbitral Turco-Anglais: Contre Mémoire Spécial Présenté au nom de Son Altesse Abbas Hilmi II en Réponse au Mémoire Spécial Présenté au nom du Gouvernement de sa Majesté Britannique*, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England, 12
- 104 Will Hanley, *Identifying with Nationality: Europeans Ottomans and Egyptians in Alexandria*. New York: Columbia University Press, (2017).
- 105 For more on his claim of being an Ottoman national, which the provisions of the Lausanne treaty applied to see HIL/+107/59-65, “Annexe I:

- Consultation Au Sujet de la Nationalité de Son Altesse Abbas Hilmi II Par M. P. Arminjon, Ancien Avocat au Barreau D’Alexandrie, Ancien Juge Aux Tribunaux Mixtes D’Égypte Professor Honoraire a la Faculté de Droit du Caire,” in *Tribunal Arbitral Turco-Anglais: Contre Mémoire Spécial Présenté au nom de Son Altesse Abbas Hilmi II en Réponse au Mémoire Spécial Présenté au nom du Gouvernement de sa Majesté Britannique*, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England. On negotiations for the recovery of an indemnity and the amount payable to his lawyer M. Vondas, be it above or below 249, 999 pounds for his property, see HIL/419/129, “Nourandoughian to the Under Secretary of State, the Foreign Office,” Paris: November 3 1927, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England. See also n102.
- 106 Lâle Can, Michael Christopher Low, Kent F Schull and Robert W Zens (eds), *The Subjects of Ottoman International Law*. Bloomington Indiana: Indiana University Press, (2020).
- 107 HIL/+107/1, *Tribunal Arbitral Turco-Anglais: Contre Mémoire Spécial Présenté au nom de Son Altesse Abbas Hilmi II en Réponse au Mémoire Spécial Présenté au nom du Gouvernement de sa Majesté Britannique*, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England
- 108 HIL/+107/1, *Tribunal Arbitral Turco-Anglais: Contre Mémoire Spécial Présenté au nom de Son Altesse Abbas Hilmi II en Réponse au Mémoire Spécial Présenté au nom du Gouvernement de sa Majesté Britannique*, 45, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England
- 109 See HIL 431/78, “Huzur Sami-e Fehimatlerinde,” Taymüz 21, 1922, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University, England.
- 110 HIL/431/34, “li-jināb mā’mūriyyat markaz bülīs Bekyoz: Muhammad Niyāzī ilā Abbas Hilmi,” Māris 22, 1337 [1918], Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University England; HIL/431/48, “‘addad 2 iqrār min qādī mahkamat Bekyoz al-Shar’iyye...” Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England.
- 111 HIL/431/150, “Mudhakira Khusūsiyya Li-Dawlat al-Amira, Ni’mat Hānim Effendī min Abbās Hilmī” Confidential, March 26 1921, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England.
- 112 HIL/431/136, “tibq asl mahkamat Bekyūz al-Shar’iyya,” Muharram 29, 1333 h.j. [December 16, 1914], Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England.
- 113 There is evidence that the Khedive recovered some monetary compensation for the seizure of his property. See HIL/418/179, “William to [a Representative of the Khedive or possibly the Khedive himself?],” Paris, Mai 3 1930, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England.
- 114 Ibrahim Ghānim Bayumī, *Al-Awqāf wa-al siyāsa fī, Mīsr*, Cairo: Dar al-Shorouk, (1994); Malak Labib. “Crise de la Dette Publique et Missions Financières Européennes en Égypte, 1878-1879,” *Monde(S)*. Vol: 4, No. 2, (2013), 23-43.

- 115 HIL/354/56, “Note au sujets des créances de l’Administration Générale des Wakfs antérieurement à 1880,” Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University, England.
- 116 In 1909 the employees of *Diwān ‘Umūm al-Awqāf* had their salaries seized in order to repay their debt of 24,000 L.E which they had borrowed from their bureau. This prompted Mustafa Bāshā Māhir to propose a draft law to prevent employees from the Waqf department from borrowing from its revenues. HIL/166/553, “Ahmed Shafiq Bāshā ilā al-Khidiwī,” July 4 1909, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England.
- 117 On the use of *hayri evkaf* to support the Khedival family, and the ensuing conflict over fair distribution of the *daira hassa* endowments see “Prince Muhamma’ye Fehametlü Seaadetlü Biraver Azizim Effendi Hazretleri [Abbas Hilmi II],” January 27. 1922, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University, England. On Cromer’s allegations of using endowments as a way to cultivate his relationship with clerics and his persona see FO 371/67, “Cromer to Sir Edward Grey Bart M.P.,” Confidential, June 13th, 1906, Cairo: No. 21481, TNA: Kew Gardens, Richmond. “The Ex-Khedive and Family Funds: A Special Inquiry,” *The Times*, Cairo, January 18 1915, 7. *The Times*, “The Ex-Khedive and Family Funds,” January 20, 1915. On the Khedive’s *evkaf ehliye*, such as two thousand fedans at Nachart, and their near bankruptcy starting 1934, see HIL 352/93, “Prince Muhammad Ali à Chère Altesse,” Janvier 24, 1934, Le Caire, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England. On Prince Muhammad Ali’s request to receive his salary as land see HIL/352/274 “Muhammad Ali ilā Mawlāy,” March 16, 1912, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England.
- 118 HIL/167/62, “Abdel-Aziz Fārid Irādāt ilā al-Khidiwī: Maslahat Al-Awqāf al-Khidiwiyya al-Khusūsiyya lil-sanawāt al-mubayana,” July 8 1908, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England.
- 119 See also Roger Owen, *Lord Cromer*, 273; Ibrahim Ghānim Bayumī. *Al-Awqāf*, 399.
- 120 See Youssef Siddiq’s claim that the Khedive forced the jurists to reinterpret the document so that he become the intendant of the endowment. SAD/153/18, “Avant-Propos,” Vienna, November 28 1915, Wingate Papers, Palace Green Library & Archive: Durham, England. For letters regarding Prince Husayn’s inquiries about the revenue of certain endowments and questioning the management of it see HIL/166/647, “Ahmed Shafiq Bāshā ilā al-Khidiwī,” 28 July 1911, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England.
- 121 Ahmed Shafiq Bāshā, *Hawliyyat Misr al-Siyāsiyya*, 59-60. Sultan Husayn Kamel also sued to have Princess Jamila’s waqf—daughter of Khedive Ismail—run by his attendant as opposed to her third husband Husayn Yaver. See *Al-Huqūq*, “Isti’nāf Misr Madanī, 4 Mārith Sanat 1902: Sa’adat Yaqūb Bashā Hasan “did” al-Shaykh Selim Matar wa-ākharīn,” Vol. 17, Dar al-Kutub: Cairo, (1901).

- 122 FO 848/5, “Interview between General Sir John Maxwell and S.E. Sirri Pacha,” No. 4, 10/12/1919, Kew Gardens: TNA, Richmond, England; TNA.
- 123 See article 168 of the constitution enshrining and immunizing law 28/1922—passed using Marshall law—as part of the constitution and beyond legislative purview. For constitutional discussions on immunizing the seizure of Khedival property see India Office Records (IOR)/L/P/15/22/iii, “Mr. Hoare to Mr. A. Henderson,” Cairo, October 25, 1930, British Library: Asian and African Studies Reading Room, St. Pancras, U.K. For seizure of Egyptian endowments overseas such as the island of Thasous/Taşoş and Kavala endowments as enemy property held by the British Custodian of Enemy Property in Egypt see FO 141/469/5, “The Residency to Earl of Kurzon,” Cairo, February 7th, 1919, TNA, Kew Gardens: Richmond, U.K; “Djelaladin à Son Altesse,” Tchiboukli, Fevrier 10eme 1914, Palace Green Archive & Library: Durham, England.
- 124 HIL/4/42-43, “Mustafa Pasha Kamel ilā al-Khidiwī,” Cairo, January 4 1908, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England.
- 125 HIL/7/520-522, “Muhammad Sa’id ilā al-Khidiwī,” Cairo, May 18 1912, Palace Green Library & Archive: Durham, England.
- 126 On this point see Karim Malak, “Fortress America in the Middle East: Academic Freedom at the American University in Cairo,” *London School of Economics blog*, April 19 2019, < <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2019/04/09/fortress-america-in-the-middle-east-academic-freedom-at-the-american-university-in-cairo/>>, accessed May 29 2023.
- 127 HIL/292/27-8, “Mustafā Husnī al-Shamashirjī ilā al-Khidiwī,” 28 March 1928, Palace Green Library & Archive: Durham, England.
- 128 HIL/203/78, “Mudhakira min Mudīr al-Awqāf al-Khusūsiyya al-Khidiwiyya ilā sāhib al-‘izza Muhammad Yūsif Bek Kamāl al-Muhāmī bi-Misr ‘an al-qadiyya al-marfū’a,” n.d. [circa March 1915], Palace Green Library & Archive: Durham, England.
- 129 In addition to George Bey Talamas, a one “Mr. Halbert” was also asked to audit the accounts of the waqf department from 1900-1914. See HIL/203/79-80, “Waqāi’ al-Da’wā,” Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England.
- 130 See Donald Malcolm Reid, *Cairo University and the Making of Modern Egypt*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1990).
- 131 Ahmed Shafiq Bāshā, *Hawliyyat Misr al-Siyāsiyya*, Al-Qāhira: Matba’at Shafiq Bāshā, 3 Vols, Vol. 1, (1926), 53. As the Khedive’s secretary, Ahmed Shafiq Bāshā’s dispatches were highly detailed and it is possible that there is considerable overlap between his letters to the Khedive and his diary. See HIL 166/1-168, 1900-1902.
- 132 Cromer, Abbas Hilmi II, London: Macmilland and Co., (1915), vii.
- 133 For an example of this binary in Egyptian historiography see Yoav Di-Capua, *Gatekeepers of the Arab Past: Historians and History Writing in Twentieth-Century Egypt*. Berkeley: University of California Press, (2009). For

an example of an anti-monarchic historiography directed at Abbas Hilmi II and Sultan Husayn see Muhammad Sayyid Kīlānī, *Al-Sultān Husayn Kāmīl: Fatrah muzlimah fī tārikh Misr, 1914-1917*, Al-Qāhira: Dār al-Qawmiyah al-‘Arabīyah lil-Tibā‘ah, (1963). For an institutional history of the monarchy and its Egyptian version of modernity through law, medicine and forensic science, see Fahmy Khaled Mahmoud, *In Quest of Justice: Islamic Law and Forensic Medicine in Modern Egypt*. Oakland California: University of California Press (2018).

134 FO 371/10044, “Evacuation of Egyptian Troops from Sudan,” Cairo, November 25 1924, TNA: Kew Gardens, Richmond; Egypt. *Majlis al-Nuwwab, Majmū‘at Madābit Dawr al-In‘iqād al-Hay‘a al-Niyabiyya al-‘Ulā li-Majlis al-Nūwwāb al-In‘iqād al-‘ādī: Al-Jalsa al-Sādisa lil-Dawr al-‘ādī al-Thānī*, November 24 1924, al-Qāhirah, al-Matba‘ah al-Amīriyah, 39-41. Indeed Parliament used Lord Salisbury’s words in 1898 during Fashoda, that the territory is Egyptian, to remind the British in 1924 that they could not withdraw. Majlis al-Nuwwab. *Majmū‘at Madābit Dawr al-In‘iqād al-Awwāl li-Majlis al-Nuwwab*, 716.

135 As Egypt’s first freely elected parliament convened for the first time, it attempted to declaw British financial controls set by the occupation. The first thing they confronted was the general budget. The second was a more troublesome challenge. So pressing was this matter that Salama Mikhail Bey, Husayn Hilal Bey and Ahmed Ramzy Bey, submitted a request to halt all discussions except that of the general budget because—put simply—this was the first time that a fully elected Egyptian body was deliberating over the general budget of Egypt, hoping to practice fiscal and monetary sovereignty. Majlis al-Nuwwab. *Majmū‘at Madābit Dawr al-In‘iqād al-Awwāl li-Majlis al-Nuwwab*, 461. See also British objections to Parliament’s discussion FO 407/199, “Enclosure 1 in No. 171: Draft Communication to the Egyptian Government,” TNA: Kew Gardens, Richmond. Annually, Sudan ran a debt of 439,000 to 297,000 to Egypt from 1914-15 and beyond. See SAD/196/1/223, “Bernard to Governor-General of Sudan,” July 26 1915, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England.

136 Majlis al-Nuwwab. *Majmū‘at Madābit Dawr al-In‘iqād al-Awwāl li-Majlis al-Nuwwab*, 715-6.

137 Majlis al-Nuwwab. *Majmū‘at Madābit Dawr al-In‘iqād al-Awwāl li-Majlis al-Nuwwab*, 714; Karim Malak, “The High Tide of Colonialism: Sovereignty and Governmentality at Sea.” *Comparative Studies of South Asia Africa and the Middle East*, Vol. 42, No. 1, (2022), 118-34

138 *Al-Mū‘ayyad*, “Hawādith Mahaliyya,” September 1st, 1898; *Al-Mū‘ayyad*, “Thalāth Rayyat,” September 26th, 1898. Writing in 1943, Muhammad Naguib echoed how 1924—and the forced withdrawal of Egyptians—carried a parallel with negotiations in 1943 and demands to abrogate the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty and 1899 Condominium Agreement. See *Risāla ‘an*

al-Sūdān, Al-Qāhira: Al-Matba‘a al-Amiriyya, (1954 [1943]), 12.

139 Great Britain, Egypt. No. 1 (1906). *Reports by His Majesty’s Agent and Consul-General on the Finances Administration and Condition of Egypt and the Soudan in 1903*. London: Harrison and Sons, (1905), 45-52, 70.

140 See for instance a draft book’s table of contents titled “al-Mas‘āla al-Misriyya wa-‘Abbās Hilmī al-Thānī Khidiwī Misr fī zaman al-‘umūmiyya al-ūrūbiyya (1914—),” which contained chapters dedicated to replying to Cromer’s books on Abbas Hilmi II. See “al-Mas‘āla al-Misriyya wa-‘Abbās Hilmī al-Thānī Khidiwī Misr fī zaman al-‘umūmiyya al-ūrūbiyya (1914—),” n.d. [Lausanne, 1916], Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England. See also HIL/202/527, “La Question Égyptienne: Relations entre Abbas II Khédive d’Égypte et le Gouvernement Britannique. I Avant la Guerre 1914,” Lausanne, Septembre 20 1916, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England.

141 HIL/5/218, “Inqisār qulūb al-‘asākīr wa-al-quda min taqrīr al-lūrd krūmir,” n.d., Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England. This reply most likely referred to Cromer’s annual report of 1903. In the 1903 report, Cromer talked about the growth of the Giza Zoo while enumerating the number of birds, which the author chastises him for mentioning compared to his omission of the Egyptian Army. The author also objected to Cromer naming certain judges for their attitude to reforming the courts. In Cromer’s 1903 report he rather slyly criticized Mahkma Shar‘iyya—particularly Shaykh Hassūna al-Nawāwī—for failing to see the importance of reforming the court and shutting down a discussion of reforms in the Legislative Assembly. See Great Britain, Egypt. No. 1 (1904). *Reports by His Majesty’s Agent and Consul-General on the Finances Administration and Condition of Egypt and the Soudan in 1903*. London: Harrison and Sons, (1904), 45-52, 70; HIL/166/494, “Ahmed Shafiq Bāshā ilā al-Khidiwī,” July 25 1909, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England. On the monitoring of al-Muqattam by the Khedive’s secretaries and reporting of how the British used it as a way to divulge secrets in the Khedive’s cabinets and his meetings in Istanbul see HIL/166/356, “Ahmed Shafiq Bāshā ilā al-Khidiwī,” July 6 1906, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham, England.

142 “Votre lettre parle sans connaitre les faits, c’est injuste...Votre Altesse que toute la Famille sauf vous sent ce changement...vous J’espère que votre Altesse saura apprécier ce changement...vous n’êtes pas plus l’objet d’espionnage.” HIL/352/252, “Prince Muhammad Ali Tewfiq à Chère Altesse,” Le Caire, Décembre 29 1936, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University, England; India Office Records (IOR)/L/PS/10/467, “Horace Rumbold to A.J. Balfour,” Berne, October 8 1917, British Library (BL), St. Pancras: London, England; SAD/153/18, “Avant-Propos,” Vienna, November 28 1915, Wingate Papers, Palace Green Library & Archive: Durham, England.

143 See the following letters from Prince Muhammad Ali, who Ashenden refers to as Ali, while Muhammad Ali was in Europe and the Khedive as well, to a cast of characters that ranged from nationalists, Europeans and foreign officials HIL 352/118, “Prince Muhammad Ali à Son Altesse,” June 20, [1922], Paris, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University, England. See also Ahmed Shafiq Bāshā’s meeting with sir Arthur Stanley, brother to the Earl of Derby, who was the head of the British Red Cross and in Switzerland handling the negotiations after the Khedive’s exile HIL/166/890, “Ahmed Shafiq Bāshā ilá al-Khidiwī,” May 14 1918, Paris, Palace Green Library & Archives: Durham University, England; Somerset Maugham W., *Caesar’s Wife: A Comedy in Three Acts*. Auckland: Floating Press, (2012); Somerset Maugham W., *Ashenden*, London: Vintage Books, (2000).

