The "Nilotic Sudan" and its for-runnerstates had a long recorded history that goes back to ancient Egyptian times. Hence the factors that led to the making of modern Sudan are a product of a close and prolonged interaction between the rich varities of its peoples, languages and cultures and also the impact of immigration and conquest. Archaeological and anthropological evidence shows that negroids and Cushites (or Hamitic speaking people) had inhabited the Sudan since ancient times. Negroids continued to populate the southern and south-western parts of the country until the present day, while the Hamites (Beja and Meroites) inhabited the eastern and northern parts. However with the exception of cultural influences emanating from ancient Egypt, relations between the Hamites and negroids took the form of cultural exchange and population movements.

The penetration of tribal groups and foreign influences into the Sudan resulted in major social and culture changes . These changes may be associated with three main stages in the historical development of the country: ancient, mediaeval and modern. The first stage is identified with the Shaheinab culture and the civilizations of Kerma, Napta and Meroe. In the neighborhood of Khartoum, at the Shaheinab settlement the earliest Sudanese culture was discovered. It goes back to the fourth millennium B.C. and is connected with a black people. Between 750 B.C. and 350 A.D. the Meroites, who belonged to a brown-skinned race with some admixture of negro, developed an urban civilized and literate state.

At the Meroetic age, the nucleus of the Sudan nation-state was firmly established. Since then Meroe (and subsequent states) tended to expand in a southerly direction until it embraced large tracts of the country. According to Dr. B. G. Haycock, there seems every reason to admit that at the height of Meroitic power some vague form of suzerainty extended from Meroe along the White Nile as far as the Sudd.

The establishment of the three Nubian kingdoms: Nobatia, al-Muqurra and ^cAlwa ended the chaos that resulted from the collapse of the Meroitic state. This development coincided with advent of Christian faith in the sixth century A.D. Prior to that, indigenous African beliefs and the cult of worshipping rulers were widespread in the Nilotic Sudan. The missionaries concentrated their efforts on kings and nobles and consequently Christianity was closely identified with political institutions. It spread gradually and initiated a new moral bond that the three kingdoms were identified with. The adoption of Christianity marked the commencement of a new epoch in Sudanese history, and also that of the mediaeval stage in the process of nation building. When the Muslims attacked Nubia in 651-52 A.D. the new faith was well established.

The advent of Islam into Nubia, like that of Christianity, marked the beginning of a new age in the history of the Sudan. Unlike Christianty, which was propagated by a fairly small number of missionaries, Islam was introduced by traders and large numbers of nomadic Arabs. The slow migratory movement which started off in the 10^th century A.D. and tailed off at end of the 15^th century A.D. in Kanem, overvan the Beja Land, Nubia, ^cAlwa, northern Kurdufan and northern Dar Fur. Then with the help of cows, baqqar, they pushed further south into southern Kurdufan and Dar Fur. There, the penetration of the Baqqara Arabs was halted again by the water divide (consisting of the Sudd: Bahr al-Ghazal and Bahr al-^cArab) and the tse-tse flies, thus creating a cultural frontier. After settling down, the nomadic Arabs intermarried with the Sudanese people (Beja, Nubians, ^cAnaj and other negroids) many of whom adopted Islam, assimilated Arab genealogies, customs and Arabic.

The manner in which this social transformation, cultural and ethnic assimilation was achieved was a two way process: it led, by and large, to the Arabization and Islamization of the Sudanese people, and the indignization of the Arabs. Anyhow, disregarding some exceptions, the term Arab was progressively being depleted of nearly all its ethnic significance and thus the cultural connotation became, the more pertinent description of this evolution. The spread of Islam in the Sudan was, by and large, a peaceful one. There was no trace of compulsory conversion nor did the Muslim authorities in Cairo commence an officially oriented policy of proselytization. Nubia itself was endowed with a healthy atmosphere of religious tolerance: followers of African religions, Christians, and Muslims co-existed for centuries practically without conflict.

By 1323 A.D. the Christian dynasty of Dunqula became both Arabized and Islamized, an event which marked the political end of Christian Nubia. Yet Christianity continued to thrive in certain pockets until the end of the fifteenth century. The end of ^cAlawa, which was already in full decline, happened approximately at the middle of the fifteenth century when its capital, Soba, was stormed by a confederacy of Arab tribes, led by ^cAbdallah Jamma^c . This event demonstrated the preponderance of Arab influence and heralded the beginning of their ascendecency in the Sudan. The descendants of ^cAbdallah Jamma^c, the ^cAbdallab, extended their authority over most of the region north of Arbaji. The Arabized chieftenships that occupied the area between Shandi and the Egyptian frontier remained loyal to the head of the Arab confederation. However, the independent existence of the ^cAbdallab state did not remain long to evolve its own institutions. In 1504 it clashed at Arbaji with another migratory people, the Funj, who defeated the ^cAbdallab and hence they were reduced to the position of junior partners. As vassals the ^cAbdallab continued to rule the northern part of the Funj Sultanate.

The Funj were cattle nomads whose remote origin is uncertain. Their Kingdom is called al-Saltana al-Zarqa (Black Kingdom) in Sudanese tradition. Their first king is described by David Reuben as a black Muslim who ruled over blacks and whites. James Bruce, the Scottish traveler, who visited their capital Sinnar, recorded that the Funj were by origin Shilluk raiders who descended from the White Nile. Yet, some Sudanese traditions attribute an Arab ancestry to them. It seems, however, from the general pattern of historical evolution and the process of cultural Arabization in the Sudan that the Funj were black Africans, who after conversion to Islam tended to associate themselves with the Arabs and thus adopted an Arab genealogy.

The heires of Nubia and ^cAlwa began to extend their authority over new territories. From their capital Sinnar they imposed direct rule over the area between Arbaji and Fazughli, and indirectly over the ^cAbdallab domains and were contented with a vague suzerainty upon the Beja Land. The expansion of the Funj power took a westerly direction across the Gezira into Kurdufan. In 1554, the Funj Sultan defeated the chiefs of Sagadi and Moya Hills. The two chiefs were confirmed in their office after agreeing to pay an annual tribute. This was properly the general pattern of relations with the newly acquired lands.

The multiplying pressure of the Nilotic people on the White Nile led to a direct encounter between the Funj and the Shilluk, who peopled most of it. At the strategic crossing point of Ilays, the Funj founded a garrison. Henceforth the Funj were able to check the Shilluk, who seem to have concluded an agreement with them. Then the Funj penetrated the Nuba Mountains and reduced the Kingdom of Tegali and the hills of al-Daiyr and Kurdufan into subordinate status. The numerous prisoners captured from those regions were accommodated around Sinnar. They formed a slave – bodyguard to protect the Sultan. Some of these slaves were destined to occupy high positions in the state. The rest of Kurdufan remained to be a disputed area between the Funj, the Fur and the Mussaba^cat.

The newly acquired lands, like old chieftenships, were indirectly controlled from the centre and hence a kind of a lose federal system seemed to have prevailed. Matters pertaining to defense and taxation were a prerogative of the Sultan.

The formation of the Funj-^cAbdallab state gave the country a measure of unity and stability that assisted the progress of Islamization by individual Muslim scholars. These were the ^culama (trained Muslim scholars), and the sufis (Mystics, followers of religious orders) who respectively brought Islamic learning and ushered in sufism (mysticism). The first category of Muslim missionaries were involved in the teaching of shari^ca (Muslim Law) and improving the quality of religion which was a difficult undertaking in a vast, isolated, and a backward state. Hence a more popular and less exacting form of Islam was propagated by the second category: the sufis and the fakis (those who propagated a combination of the shari^ca and sufism). The sufis were highly respective and feared by the ruling elite, and their subjects. Some sufis acquired considerable political influence through the numerous centres of religion they established and through the great influence they wielded. The sufis and fakis "offered elements of continuity and stability to the heterogeneous and fluid Funj society". Through their efforts to teach Islamic doctrine they provided a unifying factor and through the loyalty they enjoyed they superimposed a wider loyalty to Islam. As an important agent of Islamization they were the catalysts that assisted in moulding a more united Funj society.

Islam progressed in a similar way in Kurdufan and Dar Fur, though perhaps at a much slower pace in parts of them. Islamic influences radiated into those regions from the Funj sultanate and the Kanem-Bornu region. In a nutshell, the predominance of Islam and Arabic as a lingua franca dates from the appearance of the Islamic states chiefly the Funj, the Fur and Tegali. Henceforth the course of Islamization was guided by the conciliatory and peaceful sufi missionaries: the stage was set free for further Islamization and Arabicization. By 1800 the southern frontier of these states (and that of Islam) was stablized more or less around latitude 10^oN.

As I hinted earlier, the southern expansion of the Arabs was halted in the waterdivide. This event coincided with a counter northerly expansion of the Nilotes, especially the Shilluk, which succeeded in stopping the Arab penetration and the spread of Islam. At this water divide a cultural frontier was created between what came to be known as the north and southern Sudan. This "frontier" was not static, it was not infrequently shifting over a wide zone. For instance from the middle of the seventeenth century to the middle of the nineteenth century the Shilluk who settled in the upper regions of the White Nile pushed the frontier to Ilays. A similar process occurred in the west. What the jallaba (traders) and the Baqqara Arabs of the Fur Sultante regarded as a frontier was by 1800 a huge territory.

Along this frontier brisk economic activities were taking place. They included trade in slaves, ivory and ostrich feather. This commercial activity linked the two regions and linked the frontier to world markets. Many of the slaves who were brought from the southern regions, across this "frontier" constituted an important element of the armies of the Sultans, others were thoroughly assimilated in their new environment. Thus constituting another dimension to the process of integration.

A similar evolution of integration and assimilation was taking place across the frontier, in the southern region. Linguistic evidence indicated that the southern Sudan was the home land of the Nilotic and probably Central Sudanic cultures. Much of southern Sudan and Northern Uganda was probably peopled by speakers of Central Sudanic languages in the last decades of the first millenium A.D., when this region began to be populated by western and eastern Nilotic speakers. Hence the region was subjected to progressively intense process of Niloticization. Today the region is mostly inhabited by Nilotes.

Of these Nilotics the Shilluk constituted the most important tribe for the development of our discussion. They fromed the largest section of the Lou. Under their leader Nyikang (1490-1517) they settled near Malakal after defeating the "Funj", the previous inhabitants of the region between Tonga and Muomo. The Shilluk seem to have assimilated Funj, Nuba and other elements. From these diverse elements, the Shilluk inherited different cultures and various economic traditions. By the second half of the seventeenth century what came to be known as the Shilluk "nation " emerged. Then they began to expand in two frontier areas: northwards they succeed in dominating the White Nile from Muomo to Ilays, westwards they tried to occupy the frontier zone between the river and the Nuba Mountains. They regarded these two areas as offering wide economic opportunities. During the reign of Reth (King) Odak Ocollo the Shilluk, supported the Fur Sultanate in its strife with the Funj for the control of the White Nile trade. With the surrender of the kingdom of Tegali, the Funj and the Shilluk were left challenging each other over the White Nile for three decades.

The "frontier" was soon disturbed by the invasion of the southern region of the Funj Kingdom by the Dinka in about 1630. The Dinka presence, which continued throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, altered the balance of power in the region. Then the Funj and the Shilluk joined forces against the Dinka and forced them eastwards to the Ethiopian border.

The Funj-Shilluk alliance against the Dinka marked the beginning of a socio-economic interdependence that the Shilluk constituted with different frontier groups: the Funj, the jallaba, the Baqqara Arabs, the Arab free booters, European traders and the Mahdist, at different times, largely to exploit the Dinka. This development demonstrated that such alliance had not as yet assumed a racial ideology.

The second half of the seventeenth century witnessed significant political developments that influenced the socio-economic process in the Shilluk land. A sense of national unity emerged among the diverse people who had settled there and a more centralized form of government was developed under the Reth: hence he had a monopoly of economic resources and of local and long distance trade. As the power of the Funj along the White Nile dwindled during the eighteenth century that of the Shilluk rose correspondingly. By 1772, according to James Bruce the Shilluk were already in command of Ilays.

The Shilluk power, showed sign of decline when masses of Dinka crossed the river Sobat during the reign of Reth Nyakwaa (C.1780-1820) and shared with the Shilluk their traditional habitat, i.e. the area between Lake No and Ilays. From 1821 when the Turco-Egyptian administration was installed, the Shilluk frontier retreated in a southerly direction before the encroaching of the Baqqara Arabs and the Turco-Egyptian authority. The famous Shilluk canoes that dominated the waters of the White Nile in the past, could not compete with the steamships that accompanied the invading Turco-Egyptian army into the southern Sudan.

The territories south of Bahr al-Ghazal and west of Mashra^c al-Riq, Rumbek and the point where the modern border of Sudan, Zaire and Uganda meets, was inhabited by peoples associated with two major language families: the Ubangian (Niger-Congo) and the Central Sudanic (Sahara-Nile). Speakers of these languages had dwelled there since ancient times. Little is known about their history before 1800. By that date slave-raiders were already at work in Dar Fertit, and Dar Banda, while the Zande conquest of the peoples further south was beginning. The Zandi absorbed the people they invaded. Any way, well before 1800 the Sultanate of Dar Fur began to employ informal jurisdiction over Dar Fertit and levied a tribute from the inhabitants of Hufrat al-Nahas, while the Arabs or Fur families imposed their authority over small groups near Raga.

Unlike former conquests which affected border areas, the Turco-Egyptian invasion had penetrated deep into the country and left indelible marks on its history. The new regime which aimed at exploiting the Sudan for the benefit of Egypt, established a strong central government that gradually extended its authority over the rest of the country: the former lands of the Funj state were the core of the new administration to which the Beja land, Kurdufan and (by 1874) the Fur Sultanate were all added up. In all these regions, except for the upperr part of the Blue Nile and parts of the Nuba Mountians a broad measure of cultural unity had prevailed: they were greatly influenced by the process of Arabization and Islamization. The great addition was the area south of latitude 10^oN at which the twin agents of Arabization and Islamization were arrested.

Turco-Egyptian penetration into the southern Sudan, started with slave-raids initiated by the government, geographical exploration and then by effective control of the whole region. These lands, unlike the northern Sudan were hardly influenced by the rich and varied experiences of the states of Meroe, Nubia, ^cAlwa and the Funj. The opening of the southern region to trade led to an influx of the subjects of the Ottoman Empire and Europeans in search for ivory and slaves. Unfortunately this foreign (and northern Sudanese) inrush had irreparable negative consequences. The tough competition that ensued among traders led, first, to the fragmentation of tribal entities while, second, the extensive magnitude of slave trade left behind unforgettable bitter memories.

The General effect of the Turco-Egyptian regime on the public was heavy and oppressive. On the credit side, it improved the quality of government structure by introducing some modern methods of administration, and endeavoured to curb the rebellious tendencies of the nomadic tribes. It was during the same period that the geographical and political boundaries of modern Sudan were formed and by the middle of the nineteenth century the name "Sudan" was officially adopted. However, despite the official cancellation of the frontier between the "north" and the "south" the cultural characteristics associated with that "frontier" seem to linger on.

Indeed the existence of this frontier has prejudiced our analysis of modern Sudanese history. The Southern Sudanese tended to portray the relations between the "North" and the south" in terms of aggression and economic exploitation from the Funj, the Fur, the Turco-Egyptian and the Mahdist states. From the Northern Sudanese perspective political, economic and social developments were generally explained in terms of Muslim and Arab movements. By the twentieth century the North is portrayed as Arab and Muslim and the south as African (or Negroid) or "pagan" (or animist) and progressively as Christian. Such an image was largely promoted by the writings of colonial administrators and anthropologists. The historical reality, as we noted earlier, is more complex: political, economic and cultural contacts existed.

Probably one of the major developments that the Turco-Egyptian had witnessed was the replanting of Christian faith. The implantation of Christianity had immense repercussions on the future relations of the two regions.

European travellers who visited the Funj Sultanate brought back to the memories of their readers the fate of the Christian Kingoms of Nubia and ^cAlwa. In all probability western Europe had neither forgotten the defeat of the crusaders nor forgiven the Muslim "infidels" who had caused it. Since then western Europe attempted to circumvent the Muslim world and control its sources of prosperity. The Portugese monarchs were entrusted with the implementation of this objective. "These monarchs were also inspired in their drive to the East by the Christian ideal of their universalist church, which like Islam, seeks to convert all mankind to its cause. The two religions were and still are inherently competitive. The competition has on occasion resulted in a conflict".

Efforts to propagate Christianity in the Sudan must be viewed against this broader canvas. Christianity was replanted a few years after the extension of the Turco-Egyptian suzerainty over the southern region. In 1846 Pope Gregory XVI established the Apostolic Vicariate of Central Africa (in Khartoum) to convert negroes to Christianity. Missionary stations were established in the southern region. Charles Gordon, as Governor of Equatoria, encouraged missionaries to function in his province. However the modest breakthrough that both Islam and Christianity had attained during this period was cut short during the turmoil of the Mahdiyya.

The short-lived Mahdist state (1885-98) was in a sense a culmination of the profound assimilation of the Islamic teachings, and a spirited stand against the corrupt Turco-Egyptian regime. It should also be considered in the framework of the revivalist movements that covered the Muslim world in response to the encroaching European might. The independent Mahdist state was a significant contribution in the path of national unity. Those who rallied to support Al- Mahdi were a cross section of the inhabitants of the whole Sudan, and similarly were the citizens of the newly established cities, which acted as melting pots to the whole country. Some of Al-Mahdi’s most gifted generals were a product of the southern Sudanese nineteenth century milieu. However, the Mahdist policy towards the "South" was adverse: it arrested the development and consolidation of Islamic influences. Karam Allah al- Kurqusawi, the Mahdist general in the southern region left Bahr al-Ghazal region "in turmoil and a prey to chronic inter-tribal war".

The battle of Karari, September 2, 1898, brought about the complete collapse of the Mahdist state under the canons of the Anglo-Egyptian forces. At Khartoum, the British and the Egyptian flag few side by side as a symbol of the complete judicial authority of the two conquerors. In reality it was Britain that formulated the future of the Sudan. At first some tough resistance ensued all over the country. The North was the first to submit. The government main objective was to suppress any Mahdist revival.

In the South, resistance to the new regime continued for thirty years during which the British pursued their policy of pacification with great determination. Another important development was the formation of the Equatorial Corps in 1911. At first it was composed of Muslims and non- Muslims. Them Lt. Col. R. C. R. Owen doubted the suitability of Muslim soldiers to suppress a Muslim rebellion, and suggested that: "an Equatorial battalion be formed for service in the south, composed entirely of southerners, and the commands of which would be in English, and the observances of which be Christian."

Subsequently the British attempted to cut off the South from the North in order to protect the South from Islamic influences. The idea of preventing the penetration of Islamic influence into the interior of Africa had been voiced as early as 1892, when General Kitchener cautioned, in a memorandum on Uganda, "unless the Christian powers held their own in Africa, the Mohammedan Arabs will …. step in, and in the centre of the continent will form a base from which they will be able to drive back all civilizing influences to the coast and the country will then be given up to slavery and misrule as is the case in the Sudan at present." Through the "Southern Policy" and the "Closed District Order" Arab influence was completely eradicated.

For security reasons, the British administrators were at first disinclined to grant Missionary Societies a free hand to propagate Christianity in the South. The Missionary Societies objected on the grounds that the government acted in contrast to the principle of neutrality between religions, approved by the British government. They also alleged that the "reconquest" of the Sudan gave them the "right" to replant Christianity in the Sudan. A member of the British Parliament proposed that it was binding on Christian England to promote missionary activities in the Sudan. Under these pressures the Sudan government consented and gave Missionary Societies a free hand in the region south of lat. 10^o N.

With the inauguration of organized missionary operations in the southern Sudan and the adoption of the "Southern Policy" the disparity between the North and the South is bound to get worse.

As a result of these policies the southern Sudan was transformed into a combat zone against Islam, and Arabs or Northern Sudanese. Reinforced with the support of the British colonial administration, Missionary Societies enjoyed a monopoly of education in the South. They employed that platform to keep the memory of Arab slave trade alive. Though I am not turning a blind eye to such an evil practice it should be remembered that slavery and slave trade were an ancient social phenomenon widely practiced. In the Sudan, by and large, slavery was associated with tribal warfare, but under the Turco-Egyptian rule it assumed greater importance in which native Southerners, Northern Sudanese, Middle Easterners, Europeans and government agents were involved. Missionaries poisoned the minds of school children by inculcating in them false information about the Arab slave traders, and hardly anything on the role the Europeans here in the Sudan or their tragic role in the Trans-Atlantic outflow of slaves. Undoubtedly Islam was badly injured by the "myth" of the rapacious Arab traders. The same hostile spirit continued well after the colonial regime had abolished slave trade and declared the institution of slavery illegal. Indeed the image of Islam was greatly tarnished especially when it was exploited by Euro-Christian propaganda. Although the implication portrayed is unfounded, the "myth" is probably the most momentous single factor that generated the sense of bitterness, hatred, and mistrust that has daunted the North –South relationship until now.

The Northern Sudanese resented deeply the British policy of excluding them from the southern Sudan thus barring the natural, free cultural intercourse between the two regions. Although some of these tensions predated the condominium regime it did nothing to ameliorate the situation: it encouraged neither economic nor social development. When economic projects were initiated in the middle of the third decade it was too late to bridge the substantial gap that separated the South from the North. Furthermore the tendency to drifting apart was increased by the attitude of the southern elite that studied in Christian missionary schools, and who uphold Christianity and English language as their modern symbols of identity.

However, in June 1947 a conference attended by representatives from the North, the South and the government was convened in Juba, and a major change of policy was initiated: The idea of a "United Sudan" was endorsed. Henceforth the government abandoned its convential "Southern Policy" and decreed (in 1950) the teaching of Arabic in all Sudanese schools above elementary level. At the Juba conference, some Southerners argued that the Southern region needed to build up its economic and educational systems before joining hands with the North and therefore demanded the "protection inherent in a federal system". They quoted the history of slavery to show that it would take time to develop mutual respect and promote [a] genuine sense of equality". Missionary Societies opposed the idea of unity fearing that Northerners would threaten religious freedom.

When a united legislative assembly was convened in December 1948 Southerners were able to participate in the rapidly advancing steps towards independence. Yet they felt marganalized; they had 14 percent of the seats of the Legislative Assembly and that no Southerner participated in the delegations sent to Cairo in 1952 and 1953 to decide whether the country would join Egypt or become independent. The Southerners’ dissatisfaction with the inequitable distribution of senior posts by the "Sudanization Committee", dread of domination by the North, and attempts to transfer the Southern Corps to the North ended up in the mutiny of the Equatoria Corps in August 1955. In November of the same year, Southern members of parliament proclaimed that they would not approve of the decleration of independence unless the South gained federal status. In the end, they joined forces with their Northern colleagues and voted for independence on an assurance to enacting a federal status.

The Southerners’ call for regional autonomy was referred to a sub-committee (of the Constituent Assembly) which was drafting the permanent constitution. The committee declined to accept it. On June 16, 1958, the representatives of the South walked out of the Constituent Assembly in protest.

The debate over a new constitution and the role of Islam in it claimed the attention of the whole country. Most of the northern parties called for the development of an Islamic parliamentary republic based on the shari^ca. The whole project was objected to by Southerners, like a few northern parties, who demanded a secular constitution. In short, the southerners decided to boycott the consultations for the constitution if Christianity was not placed as a state religion like Islam.

It was in this period of discontent, and heightened religious tension that the army under General Ibrahim ^cAbbud assumed power on November 17, 1958. The military junta did not have a specific programme that would appease the fears of the Southerners. On the contrary, President ^cAbbud disapproved of the devolution of power to marganalized groups. He maintained that cultural homogenization was essential to Sudan’s national unity. Hence he stepped up the policy of national integration as the only tool to promote unity. He encouraged the spread of Islamic education and the promotion of Arabic to the status of a national language. The enforcement of this policy took two forms (a) stepping up the implementation of Islamization and Arabicization and (b) curtailing the work of Missionary Societies, nationalizing missionary schools, and expelling foreign missionaries from the Sudan.

These commands provoked much resistance and protest locally and abroad. The missionaries rejected the state’s claim of complete control of education, and claimed that "the (Catholic) Church has been given a special mandate and right by Christ to share in the teaching of mankind"

Reinforced with the moral and financial support of the Church, the Anya-Nya guerilla fighters (who were fighting for secession from the North) intensified their attacks on government targets.The government retorted that the Missionary Societies had exceeded the limits of their sacred mission: and "exploited religion to impart hatred, fear, and animosity in the minds of Southerners against Northerners".

Overall, the strict policy followed by the government and the firm stand of the rebels and the church and the ensuing ruthlessness, generated an incurable climate of bitterness and distrust between the North and the South. Certainly "once the junta had deviated from the peaceful historical socio-cultural pattern of spreading Islam to which the Sudan had been accustomed, the clash of cultures became violent and uncompromising. The course of peaceful Islamization involved free interaction of cultures, persuasion and consent. The inexperienced military government bolted itself into an armed conflict with a very experienced and strong foe: the Church. The conflict was henceforth shifted from Khartoum to the South and soon it acquired an international dimension. Consequently the southern Sudanese issue won the support of both the Church and the West.

The October 21^st (1964) Revolution was welcomed by all sectors of the Sudanese society. At the Round Table Conference (March 1965) attended by representatives of all the Sudanese parties, the Southern Sudan issue was discussed. The conference was an important face-to face meeting, in which Northerners and Southerners met as equals. Though the conferees were too divided to reach a comprehensive accord, some tentative solution was reached to eliminate the misgivings of the south in a united Sudan.

Two years later the political stage witnessed a vigorous drive for an Islamic constitution advocated by the Northern parties except the communists, who like the Southern political parties called for complete separation between state and religion….i.e. Islam. The unmistakable rejection of an Islamic constitution has prevailed to the present day as a pivotal factor in the Southerners’ strategy for resolving the North-South conflict. Indeed there is no sign of moderating their claim.

In the midst of this political wrangling the army staged its second coup d’etat in May 1969. On June 9, 1969 General Ja^cfar Muhammad Numayri declared his government policy towards the South. The declaration acknowledged the existence of the southern issue; historical and cultural difference between the two regions; the right of the Southerns to cultivate their own culture and customs; and to develop regional autonomy within a united Sudan. This declaration initiated the prospect of "a shift from the government assimilationist approach towards a more inclusive formula of national identity". The declaration paved the way for the successful conclusion of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972. Besides ending the civil war, the accord resulted in the enactment of the Regional self-Government Act for the Southern Provinces. The South became a self-governing one region, with a regional assembly and one executive council. It was also represented at the National Assembly. Hence a de facto federal system was created.

The Addis Ababa Accord was certainly a courageous agreement. It reflected that both Northerners and Southerners were at times willing and can reach a solution. Indeed it induced a favourable climate which lasted for a decade. During that period both Christianity and Islam gained new grounds in the southern region.

The political fabric of the Addis Ababa accord was eroded by a number of factors and henceforth the North-South relations took a turn to the worse. The President failed to sustain the autonomy of the South when he divided it into three provinces as it was the case before, and also in issues pertaining to economic development. The Accord was undermined further by the growing power of the Islamists, especially the Islamic Charter Front (ICF) who were campaigning vigorously for the Islamization of state and society.

In September, 1983, Numayri declared the enactment of the shari^ca (or September) laws. Numayri’s proclamation provoked widespread opposition among the southerners and Church leaders. They reciprocated violently: the southern military forces mutinied at Pibor and Bor on May 19, 1983, thus sparking off the second civil war or Anya-Nya II. Some radical elements in the military and political organizations constituted the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement [SPLM] and its military arm the Sudan People’s Liberation Army [SPLA]. They were led by Colonel Dr. John Grang de Mabior.

With the exception of its basic concept of a United Socialist Sudan, the objectives of the SPLM and the manner of their implementation do not appear to be different from those sponsored by its fore-runners Anya-Nya I and II. The movement tended to overstate in its literature the religious and social dimensions of the conflict. From its birth it laid down its insurmountable condition not to participate in any peace efforts unless the shari^ca laws were abrogated. While these aspirations were being put to the test, the civil war continued to flare up unceasingly.

The Rajab Intifada or March-April, 1985 popular uprising forced the Sudanese army to overthrow Numayri’s government. The one year Transitional Government did not intervene in the question of the September laws and left any revision to a duly elected government. In the general elections that followed the much reinforced ICF (renamed the National Islamic Front-NIF) came third after the two main parties the Umma and the Democratic Unionist Party-DUP.

However it proved very difficult to abrogate Numayri’s Islamic Laws. Indeed, regardless of the application of the September law, the shari^ca constitutes a fundamental principle in the religious belief of the majority of the Sudanese Muslims, and so were the majority of the northern politicians. They became perhaps fearful of annulling Numayri’s September laws. And though other factors are equally applicable to the problem under discussion I tend to agree with Dr. Francis Deng’s view: that some how "religion has become [to the southerners] symbol of identity, of power sharing … [and] of the culture that gives us our sense of who were and to whom we relate to in the world….."

In the heated contest and the intense fighting that followed Numayri’s application of the shari^ca laws, the prospects of a settlement faded out, and hence Sudan’s national unity was severely shaken up. Furthermore, this conflict the aggression was increasingly being taken over by extremists, basically the SPLM and the NIF. The attitude the of other Sudanese parties, to this matter, varied widely.

The political agenda of the SPLM and its military organ were elucidated in the movement’s manifesto. While equating certain northern provinces with the three southern provinces, because they were all underdeveloped and politically marginalized, the mainfesto calls for the establishment of a united socialist Sudan. It also advocated total separation of state, mosque and church, and hence all religions would have complete freedom. The secular and radical attitude of the SPLM explains the supportive response of the Sudanese left to it. However with the exception of the SPLM’s central concept of a united socialist Sudan, the agenda of the SPLM and the manner of their implementation do not appear to be different from those of its fore-runners, Anya-Nya I and II. The movement tended to overemphasize in its abundant literature the religious and the ethnic dimensions of the conflict. There it depicted itself as a Christian movement that is challenging the Islamic onslaught approaching from the North, and through its newly established Sudanese Council of Churches it gained the support of other Christian organizations and thus won their positive assistance for regions which it had snatched from the government. Indeed from its first beginning it laid down the insurmountable condition of not participating in any peace efforts unless the shari^ca laws were cancelled.

What John Garang de Mabior is aiming to achieve is equated with Anthony D. Smith’s "territorial model" or a territorial nation-state. Such an objective requires restructuring of the political system which is built on a pluralist type. Hence the status of a Sudanese citizen should be determined by birth and residence and not by religion, language or culture. Such an approach, it was argued, would redress the balance of power in favour of marginalized people. The pluralist approach was successfully implemented after the Addis Ababa Accord in 1972. When Numayri unilaterally repealed that agreement, the SPLM advocated the creation of a "New Sudan" which would have a mixture of languages and cultures. This programme was supported by leftist politicians in the North notably at the Koka Dam agreement of 1986 and in the SPLM agreement with the DUP (the second largest party after the Umma party). It was also ratified, after the 1989 NIF coup d’etat, by the opposition parties (Umma, DUP, and leftists), National Democratic Alliance (NDA). In 1995 the NDA and the SPLM agreed at Asmara that citizenship is for all Sudanese and that Sudan’s political system must be constituted on democracy and a multiplicity of religions.

The second extremists party is the NIF, an Islamic revivalist movement that had by the end of Numayri’s regime developed into a well organized formidable organization with considerable influence and financial resources. Its immediate objective, was the preservation of the September laws. The NIF’s views on the question of the South were implicitly stated in its "Sudan Charter". While maintaining that Muslims are a majority in the Sudan, the charter confirms that "they do not espouse secularism neither do they accept it politically." Hence they have a staturory right to pursue the commandments of their religion fully. The charter also advocates the right of non-Muslims to pursue their beliefs without reservations.

The Charter affirms that the shari^ca is the main source of law. It, states that disputed matters would be discussed at a constitutional conference, a mechanism suggested also by other North Sudanese parties and the SPLM. In short, the NIF asserts that the application of the shari^ca law constitutes an unnegotiable principle of the Islamic doctrine. In fact it did not budge an inch from that commitment. Since the NIF often appears as the most vocal defender of Islamic ideals, its programme like that of the SPLM, constituted an important development in the religious dimension of the North-South discord. Certainly the disparity between the Islamic ideals of the NIF, the aspirations of the SPLM and the political realities of the present time constitute a serious challenge to the Sudanese nation- state.

To accomplish its Islamic agenda the NIF staged the June 30, 1989 coup d’etat. It was conceived by the NIF and effected by its adherents in the armed forces. Under the leadership of General ^cUmar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir, the new government initiated a series of contacts with a view of reaching a settlement with the SPLM. Unfortunately both sides tended to reaffirm their declard stands. The IGAAD (Inter-Governmental Authority for Draught and Desertification) mediators raised some controversial issues but no significant progress was attained.

During these contacts the civil war persisted unceasingly. There, the NIF government stepped up its war effort which took the form of jihad. It also endeavoured to propagate Islam in the Southern region. Both operations were widely criticized by Southerners.

At the beginning of the North-South encounter the northern Sudanese parties (except for the communists) were more or less in agreement in their attitude to the Southern issue. Gradually they drifted apart on that question as well as on basic political issues regarding the type of government that was to gain the approval of the country. The NDA main objective was to overthrow the NIF government and institute a democratic system, consequently it adopted a common policy towards the South. This is attested by the Chukodom agreement between the Umma Party and the SPLM/SPLA on December 12, 1994; and the Asmara Declaration which incorporated the resolutions of the NDA conference (June 1995). Both agreements were virtually based on the IGADD Declaration of Principles which were approved by the SPLM, and rejected in some parts by the government.

In the Chukodam agreement both the Umma Party and the SPLM recognized the right of self determination as a basic people’s right. The last phrase was objected to by the Sudan government to the IGADD peace talks. The two suggested alternatives for the self determination referendum were (a) unity (federal or confedral?) or (b) complete secession. Both accepted the constitutional arrangement for the suggested interim period of two-four years. The Declaration of Asmara mapped out a detailed political programme and was endorsed by approximately all opposition parties.

Meanwhile the government continued to pursue peace talks with other groups of Southerners. These efforts were punctuated by a series of minor agreements. Sudan Peace Agreement between the Sudan government and South-Sudan United Democratic Salvation Front- which embraces five groups. The Sudan Peace Agreement covered a wide range of items like religion and state, fundamental rights and freedoms, power – sharing, and referendum.

Although the government of the NIF Party has in this agreement maintained its basic principle of non-separation of state and religion, it tried to modify the state of affairs by affirming that the bases of citizenship are bases of rights and duties and that all Sudanese shall equally share in all aspects of life and political responsibility.The citizenship approach was also championed by other parties including the SPLM. The NIF envisaged that the adopted frame of reference of the Sudan Peace Agreement, if successful, might persuade others to sign up. So far, no apparent support is forthcoming. As a matter of fact the political stand of the SPLM has stiffened and has assumed a more militant and unyielding line in the South. Furthermore John Garang de Mebiojr in his attempt to liberate the Sudan from the minority clique regimes", transferred the war across the traditional frontier.

However since the former declarations and agreements fell short of commanding the consensus of the Sudanese people, and that some of them were diametrically opposed to each other, a fresh look is needed. Certainly, the need is greater so long as the unity of the Sudan is still the only alternative. Is there a latitude for such a step? Are the warring parties prepared to make the necessary conciliatory concessions?

The foregoing historical survey shows that the shared interaction of the two regions was not positive enough to generate a common historical experience and unity of mutual feelings. It is true that on occasions, such a common feeling has emerged, as it was the case during the deliberations of the Juba Conference in 1947, the decision to vote for independence in 1955 or the Addis Ababa Accord. Some Southerners argue that the southern issue is not solely due to underdevelopment, but that social discrimination is also an important factor. Such grievences can only be dispelled through time and good will, and in a system where democracy and transperancy prevail. Unfortunately the military dictatorships have committed a grave crime by curtailing the development of democratic institutions where national issues could have been discussed freely.

What is needed is a more pragmatic look into the whole issue from both sides. The proposed constitutional conference, the formation of which all contending parties have agreed to, may be the last chance for reaching a just and lasting peace in a united Sudan. One hopes that during the democratic interim period, the constitution conference would create the possibility of unity in a just Sudan and thereby reduces the escalating demand for secession. Yet the southern Sudanese people should have a free option and that unity is not to be forced on them.